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THE LAWS OF MANU WITH THE BHĀṢYA OF MĒDHĀTITHI

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Section XI.

THE 'JĀTAKARMA' SACRAMENT

VERSE XXIX

FOR THE MALE CHILD, BEFORE THE CUTTING OF THE UMBILICAL CORD THE PERFORMANCE OF THE JĀTA-KARMA (BIRTH-RITE) HAS BEEN ORDAINED: (IT CONSISTS OF) THE FEEDING OF HIM WITH GOLD, HONEY AND BUTTER, TO THE ACCOMPANIMENT OF MANTRAS.—(29).

Bhāṣya

'*Vardhana*' is *cutting*.

'*Jātakarma*' is the name of the particular rite. The exact form of this rite is to be learnt from the *Gṛhya-sūtras*.

In answer to the question as to which is the act to which the name 'Jāta-karma' is applied, the author adds—'*the feeding with gold, honey and butter.*' '*Of him*' refers to the child; or, it may refer to the rite; the sense being that '*of this*' rite of Jāta-karma, the principal part consists in the feeding of the child *to the accompaniment of mantras.*

'*To the accompaniment of mantras*',—*i.e.*, the act should be done along with the reciting of mantras. Though the present text does not specify the mantras, yet, since all *Smṛtis* have the same end in view, we must accept those same mantras that are prescribed in other *Smṛtis*. Hence it follows that the mantras that should be recited are those that have been mentioned in the *Gṛhya-sūtras*.

"If it is necessary to call in the aid of the *Gṛhya-sūtras*, the substances (Gold, Honey and Butter) also need not have been mentioned here; as in the *Gṛhya-sūtra* we find the following words (in Apastamba's *Gṛhya-sūtra*, 1.15.1).—'The child should be made to eat butter, honey and the essence of gold with a golden ladle, with the mantra, *Prati dadāmi madhuno ghṛtasya* etc.' Further, there are many *Gṛhya-sūtras*; the mantras also that [illegible]

Gṛhyasūtras are different ; the very procedure of the rite is variously prescribed ; so that (if we were to seek for information from the *Gṛhyas*) we would fail to know which one of these we should adopt. It might be argued that the name of the particular Vedic Rescension (which the performer has studied and with which a particular *Gṛhyasūtra* is connected) would help to determine the exact procedure to be adopted. But in that case, there can be no use in Manu laying down the 'Birth-rite' and the other sacraments ; as these also could be learnt from the *Gṛhyasūtras* themselves. Every *Gṛhyasūtra* is named after a particular Vedic Rescension,—*e.g.*, '*Gṛhya* of the *Kaṭhas*,' '*Gṛyya* of the *Āshvalāyanas*' and so forth ; so that a man would naturally adopt that procedure which is laid down in the *Gṛhya* that is named after the Rescension to which he belongs."

To the above our answer is as follows :—The fact that the substances (Honey, etc.) mentioned in the text are just those prescribed in the Gṛhyas in connection with the '*Jātakarma*,' shows that the rites mentioned (here and in the *Gṛhya*) are the same. This is what leads us to the recognition that—'the rite ordained here having the same name and the same substances as those found in the *Gṛhyas*, this must be the same as that.' In several cases we recognise a thing through its qualities. And when the rites are one and the same, if a certain detail is not mentioned in one text, it has to be brought in from the other text, specially when there is no inconsistency between the two. It has been decided that the act (of *Agnihotra*) prescribed in the several rescensional Vedic texts is one and the same ; and the analogy of this leads us to conclude that the act (of the sacrament) as prescribed in the several *Smṛtis* (of Manu and of the *Gṛhyasūtras*) must be one and the same. As regards the uncertainty that has been urged by the objector as to the exact procedure to be adopted, in face of there being many *Gṛhyas* laying down diverse procedures,—our answer to that is that all the *Gṛhyas* being equally authoritative, what one has got to do [illegible] to the end, he may adopt any one of them optionally, while if the details varying relate to different purposes, he should employ them all. The name of the Vedic Rescension can never form the determining factor. Because the name of the Vedic text in relation to a particular individual is not such an invariable factor as his '*gotra* and *pravara*' are; for a man is called after that Vedic Rescension which he happens to study: if he has studied the '*Kāṭhaka*' rescension he is called '*Kāṭhāka*,' and if he has studied the Ṛgveda, he is called '*Bahvṛcha*'; and in regard to studying there is no such hard and fast rule as that 'such and such a man should study only such and such a rescensional text.' Then again, a man very often studies several Vedic texts, as is ordained (by Manu, in 3.2)—'Having studied the *Vedas* &c. &c.'; and one has studied all the three Vedas comes to be known by all such names—as '*Kauthuma*' (Sāmavedin) '*Kāṭhāka*' (Yajurvedin) and *Bahvṛcha*'(Ṛgvedin); and in this case one must have recourse to option. For the man however who studies a single Vedic text, it is only right that he should adopt the procedure prescribed in the *Gṛhya* that is named after that Vedic text; in fact, he *can* follow only that procedure; as he has studied only the mantras occurring in that particular text; and these alone he can recite (properly). In fact the only knowledge that he possesses of the Rite is what is derived from that particular text.

"As for the man's knowing the *mantras*, since the Veda is studied only for the performance of the rites, the man would read up just those mantras (also of the other texts) that might be used in a certain performance."

Our answer to this is that the study of the Veda is undertaken in virtue of the Injunction of 'Vedic study;' and until one has studied the Veda, he is not entitled to perform any religious act; it is not (as the objector thinks) that the Veda is studied only for the performing of the acts. In fact, the name that has been applied to the various *Gṛhyas*—as 'this is the Gṛhya of the Kaṭhas,' 'this is the *Gṛhya* of the *Vājasaneyins*' and so forth—is simply for the purpose of indicating what particular mantras have to be employed by certain persons; and when the majority of mantras prescribed in a certain *Gṛhya* happen to be those that have been read in a particular Vedic text, that *Gṛhya* comes to be named after that text. Further, when *Gṛhya Smṛti* is a trustworthy source of knowledge, even though it may be named after the '*Kaṭhas*,' it cannot fail to make its purport known to the Ṛgvedins also; and what forms the purport of the Vedas and the *Smṛtis* is that 'such and such an act should be done.' So that when one has come to know that 'this should be done,' there can be nothing to limit the performance of that act to any particular class of persons, unless there is a Vedic text specifying any particular performer;—as for instance, when the performance of the *Tanūnapāt Prayāja* is restricted to the 'Vashiṣṭha' clan,—or a distinct prohibition sets aside the said 'performability.' Neither of these two circumstances is present in the case in question. Nor can it presumed that the *Ṛgveda* is not an authority for the *Kaṭhas, or vice vèrsa.* Because until a particular Vedic text has been actually studied, there is no difference between the '*Kaṭha*' and the '*Non-Kaṭha.*' As regards the '*Gotra*' (the Clan-name), this is fixed for each man (being determined by his birth). So that the '*Gṛhya*' of a man does not stand on the same footing as his '*Gotra.*'

This [that the *Gṛhya* of the man is that connected with the Vedic text that he has studied] is what is meant by the assertion—'He who renounces his *own Gṛhyasūtra* and acts according to another *Gṛhyasūtra* &c.' In fact the man can carry into practice the precepts of that text only which he has studied. Consequently if one were to give up the rules of his own Vedic text to perform a rite in accordance with the Vedic text studied by his forefathers, and adopt the procedure laid down in the *Gṛhyas* belonging to this latter, he would incur the sin of 'renouncing his own Vedic text'; or in this case the sin of 'renouncing the text' will have been committed by the father who did not teach the boy that particular text which had been continually studied in his family; and no blame attaches, in this, to the boy himself. In a case where the boy has lost his father and betakes himself to the teacher, as Jābāla is described as having done, it would be right for the Teacher to teach him that Text which had been studied in the boy's family,—in accordance with the law 'one should proceed by the path by which his father and grandfather have proceeded' (*Manu*, 4.178); 'and the renouncing of the hereditary Vedic text' would be justifiable only in the event of its study being absolutely impossible.

From all this we deduce the following conclusion:—All the sacraments—'*Jātakarma*' and the rest—have been prescribed in all the Smṛtis; and where they lay down different details pertaining to diverse purposes, they should all be employed; but when any such details pertain to the same end and are mutually inconsistent, then there should be an option as to the particular detail to be employed.

'*Of the male child*'—is added with a view to exclude the female and the sexless child.

Others however have held that there is no special significance attaching to the masculine gender of the word; because the context refers to all 'twice-born' persons in general as to undergo the sacramental rites. That which is meant to be 'consecrated' forms the principal factor; and it has been decided that no significance attaches to any such qualifications gender, number and the like, when applied to the principal factor; *e.g.*, even though the washing of the cups is laid down in the words—'one should wash the *cup*' (in the singular),—yet *all* the cups are washed. Similarly when it is laid down, that 'the *man* who is feverish, or just free from fever, should be fed at the close of the day,'—the feverish *woman* also is fed at that same time; and it is because the present verse affords the idea of the sacrament being performed for females also that the Author has added the interdict (in 2.66) that 'the whole of this is to be done for women without Mantras' [otherwise, if the present verse itself had excluded the women, there would be no point in this further interdict]. Then again, marriage (which is also a sacrament) is actually spoken of (in 9. 203) in connection with Eunuchs.

Our answer to the above is as follows:—The word 'male' does not denote the 'human' genus in general, in the way that the word 'man' does; and it is only if it did have that denotation that there might be some ground for not attaching any significance to the gender expressed by the particular case-ending. What the word 'male' denotes in all cases is a particular gender in the form of *masculinity*, as pertaining to all things, moving and unmoving, corporeal and incorporeal. In the present case the gender is denoted by the basic noun ('*pumān*' in '*puruṣaḥ*') itself; and it is only in connection with what is denoted by the case-ending, that the question of significance or non-significance can arise; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the denotation of *number* (or gender) is not the only function of the case-ending,—it may have its use simply in the denoting of any one of several such factors as the 'accusative character' and so forth [so that if no significance is attached to any one of these several factors, it does not matter]. In the present case however (where the gender is denoted by the basic noun itself), if no significance were attached to the gender, then the word '*pumān*' would become absolutely meaningless. As in the very instance cited above, full significance is actually attached to the denotation of the basic noun '*Cup*'; and this is done simply because the sentence would, otherwise, become absolutely meaningless.

The following argument might be urged—"It is not only what is signified by the case-ending that may be non-significant; as a matter of fact, the denotation of the entire word, if it qualifies the subject, is regarded as non-significant. For instance, in the case of the text which lays down an expiatory rite in the case of one for whom '*both offering materials* have been spoilt,'—though we have the word 'both,' yet the expiatory rite is performed even on the spoiling of even one of the two materials, milk and curd; and no significance is attached to the denotation of the entire word '*both*' (which qualifies the subject.)"

To this objection some people offer the following answer:—The present case is not analogous to the case just cited. In the latter, the '*Pañchasharāva* rite' (which is the expiatory rite referred to) is not done for the sake of the offering-material; all that is meant is that the spoiling of the materials provides the occasion for the performance of the rite;—while in the case in question, the sacraments are done for the sake of the Boy.

This difference (between the two cases) however is of no consequence at all. Because as a matter of fact, it is only with a view to avoid a syntactical split that significance is not attached to qualifications; and even though the Rite were for the sake of the material, that would not prevent the said syntactical split.

Hence the real answer to the objection is as follows:—The passage beginning with '*vaidikaiḥ karmabhiḥ*, etc.,' (Verse 26) is what constitutes the original injunction of the '*Jātakarma*' sacrament; and throughout this passage it is the *male* that is indicated as the person to be 'consecrated.' So that if no significance were attached to this *male-character*, the whole passage would become meaningless. It is this same consideration which leads us (in the case of the passage cited by the objection) to attach due significance to the denotation of the word 'offering-material' (even though none is attached to its qualification 'both').

"Well, then the sacraments would be performed for the *Shūdra* also; as the passage does not specify any particular caste."

Certainly there is no possibility of the sacraments for *Shūdras*, because sacraments are performed to the accompaniment of *Mantras*. Or, we may take the term 'of the twice-born persons,' occurring in a supplementary passage, as providing the necessary restriction. Nor does the term 'of the twice-born persons' in the said passage pertain (as a qualification) only to what is therein enjoined; so that it cannot be urged that, "in as much as the necessity of their consecration has been mentioned in that passage, no significance can attach to the term 'male' in the present passage; just as none is attached to the term 'both' in the passage referred to above."

As for the fact of a later text (Verse 66) speaking of the Rites for females being 'without mantras,' this could be taken as an independent injunction; without necessarily depending upon the fact of the 'sacrament *with mantras*' being possible for women also (under the present verse; of which the later verse has been regarded as an exception, by the objector above).

As for the 'marriage of sexless persons';—'sexless' persons are of various kinds—*e.g.*, (*a*) those whose semen is 'airy,' (Impotent), (*b*) those who have the signs of both sexes (Hermaphrodite), and (*c*) those whose organs are inactive. All these people cannot be excluded from all the 'sacraments'; because, in the first place their *impotence*, etc., cannot be detected at the time (during infancy) when the '*Jātakarma*' and the other (earlier) sacraments are performed; and secondly (even when detected) the said impotence, etc., may be such as might be cured, and certainly a characteristic that is not of a permanent character can never serve as a disqualification. For instance, *absence of wealth*; this is not a permanent characteristic, like the *caste* of a person; for the man who has no wealth comes to acquire wealth; having remained poor for a long time, a man becomes very rich in a single day. It is on the killing of such a (confirmed and permanent) eunuch that one becomes purified (of the sin) by the giving of a load of dry grass; and the reason for this lies in the fact that he has had no 'sacraments,' he has not been 'initiated,' and his life is of no use to any person.

From all this it follows that the present text prescribes the sacraments for *males* only,—the later Verse (66) prescribes them for *females* as to be done 'without mantras,'—and for *eunuchs* there are no sacraments at all.—(29)

IX.—The 'Naming Ceremony'

VERSE XXX

ONE SHOULD HAVE HIS 'NAMING' (NĀMADHĒYA) DONE ON THE TENTH OR THE TWELFTH (DAY), ON AN AUSPICIOUS LUNAR DATE AND AT AN AUSPICIOUS MOMENT, AND UNDER A PROPITIOUS LUNAR ASTERISM.—(30)

Bhāṣya.

One should perform the 'naming,' '*Nāmadhēya*,' of the child on the tenth or the twelfth day.

No significance is meant to be attached to the sense of the causative affix in '*Kārayēt*,' 'should *have it done*.' For the *Gṛhyasūtra* simply says—'On the tenth day the father should take up the child and *perform* his naming' (without the causal form).

The term '*Nāmadhēya*' means simply '*nāma*,' 'name'; and it is that word by which a person is called during life.

In as much as the section has started with the mention of the '*Jātakarma*,' as to be done 'before the cutting of the umbilical cord,' it follows that the '*tenth*' and '*twelfth*' (of the Text) refer to the day as counted from the day of birth; and they do not refer to the *lunar dates*.

On this point some people have held that the mention of the 'tenth day' is only meant to indicate the 'passing of the days of impurity'; the past-participle epithet '*atītāyām*,' 'having passed,' being understood. So that the meaning is that, 'for the *Brāhmaṇa* the Naming should be done after the lapse of the tenth day, for the *Ksattriya* after the lapse of the twelfth day, and for the *Vaishya* after the lapse of the fifteenth day.'

This explanation, however, is not right. For there being no ground for taking the words in the indirect figurative sense suggested, the ceremony could very well be performed during the period of impurity, just like the 'Birth-rite.' If the feeding of the Brāhmaṇas were enjoined (as a necessary accompaniment of the Rite), then there might be some justification for the suggested figurative interpretation.

If the 'tenth' or the 'twelfth' day happen to fulfil the conditions mentioned in the second line of the verse, then the ceremony should be done on those days. Otherwise it should be performed on some other *auspicious lunar date*.

The 'auspicious lunar dates' are the *second*, the *fifth* (day of the lunar month), and so forth.

'*Puṇya*,' '*auspicious*,' means *commended*. The *ninth*, *fourteenth* and such other days (of the lunar month),—which are commonly called '*Riktā*,'—are 'not commended,' 'inauspicious.'

'*Muhūrta*,' '*moment*,' stands for what is called '*lagna*' (the point of time indicated by the 'contact with the Horizon,' *i.e.*, the 'rising,' of a particular Zodiacal Sign), Aquarius, and the rest. 'At a moment that is *auspicious*,'—*i.e.*, which is not possessed by any evil planet, which is looked upon by Jupiter and Venus. Such 'auspiciousness' of the moment can be ascertained with the help of the science of Astrology.

'*Under a propitious lunar asterism*,'—the '*lunar asterisms*' are those beginning with *Shraviṣṭhā*; and that day on which these happen to be 'propitious.' The 'propitiousness' of the Lunar Asterism consists in its being free from the contact of 'malignant' and 'evil' planets, as also from the condition of '*Vyatīpāta*' (a malignant aspect of the Sun and the Moon).

The particle '*Vā*' in the Text has a collective sense (meaning 'and'); hence the meaning is that 'the ceremony should be performed on an auspicious day, *and* at an auspicious moment, *and* under a faultless lunar asterism.' The due combination of all these conditions can be ascertained with the help of the Science of Astrology.

The final upshot of the whole comes to this:—The ceremony should never be performed before the tenth or twelfth day,—and after these days it may be performed only at the auspicious moment on that day which is found to be under a propitious lunar asterism.'—(30)

VERSE XXXI

THE NAME OF THE BRĀHMAṆA SHOULD BE AUSPICIOUS, THAT OF THE KṢATTRIYA CONNECTED WITH POWER, THAT OF THE VAISHYA ASSOCIATED WITH WEALTH; WHILE THAT OF THE SHUDRA CONTEMPTIBLE.—(31)

Bhāṣya.

The Author now proceeds to determine the form of the name to be given to the child.

'*Maṅgalyam*,' '*auspicious*,' means '*maṅgalāya hitam*,' or '*maṅgalāya sādhu*,' 'conducive to welfare.' The 'welfare' meant here is that which consists in the fulfilment of something desirable, in the shape of longevity, wealth and such other things as lead to physical and mental pleasure. And a term can be said to be 'conducive,'—'*hita*' or '*sādhu*,'—to this welfare, only when it connotes it; and it is in this sense that we have the Nominal Affix ('*yat*,' in '*maṅgalyam*'). Further, by being 'conducive' it is not meant that it should always express the actual fulfilment of a desirable thing; but that it may also express the desirable thing itself.

This connotation of the desirable thing may be either (*a*) by means of compounds, such as '*āyuḥsiddhi*' (accomplishment of longevity), '*dhanasiddhi*' (acquisition of wealth), '*putralābha*' (obtaining of a son), and so forth,—or (*b*) by a nominal affix connoting 'conduciveness' 'effectiveness,' or 'purpose.' But the *Gṛhyasūtra* has prohibited the use of a name ending in a Nominal affix—'One should fix a name ending with a Verbal, not one with a nominal affix'—says Pāraskara. And as for compounds also, there is a combination of the denotations of two words; so that there is a chance of the name consisting of many letters; the text is going to lay down certain appendages to the actual names, such as 'the name of Brāhmaṇa should end in *Sharman*, and so forth' (Manu, 2.32); so that if the name consists of three or four letters, along with the appendage '*sharman*,' it would come to consist of five or six letters; and this would go against the rule that 'the name should consist of two or four letters.' (Baudhāyana and Āpastamba). From all this it follows that such words should be employed as names as are connotative of things that are desired by most people,—*e.g.*, son, cattle, landed property, daughter, wealth and so forth; and these should end with the term '*sharman*.' Thus it is that such names become possible as '*Go-sharman*.' '*Dhana-sharman*,' '*Hiraṇya-sharman*,' '*Kalyāṇa-sharman*,' '*Maṅgala-sharman*,' and so on.

Or, the term '*maṅgala*' may be taken as standing for '*Dharma*,' '*Merit*'; and '*maṅgalya*' in that case would mean *that which is conducive to merit* (meritorious).

"What is it that is *conducive to merit?*"

All those words that constitute the names of Deities; *e.g.*, '*Indra*,' '*Agni*,' '*Vāyu*'; also the names of sages—*e.g.*, '*Vasiṣṭha*,' '*Vishvāmitra*,' '*Mēdhātithi*'; these latter also are 'conducive to merit'; as is clearly indicated by such directions as—(*a*) 'one should make offerings to the sages,' (*b*) 'one should meditate upon the men of pious deeds,' 'one who desires prosperity should, on rising in the morning, repeat the names of Deities, sages and of the Brāhmaṇas of pious deeds.'

The epithet '*mangalya*,' '*auspicious*' (meritorious) serves to preclude all 'inauspicious' names, such as '*Yama*,' '*Mṛtyu*' and the like; and also those that are meaningless—such as '*Ḍittha*' and the like.

'*That of the Kṣattriya connected with power*,'—*i.e.*, *expressive of power*. The '*anvaya*' (expressed by '*anvita*' in the compound '*balānvita*') means *connection*; and the only connection that a word can have with a thing is the relation of being connotative of it.—'*Power*' is *strength*; and the word that connotes this should be used as the name for the *Kṣattriya*, *e.g.*, '*Shatruntapa*,' '*Duryodhana*,' '*Prajāpāla*.'

The several kinds of names have been mentioned (in the text), as indicative of the several castes.

Similarly, '*that of the Vaishya associated with wealth.*' It is not meant that only synonyms of '*dhana*' should be used,—such as '*Dhana,*' '*Vitta,*' '*Svāpatēya,*'—but that any word that may be in any way connotative of wealth should be used. Or, what is meant is that either such words as '*dhana*' ('wealth') and the like should be used, or such as signify connection with wealth; such as '*Dhanakarman,*' '*Mahādhana,*' '*Gomān,*' '*Dhānyag aha.*'

Throughout this verse, such is the meaning—of the term 'connected with power' and 'associated with wealth.' If this were not what is meant, the text would have said simply 'the *names of power* should be used.' And in that case, since the words actually denotative of *power* would be very few in number, while the number of individuals to be named would be endless,—all usage (based on names) would come to an end.

'*That of the Shūdra contemptible,*'—such as '*Kṛpaṇaka,*' '*Dīna,*' '*Shavaraka,*' and so forth.—(31)

VERSE XXXII

THE NAME OF THE BRĀHMAṆA SHOULD BE EXPRESSIVE OF 'PEACE,' THAT OF THE KṢATTRIYA, OF 'PROTECTION'; THAT OF THE VAISHYA, OF 'PROSPERITY,' AND THAT OF THE SHUDRA, OF 'SUBMISSIVENESS.'—(32)

Bhāṣya.

[What appears to be the meaning is that] the actual term ('*sharman,*' etc.) should form part of the name,—and that the two terms (mentioned in the preceding and the present verse) should appear in the order stated, the 'auspicious' term coming at the beginning and the term '*sharman*' at the end (of the name),—as illustrated above ('*Go-sharman,*' '*Dhana-sharman*' and so forth).

But this would not be possible in regard to the names of the *Kṣattriya* and the rest; because the term '*rakṣā*' ('security,' which is mentioned in connection with the *Kṣattriya*) is of the feminine gender, and as such could not be co-ordinated with the names of males. Hence in view of conformity, and in view also of actual practice, and also in view of the two verses being syntactically distinct, we should take them as complementary to each other; the sense being that the 'auspicious name' (mentioned in the preceding verse) should be 'expressive of *sharman*, Peace'—this term standing for *refuge, shelter, happiness.* It is only if we take the term '*sharman*' of the text as standing for what is developed by it, that we have the possibility of names ending in '*svāmī*,' '*datta*,' '*bhūti*,' and the rest; the name '*Indrasvāmī*' meaning 'he who has Indra for his shelter'; '*Indra-datta*' also signifies the fact of Indra being the *shelter*.

Similarly with all the rest (the names of the *Kṣattriya*, etc.)

"What does this argument mean—that, in view of the two verses being syntactically distinct, we should take them as complementary to each other? For the same reason, why are not the two sentences 'one should sacrifice with *Vrīhi*' and 'one should sacrifice with *Yava*' taken as complementary (and not as optional alternatives, as they have been taken)?"

What we have said is only what is indicated (by the words of the Text). The Text being the work of a human writer, if he had intended the statements to be optional alternatives, he should, for the sake of brevity, have said 'the name should be *either auspicious or expressive of peace*'; when we have two distinct syntactical constructions, there are two verbs, and this becomes too prolix (and the prolixity cannot be justified except by taking the two as complementary). [All this reasoning, based upon *intention* and *propriety of speech*, cannot apply to the case of Vedic sentences, where there is no author.]

'*Rakṣā*,' is 'protection,' 'preservation.'

'*Puṣṭi*' is 'prosperity' as well as 'security.' Such names as '*Govṛddha*,' '*Dhanagupta*.'

'*Prēṣya*' is 'submissive'; such names as '*Brāhmaṇa-dāsa*,' and '*Dēvadāsa*,' which means (respectively) 'submissive to,

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dependent upon, the Brāhmaṇa' and 'submissive to and dependent upon a deity.'—(32)

VERSE XXXIII

THAT OF WOMEN SHOULD BE EASILY PRONOUNCIBLE, NOT HARSH, OF PLAIN MEANING, HEART-CAPTIVATING AND AUSPICIOUS; IT SHOULD END IN A LONG VOWEL AND CONTAIN A BENEDICTORY TERM.—(33)

Bhāṣya.

Inasmuch as significance has been attached to the mention of the 'male' child (in verse 29), what has been said in the preceding verses is not applicable to women; and the present verse is going to lay down rules regarding the names of women.

'*Easily pronouncible*';—that which can be easily pronounced; the name of women should be such as can be uttered, with ease, even by women and children. It is mostly women and children that have got to deal with women; and the woman's organ of speech being not very efficient, she cannot pronounce each and every Sanskrit word; hence the Text lays stress upon this pronouncibility in the case of feminine names. This however does not mean that the masculine names may be unpronouncible. As examples of 'pronouncible' names we have, '*Maṅgala-dēvī*,' '*Chārudati*,' '*Suvadanā*,' etc., and as counter-examples (*i.e.*, of *unpronouncible* names), '*Sharmiṣṭhā*,' '*Sushliṣṭāṅgī*,' and the like.

'*Not harsh*,'—*i.e.*, not denoting any thing harsh; names denoting harsh things are such as '*Ḍākinī*' '(Sorceress), '*Paruṣā*' (Rough) and so forth.

'*Of plain meaning*,'—whose meaning does not need to be explained before it is comprehended; which, as soon as it is heard, conveys its meaning to the learned and the unlearned alike. As examples of names with meanings not plain, we have, (*a*) '*Kāmanidhā*' and (*b*) '*Kāriṣagandhī*'; the meaning of these terms is not comprehended until the following explanations have been provided :—(*a*) 'who is, as if it were, the very receptacle of love, she in whom all love is contained,' and (*b*) '*Kārīṣagandhī*' is the 'daughter of Kariṣagandhi.'

'*Heart-captivating*,'—that which pleases the mind; *e.g.*, '*Shrēyasī*'; while of the contrary kind we have the name '*Kālākṣī*.'

'*Auspicious*,'—such as '*Sharmavatī*'; of the contrary kind is the name '*Abhāgā*,' '*Mandabhāgā*.'

'*Ending in a long vowel*,'—that which has a long vowel at the end. Contrary to this is the name '*Sharat*.'

'*Āshīrvāda*' is *that which denotes benediction*; '*abhidhāna*' is *term*; and when the two are compounded in the *Karmadhāraya* form, we get the meaning '*benedictory term*'; and the name that contains such a term is called '*āshīrvādābhidhānavat*,' '*containing a benedictory term*.' Examples of such names—'*Saputrā*,' '*Bahuputrā*,' '*Kulavāhikā*'; these are benedictory names; of the contrary kind are such names as, '*Aprashastā*,' '*Alakṣaṇā*.'

"What is the difference between 'auspicious' and 'benedictory'?"

None whatsoever. The second epithet has been added only for the purpose of filling up the metre.—(33)

XI. The Ceremony of 'First Egress,' Niskramana and that of 'First Feeding,' Annaprashana.

VERSE XXXIV

IN THE FOURTH MONTH SHOULD BE PERFORMED THE CEREMONY OF THE CHILD'S 'EGRESS' FROM THE ROOM; AND IN THE SIXTH MONTH THE CEREMONY OF 'FEEDING'; OR, WHATEVER MIGHT BE REGARDED AS AUSPICIOUS IN THE FAMILY.—(34)

Bhāṣya.

'*In the fourth month*'—from birth—'*should be performed the ceremony of the child's egress*'—being taken out of the room and shown the sun. This implies that for three months the child should be kept in the lying-in room itself.

The common name '*child*' is used, with a view to include the *shūdra* also.

Similarly '*in the sixth month,*' the ceremony of First Feeding on grains. For five months the child should be kept purely on milk.

'*Or, whatever might be regarded as auspicious*'—conducive to welfare—'*in the family*' of the child; such well-known rites, for instance, as making offerings to *Pūtanā*, to *Shakunika*, to certain trees, etc., etc. This may be done at specified times.

This last clause is meant to apply to all ceremonies; so that the *naming* also may be done according to family custom, even though it be not in strict conformity with the rules laid down above. Hence with different families, such names become possible as—'*Indrasvāmī,*' '*Indrasharman*' '*Indrabhūti,*' '*Indrarāta,*' '*Indraviṣṇu,*' '*Indradēva,*' '*Indrajyotiṣ,*' '*Indrayashas,*" and so forth.—(34)

XII. Tonsure.

VERSE XXXV

IN VIEW OF THE INJUNCTIONS OF THE VEDA, THE TONSURE-CEREMONY OF ALL TWICE-BORN CHILDREN SHOULD BE PERFORMED, ACCORDING TO LAW, IN THE FIRST YEAR OR THE THIRD.—(35)

Bhāṣya.

'*Chūḍā*' is 'the tuft of hair on the crown of the head'; and the ceremony for the purpose of this is called '*Chūḍākarman*,' '*Tonsure*'; this name 'Tonsure' is given to that ceremony which consists in the cutting of the hair in such a manner as to leave well-arranged tufts of hair on certain parts of the head.

This may be done '*in the first year or the third*';—this option being due to considerations of the good and evil aspects of planets.

'*In view of the injunctions of the Veda*';—this is merely explanatory; the fact of the entire contents of the work being based upon the Veda having been already stated before. Or, the term may be taken here as not necessarily standing for the injunctive texts, but including the Mantras also; and as a matter of fact, we have the *mantra*, '*yatkṣurēṇa mārjayēt, etc.*,' (*Pāraskara-gṛhyasūtra*, 2.1.1), which is indicative of the Tonsure-ceremony, in the same manner as the *Mantra* '*yān janā pratinandanti, etc.*,' (*Pāraskara,—Gṛhyasūtra*, 3.2.2) indicates the *Aṣṭakā-rites*. So that what the phrase means is that the ceremony should be performed with *mantras*. As to the particular details (regarding the *mantras*, etc.), these are learnt from the *Gṛhyasūtra*.

From this it follows that this sacrament is not to be done for the *Shūdra*; which is also clear from the mention of the '*twice-born.*' As for the *shaving of hair* without any restriction as to time, this is done for special purposes, and may be done for the Shūdra also: this is not interdicted.—(35)

XIII. Upanayana—Initiation

VERSE XXXVI

IN THE EIGHTH YEAR FROM CONCEPTION ONE SHOULD PERFORM THE INITIATION OF THE BRĀHMAṆA; OF THE KING IN THE ELEVENTH YEAR FROM CONCEPTION; AND OF THE VAISHYA IN THE TWELFTH.—(36)

Bhāṣya.

Counting from the year that one spends in the mother's womb, when the child reaches the eighth year;—the term '*garbha*' stands for the *year* spent in the womb; this indication being due to the presence of the term 'year,' '*abda*'; certainly the 'year' could never be the 'eighth' from '*garbha*,' if this latter were taken in its direct sense;—in this year *one should perform the Initiation of the Brāhmaṇa.*

The term '*aupanāyanam*' stands for '*upanayanam*,' the '*aṇ*' affix having the reflexive sense; and the lengthening of the vowel in the latter term ('*nayanam*') being in accordance with (*Pāṇini* 6.3.198); or the lengthening of the vowels of both terms ('*upa*' and '*nayanam*') may be regarded as a Vedic anomaly.

'*Upanayana*,' 'Initiation,' is the name of a sacrament described in the *Gṛhyasūtras* and well-known to Vedic scholars, its other name is '*Mauñjī-bandha*,' '*Girdle-Investiture*.' That ceremony in which the child is taken over to—made over to—(*upanīyatē*)—the teacher, for the purposes of teaching—and not for any such other purpose as the building of a wall, or the making of a mat—is what is called '*Upanayana*.' It is the name of a particular sacramental rite.

'*Of the King in the eleventh year from conception*';—for the *Kṣattriya* the ceremony should be performed in the eleventh year '*from conception*,'—*i.e.*, '*beginning from* conception,' or '*after* conception.'

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The term 'king' '*rājan*' (in '*rājñaḥ*') should be taken as standing for the Kṣattriya caste; and does not necessarily mean one who is a duly anointed king; firstly because such is the sense in which the word is generally used in books; secondly because in the present context it occurs along with the terms '*Brāhmaṇa*' and the rest (which are all denotative of *castes*); and thirdly because we find the term '*Kṣattriya*' used in the rules that follow regarding the details of the ceremony; *e.g.*, it is said that 'the girdle of the Kṣattriya should consist of the bow-string' (below, Verse 42). It is true that the term 'king' is sometimes used in the sense of the 'rulers' of 'countries,' and as such applied to *Vaishyas* and other castes also; but such usage is purely figurative and indirect. And the figurative meaning of a word can be accepted only when the original direct meaning is found inapplicable. That the term 'king' in the text stands for the *Kṣattriya* is shown by the following words of the author of the *Gṛhya-sutra*—'One should initiate the Brāhmaṇa in the eighth year, the *Kṣattriya* in the eleventh and the Vaishya in the twefth.' It is on this understanding that the revered Pāṇini derives the word '*rājya*' ('Kingship') from the word '*rājan*' (King), explaining it as 'the function the King,' and hence used in the ordinary sense of 'lord of country' [*i.e.*, the 'function of ruling a country' really belongs to the Kṣattriya caste, and when persons of other castes are called 'King' their title is based upon their doing 'the work of the King'].

Of the Vaishya, the ceremony should be performed in the twelfth year from conception.—(36)

VERSE XXXVII

FOR THE BRĀHMAṆA DESIROUS OF BRAHMIC GLORY, IT SHOULD BE DONE IN THE FIFTH YEAR; FOR THE 'KING' DESIROUS OF POWER, IN THE SIXTH; AND FOR THE VAISHYA DESIROUS OF BUSINESS, IN THE EIGHTH.—(37)

Bhāṣya.

What belongs to the father is here attributed to the child; the desire—'May my son attain Brahmic glory!'—

resides in the father; and this desire being attributed to the child, the latter is spoken of as 'desirous of Brahmic glory.' The child itself is too young to have the said desire.

"In that case the action done by one person would have its result accruing to a totally different person; and this would involve the absurdity of a man acquiring what he has not earned. And the assertion that the result accrues to the child without his desiring it is one that is contrary to all reason and scriptural authority."

There is no force in the objection. The case in question is analogous to that of the *Shyēna* sacrifice: the *Shyēna* is performed by a man seeking to encompass death, and this death falls upon the person against whom the performance is aimed (and not on the performer himself). It might be argued that—"in this case the result actually accrues to the person seeking for it; it is the sacrificer who desires the death of his enemy; and it is he who obtains this result; so that the result of the act does not accrue to a person that did not perform it."—But in the present case also, the result, in the shape of 'having a child with the particular qualification,' accrues to the performer of the Initiation (the father); just as the good health of the child brings pleasure to the father, so also the Brahmic glory of the son would be a source of pleasure to the father; so that the result here also would accrue to the performer, who had sought for it. Further, it is only from the construction of the actual words used that we can ascertain the meaning of the scriptural texts; and in the present context, the only construction found possible is that the father should perform the ceremony with the desire of a certain result to accrue to his son; and there are no grounds for abandoning this natural construction of the words.

This same explanation applies also to the case of the benefits of the after-death rites accruing to the father (even though performed by the son); as in that case also the performer is the son, and the result is the satisfaction of the father. Further, we have the text—'Thou art my very self called the *son*'—which shows that when the after-death rites are performed by the *son*, it is the father himself (in the shape of the son) that makes the offerings to himself; specially as it was with a view to this alone that the father begot the son.

Then again, in the *Sarvasvāra* sacrifice (which is performed by one who wishes to bring about his own death and translation to heaven),--even after the sacrificer himself has died, the subsequent details have got to be performed; and in this performance also the same sacrificer is regarded as the 'performer,' in view of the direction that he has given to the Brāhmaṇas—'O Brāhmaṇas, please complete this sacrifice,'—as also of the sacrificial gifts and appointments made by him; by virtue of which the said sacrificer is regarded as the actual instigator or employer of the officiating priests. In the same manner, in the case in question also, in as much as the son was begotten for the purpose of performing the funeral rites, these rites, though performed (by the son) for the sake of the father, are regarded as performed by the father himself.

'*Brahmic glory*' is *proficiency in Vedic learning.*

'*Power*'—is *strength*, moral as well as physical; *moral strength* consisting in courage and energy; and *physical strength* in the possession of elephants, horses, infantry and full treasury. It is with reference to this that we have the assertion—'the full development of kingly power consists in the excellence of military organisation.'

'*Īhā*,' '*Business*,' is *action*, *i.e.*, agricultural and commercial transactions carried on by means of large capital.

In all cases, the number of years is to be counted '*from conception*'; this phrase (occurring in the preceding verse) being construed with the present verse also.—(37)

VERSE XXXVIII.

FOR THE BRĀHMAṆA THE SĀVITRĪ DOES NOT LAPSE TILL THE SIXTEENTH YEAR; FOR THE KṢATTRIYA TILL THE TWENTY-SECOND YEAR; AND FOR THE VAISHYA TILL THE TWENTY-FOURTH YEAR.—(38)

Bhāṣya.

For the Initiatory Rite, the principal as well as the optional time have been prescribed. From this it would seem that if, on account of the death of the father, or by reason of illness and such other causes, the boy remains uninitiated and the prescribed time has gone by,—he becomes unfit for initiation; this idea being countenanced by the fact that, even though the prescribed time is a secondary factor in the rite, yet on the lapse of that time, the performer's title to the performance ceases; just as we find in the case of omission of the *Agnihotra*-offerings after the prescribed morning and evening have gone by. It is with a view to this that the present verse propounds an exception to the general rule, and lays down the necessity of performing the rite even after the passing off of the prescribed time.

Till the end of the sixteenth year after conception, the Brāhmana's title to the Initiatory Rite does not cease. The term '*Sāvitrī*' in the text stands for the 'Rite of Initiation,' which is the means whereby the teaching of the *Sāvitrī* is accomplished. '*Does not lapse*,' *i.e.*, does not become out of date.

Similarly '*for the Kṣattriya till the twenty-second year*,'—*i.e.*, for the person belonging to the Kṣattriya *caste*. The term '*bandhu*' is used (*a*) sometimes in a deprecatory sense; *e.g.*, in such passages as—'how doth thou know this, O Brahma-bandhu! (wretched Brāhmaṇa)?';—(*b*) sometimes it is used in the sense of '*family*'; *e.g.*, in the passage—'the possession of a number of villages, the presence of a large following, extensive family-connections (*bandhutā*), and alliances,—these are not to be trifled with even by Indra himself; what to

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say of persons possessing only parts of the earth!';—(*c*) in some cases it also means 'substance'; *e.g.*, in Pāṇini's Sutra (5.4.9)—'a word ending with the term *jāti* takes the affix *chha*, when it denotes *bandhu* (*i.e.*, a substance belonging to a particular class).' In the present context the first two meanings of the term '*bandhu*' being inapplicable, we take it in the third sense.

The nominal affix (ḍaṭ) in the term '*dvāvimshaḥ*' means that which completes the number twenty-two, *i.e.*, the *twenty-second.*

'*For the Vaishya till the twenty-fourth year*'.—Here also though the presence of the '*ḍaṭ*'-affix implying completion was necessary, yet it has not been used in view of metrical contingencies; but the sense is there all the same. That this must be so is proved by the fact that the number 'twenty-four,' which denotes the entire lot of twenty-four years, could never form the limit of anything; while the '*twenty-fourth year*' which is one part of the '*twenty-four*,' can very well form the limit.

People explain the particle '*ā*' as denoting *inclusion.*

In support of what is said in this verse people cite the Vedic text—'The Brāhmaṇa should be initiated with the *Gāyatrī*, the Kṣattriya with the *Trīṣṭup* and the Vaiṣhya with the *Jagatī*' [the *Gāyatrī* metre containing 24, three times *eight*, the *Trṣtup* 33, three times *eleven*, and the *Jagatī*, 48, four times *twelve*, syllables]; the ages spoken of in the text (16, 22 and 24) suffice to complete two quarters of each of the three metres; up till then the metres retain their force and do not abandon the castes that form their receptacles; when however the third quarter has passed, they lose their essence, become aged and having their force reduced, they disappaer, just as the man becomes *old* at 50 (which represents two quarters of his life of 100 years). It is for this reason that the said metres abandon their respective castes, when they find that they have not been studied by them; and it is thus that (after the said ages) the Brāhmaṇa ceases to be 'related to the *Gāyatrī,*' the Kṣattriya ceases to be 'related to the *Triṣṭup*' and the Vaishya ceases to be 'related to the *Jagatī.*'

'*Sāvitrī*'—is the name of that verse which has *Savitṛ* for its deity; and that such a verse is the *Gāyatrī* has been shown above, on the strength of the *Gṛhyasūtras.*

For the Kṣattriya, the '*Sāvitrī*' is the verse '*Ākṛṣṇēna, etc.*' (Ṛgveda, 1.35.2; Vājasanēya, 33.43), which is in the *Triṣṭup* metre; and for the Vaishya, it is the verse '*Vishvā rūpāṇi,* etc.' Ṛgveda, 5.81.2; Vājasanēya, 12.3).—(38)

VERSE XXXIX

BEYOND THIS, ALL THESE THREE, NOT HAVING RECEIVED THE SACRAMENT AT THE PROPER TIME, BECOME EXCLUDED FROM SĀVITRĪ (INITIATION), AND THEREBY COME TO BE KNOWN AS 'VRĀTYAS' (APOSTATES), DESPISED BY ALL GOOD MEN.—(39)

Bhāṣya.

'*Beyond*'—after—the said time, '*all these three*' castes—the Brāhmaṇa and the rest;—'*at the proper time*'—at the exact time prescribed for each caste, or even at the secondary period permitted;—'*not having received the sacrament*'—not having their *Upanayana*-ceremony performed;—'*excluded from Sāvitrī*'—become fallen off from Initiation; and also '*come to be known as Vrātyas*'—'*despised,*' looked down upon, '*by all good men,*' by respectable and cultured people.

This verse is intended to explain the signification of the well known name '*Vrātya.*' That they become excluded from Initiation has already been implied in the preceding verse.

It has been said that they 'are despised by good men'; the next verse explains the nature of contempt in which they are held.—(39)

VERSE XL

THE BRĀHMANA SHOULD NOT IN ANY CASE, EVEN IN TIMES OF DISTRESS, ESTABLISH SPIRITUAL OR UTERINE RELATIONSHIP WITH THESE PERSONS, UNTIL THEY HAVE BEEN DULY PURIFIED.—(40)

Bhāṣya.

'*With these*'—Vrātyas;—'*until purified*'—by expiatory rites;—'*duly,*' *i.e.*, according to rules laid down in the scriptures laying down expiatory rites; *e.g.*, 'making them undergo three *Kṛchchhras, etc., etc.;*'—'*even in times of distress*'—*i.e.*, under no circumstances however distressful;—'*should not establish,*' enter into, '*relationship*' with them.

The question arising as to whether or not this prohibits all kinds of relationship, the text supplies the answer in the negative—'*spiritual or uterine.*'

The term '*brāhma,*' '*spirit,*' here stands for the Veda; and it is relationships through the Veda that are prohibited; such relationships as officiating at sacrifices, teaching and accepting gifts; the meaning being that one should neither officiate at their sacrificial performances, nor appoint them to officiate at sacrifices, they should not be taught, nor should one read with them. Since it is only one who knows the meaning of the Veda that is entitled to accept gifts, the accepting of gifts also becomes a 'Vedic' or 'spiritual' relationship.

'*Uterine relationship,*'—the giving and taking of daughters in marriage.

The specification of the '*Brāhmaṇa*' is intended to be illustrative only.

The sense of all this is that, in view of the disqualification here described, the boy whose father is no more should, if he is intelligent, try to avoid the disqualification, by presenting himself (at the proper time) for Initiation. To this end we have the *Shruti*—"Satyakāma Jābāla went to Gautama Hāridrumata and said—'I shall, sir, live with you as a religious student"; where the boy himself requested the teacher to initate him. The initiating of boys is however entirely optional; so that if the teacher should be found unwilling to take up the initiation, he should be appealed to by the boy by means of presents, etc.—(40)

VERSE XLI

BRAHMACHĀRIS SHOULD WEAR THE SKIN OF THE BLACK (DEER), OF THE RURU DEER AND OF THE GOAT RESPECTIVELY; AND ALSO THE CLOTH OF HEMP, FLAX AND WOOL.'—(41)

Bhāṣya.

Though the term '*Kṛṣna*,' '*black*,' is applied to everything that may be endowed with the quality of *blackness*,—as we find in the expressions 'the black cow,' 'the black blanket,' and so forth,—yet, in the present context, it is clearly recognised as standing for the 'black deer'; firstly because of its occurring along with the 'skin of the *Ruru* deer,' and secondly because of the directions contained in other *Smṛtis* (which clearly mention the *black deer*).

'*Ruru*'—is a particular species of the deer.

'*Basta*'—is the *goat*.

In all the three words ('*kārṣṇa*'—'*raurava*'—'*vāsta*') the nominal affix (*aṇ*) denotes either *formation* or *constitution* (*i.e.*, either 'formed out of' or 'consisting of').

'*Should wear*';—the Brāhmaṇa should cover his body with the skin of the black antelope, the Kṣattriya with the skin of the *Ruru* deer and the Vaishya with the skin of the goat.

And also cloth made of *shaṇa* (hemp), *kṣumā* (flax), and *ūrṇā* (wool).

The particle '*cha*' ('and also') has the cumulative force.

The cloth made of hemp and the rest are not to be used as *upper* garments; and the skins are to be used as upper garments; as such is the proper course. For *Kaupīna* (loin-slip) and *wrapping*, the cloth is to be used.

'*Respecting*';—*i.e.*, each of the three castes is not related to all the clothing that is mentioned; nor are they to be connected in the reverse order ; in fact the first Brahmachārī is connected with the first skin and first cloth, the second with the second and so forth, as we have shown.

An objection is raised—" Even without the express mention (of the respective order), it would be understood through usage; for instance, such expressions as 'shattered, scattered and burnt by thunder, wind and fire' are always understood to mean 'shattered by thunder,' 'scattered by the wind' and 'burnt by fire' (even though *respectivity* is not expressly mentioned)."

Answer.—This could be so understood if the three *Brahmachāris* had been mentioned separately, and if the number (of Brahmachāris and the clothings) were the same. In the present instance, however, we have the single term 'Brahmachāris,' and the three Brahmachāris are not specifically named in any order. Further, the number of Brahmachāris is *three*, while that of the correlatives is *six*—three skins and three cloths. When however the text expressly mentions 'respectivity,' the order of the Brāhmachāris is deduced from that in which they are found to be spoken of in other texts. And after the 'three Brahmacharis' have been construed with the three *skins*, they are again repeated and construed with the *cloths*. And in this manner the compatibility of numbers is maintained. It is primarily with reference to such cases that the revered Pāṇini has taken the trouble of laying down that 'when an equal number of things are mentioned they are to be taken in their respective order.' (1. 3. 10).—(41)

VERSE XLII

FOR THE BRĀHMAṆA THE GIRDLE SHOULD BE THREEFOLD, OF EVEN THICKNESS, SOFT AND SMOOTH, MADE OF MUÑJA GRASS ; FOR THE KṢATTRIYA IT SHOULD BE THE BOW-STRING MADE OF MURVĀ GRASS ; AND FOR THE VAISHYA THE CORD MADE OF HEMPEN FIBRES."—(42)

Bhāṣya.

The *muñja* is a particular kind of grass; the cord made of that grass is called '*Mauñjī.*' This cord should form the 'girdle,' braid, waist-band. '*Threefold*'—triple-corded;—'*of even thickness*'—not such as is thin in one part and thinner in another; but such as is even throughout;— '*soft and smooth,*' of soft texture, well-rubbed.

'*For the Kṣattriya the bow-string*';—the string of the bow. The bow-string is made sometimes of leathern thong, sometimes of grass or of fibres of hemp or flax; hence the text specifies it as that '*made of murvā grass*'; this string should be taken down from the bow and made into the waist-band.

Even though the qualifications of *triplicity* and the rest apply literally to all kinds of 'girdle,' and not only to that of *muñja grass*, yet they cannot be applied to the 'bow-string,' as with such qualifications it would entirely lose its character of 'bow-string.'

'*Made of hempen fibres*'; —the lengthening of the vowel in the second number of the compound is an archaism. Or, we may take the term '*tāntavī*' by itself formed with the nominal affix added to the term '*tantu*' only, and then compound the term '*tāntavī*' with the term '*shaṇa*'; since the '*tāntavī,*' the *fibre*, is a product of the '*shaṇa,*' *hemp*, it is naturally spoken of as related to its source (the hemp) [hence the compound *shaṇānām tāntavī*—'*shaṇatāntavī*'; as we find in such expressions as 'the cow's butter,' 'Deva-datta's grand son' and so forth]. This hempen cord should be made like that of the *Muñja* cord; as the authors of the Gṛhyasūtras have clearly laid down that the Vaishya's girdle should have the qualities of *triplicity* and the rest.—(42)

VERSE XLIII

IN THE EVENT OF MUÑJA (AND THE REST) BEING NOT AVAILABLE, THEY SHOULD BE MADE OF KUSHA, ASHMANTAKA AND BALVAJA,—TRIPLICATED WITH ONE, THREE OR FOUR KNOTS.—(43)

Bhāsya.

Writers declare that the phrase 'and the rest' is understood, the sense being 'in the event of Munja *and the rest* being not available.' And the reason for this is that it is only thus that the plural number *kartavyāḥ*, 'should be made,' becomes more appropriate; specially as the diversity of the girdle has been clearly prescribed in accordance with the diversity of castes. If the girdle spoken of in the present verse were meant for that of any one caste only, then the plural number could be justified only by taking it as referring to the girdle worn by the endless individual members of that one caste; and further, it would be necessary in this case to alter the singular number in '*viprasya*' (of the preceding verse) into the plural number (to bring it into conformity with the present verse); and lastly, in this case all the three alternatives herein mentioned would have to be taken as pertaining to the one girdle (of the Brāhmaṇa only). And no such multiplicity of option should be allowed so long as there is any other way of taking the text.

Thus then the sense of the present verse is as follows—(*a*) if *Muñja* is not available, the girdle should be made of *Kusha*; if the *bow-string* is not available, it should be made of *Ashmantaka*; and (*c*) if the hempen fibre is not available it should be made of *Balvaja*.

The terms '*kusha*,' etc., denote grasses and herbs.

This verse is meant to restrict the choice of substitutes; so that in the absence of *kusha*, etc., one would not be justified in using any other similar substances.

Triplicated by one knot. The various numbers (of knots) are not meant to be restricted to the three castes respectively; they are intended to be optional alternatives for every one of them. This difference in the number of knots in the girdle made of kusha, etc., as well as the other details laid down in connection with it are to be regarded as regular injunctions, even though the customs laid down in other Smṛtis are not necessarily binding.—(43)

VERSE XLIV.

THE SACRIFICIAL THREAD WORN OVER THE SHOULDER,—WHICH IS TRIPLE AND TWISTED UPWARDS,—SHOULD BE MADE OF COTTON FOR THE BRÂHMAṆA, OF HEMPEN FIBRES FOR THE KṢATTRIYA, AND OF WOOLEN FIBRES FOR THE VAISHYA.—(44)

Bhāṣya.

The term '*upavīta*' stands for the peculiar manner in which cloth is worn; as will be explained later in Verse 63; as such, it is only a *quality*; and since this *quality* cannot be *made of cotton*, the quality is taken as standing for the thing to which the quality belongs; the meaning being that the *thing* that is to be worn in the particular way should be made of cotton; the term '*upavītam*' being regarded as formed with the '*ach*' affix, according to Pāṇini 5.2.127, '*upavītam*' being equivalent to '*upavītavat*.'

'*Twisted upwards*'—*i.e.*, turned round, coiled upwards.

'*Triple*'—consisting of three yarns.

This '*twisting upwards*' is laid down for that article which, on coming out of the spinning wheel, has acquired the properties of the 'yarn' and has then been folded three times. That is to say, three yarns should be brought together and by upward twisting made into a cord, and then used as the 'sacred thread.' Of this cord, either only one or three or five or seven should be worn. It comes to be known as the '*sacrificial* thread' by reason of its being connected with sacrificial performances; in as much as it is worn for the purposes of sacrificial performances, it is so called figuratively.

Now, of the three kinds of sacrifice, the *Iṣṭi*, the *Pashu* and the *Soma* sacrifices, it may be worn single at all these, when they are all looked upon as 'sacrifices' in general (and hence, uniform); or it may be worn three-fold, when they are looked upon either as performed with the help of *three* fires, or as being divided into the *three* classes of '*Ahīna*,' '*Ekāha*' and '*Satra*'; or again, it may be worn seven-fold, in view of the number of stages in the Soma sacrifice being *seven*; or lastly, it may be worn five-fold, in view of there being *three* 'Savanas' (extractions of Soma-juice) and two '*Sandhyās*' (twilights).

[In the absence of Cotton], the 'Thread' may be made of silk and other fibres also; such is the direction given in other *Smṛtis.*

'*Avi*' is *sheep*; the yarn made of wool is 'woolen fibre'; the term '*āvikasūtrikam*' being formed with the '*ṭhañ*' affix, according to the *Vārtika* on Paṇini 4. 3. 60. Or, we may read '*avikasūtrikam*,' this word being formed with the '*ṭhan*' affix having the sense of the possessive.—(44).

VERSE XLV

THE BRĀHMAṆA SHOULD, BY LAW, HAVE STAVES OF BILVA AND PALĀSHA WOOD; THE KṢATTRIYA THOSE OF VAṬA AND KHADIRA; AND THE VAISHYA THOSE OF PĪLU AND UDUMBARA.—(45).

Bhāṣya.

Even though the text uses the Copulative Compound (which implies that two staves have to be carried), yet, in as much as in connection with the detailed qualifications of the staff laid down in the text, we find the singular number used, —*e.g.*, in the next verse, and in Verse 48 below,—it is understood that only one staff is to be carried; specially as in the *Gṛhya-sūtra* we read—'the Brāhmaṇa's *staff* is of Bilva or Palāsha'; and the Gautama-sūtra speaks of the carrying of *one* staff only. In the present context all that is done is to lay down the mere possibility of the staff; the expression 'should have staves' meaning that the said staves are fit for Brahmachārīs. As regards the question as to the act during which the staff is to be held, we shall have the answer in Verse 48 below; so that the *staff* being only an auxiliary to that act, the singular number used in that verse must be regarded as significant. For these reasons the

Dual number used in the present verse must be taken merely as referring to all possible staves; just like the plural number in the assertion—'if God were to give rain *many persons* would take to cultivation.'

'*Bilva*,' '*Palāsha*,' '*Vaṭa*,' '*Khadira*,' '*Pīlu*' and '*Udumbara*' are names of particular species of trees.

'*Bailva*' means 'made of Bilva'; and so with the rest.

The naming of the woods is meant to be merely illustrative; as the general rule is that 'staves made of sacred woods are fit for all castes' (*Gautama* 1. 1. 24).

These staves the Brahmachārīs '*should have*' during the act to be described below (in 48);—'*by law*'—*i.e.*, in accordance with scriptural injunctions.—(45)

VERSE XLVI

FOR THE BRĀHMAṆA THE STAFF SHOULD BE MADE IN SIZE REACHING UP TO THE END OF HIS HAIR, FOR THE KṢATTRIYA IT SHOULD REACH UP TO THE FOREHEAD, AND FOR THE VAISHYA TO THE NOSE;—(46)

Bhāṣya.

The term 'staff' denotes the particular shape (of the wood carried);—a long piece of wood of a well-defined size is called '*staff*.'

The question arising as to what its length should be, the Text answers it. That which reaches up to the end of the hair is called '*Kēshāntika*,' *i.e.*, reaching up to the head; *i.e.*, in size it should reach from the tip of the foot up to the head. Or, the compound '*Kēshānta*' may be expounded as 'that of which the hair forms the end,' the *ka* coming in as an additional affix at the end of the compound.

'*In size*,'—the staff—'*should be made*' of the said size,—'*for the Brāhmaṇa*,'—*i.e.*, by the Teacher.

'*Reaching to the forehead*'—*i.e.*, of the size reaching up to the forehead. The 'forehead' itself is only four inches in width; and as a piece of wood of that size could never be spoken of as 'staff,' we have to explain the term '*lalāṭasamnitaḥ*' (which, as it stands, means 'of the size of the forehead') as meaning 'that which reaches from the tip of the foot up to the forehead.'

Similarly for the Vaishya, it should reach up to the tip of the nose.—(46)

VERSE XLVII

ALL THESE SHOULD BE STRAIGHT, UNIMPAIRED, HANDSOME-LOOKING, NOT FRIGHTENING TO MEN, WITH BARK AND UNSPOILT BY FIRE.—(47)

Bhāṣya.

'*Straight*'—not crooked.

'*All*'—refers to those mentioned above; all those mentioned being equally the things under consideration.

'*Unimpaired*'—without holes.

'*Handsome-looking*';—whose appearance is *handsome*, pleasing. That is, of pure colour and without thorns.

'*Not frightening*';—they should not be used to frighten anyone, dog or man; '*to men*' being only indicative (of animals in general).

'*With bark*'—uncut, unpeeled.

'*Unspoilt by fire*,'—not affected by fire either of lightning or of the forest.—(47)

VERSE XLVIII

TAKING UP THE STAFF OF HIS LIKING, HAVING WORSHIPPED THE SUN AND WALKED ROUND THE FIRE TO HIS RIGHT, HE SHOULD BEG FOR ALMS ACCORDING TO THE PRESCRIBED RULE.—(48)

Bhāṣya.

After the skins have been put on, the tying of the girdle should be done; and after having tied the girdle, the Initiation should be performed; the staff is taken up after the 'sacred thread' ceremony has been performed. After the staff has been taken up, the Sun should be worshipped ; *i.e.*, one should stand facing the sun and worship Him with those Mantras of which the sun is the presiding deity ; what are the particular Mantras to be employed can be ascertained from the *Gṛhyasūtras* ; as also the other details of procedure. The present verse describes only what is common to all persons.

'*Having walked round the fire to his right*,'—having passed all round it.

'*Charēt*'—(lit.) should accomplish ;—'*alms*' is a collective term, standing for collection of food ;—this he '*should beg*.'

'*According to prescribed rule*'—refers to the rules going to be laid down below. The term '*bhikṣā*' (food) stands for small quantities of cooked rice, etc.—(48)

VERSE XLIX

THE BRĀHMAṆA, HAVING UNDERGONE INITIATION, SHOULD BEG FOR FOOD WITH WORDS OF WHICH 'BHAVAT' ('LADY') FORMS THE BEGINNING ; THE KṢATTRIYA WITH WORDS OF WHICH 'BHAVAT' FORMS THE MIDDLE ; AND THE VAISHYA WITH WORDS OF WHICH 'BHAVAT' FORMS THE END.—(49)

Bhāṣya.

The word '*bhaikṣam*' here stands for the words with which the request for alms is preferred ; as it is only the words that can have '*bhavat*' as the 'beginning'; the food itself could not have any such beginning.

In as much as it is laid down that ladies are the first to be begged from first, and in the request made it is the person begged from that is addressed, it is the feminine vocative form of the term '*bhavat*' that should be used.

All that the present text does is to lay down the order of the words to be used, there being some transcendental purpose served by the order. The actual words used should be—'*bhavati bhikṣām dēhi*,' 'O Lady, give me food.'

Question.—"Wherefore could there be any possibility of

Sanskrit words being used, since they are addressed to women, and they do not understand Sanskrit ?"

Answer.—The Initiatory ceremony, being compulsory, is of an eternal character ; and it is in connection with this ceremony that the use of the words is laid down. The vernaculars (corrupt languages) are not eternal ; so that there could be no connection between these and an eternal ceremony. Then again, just as when educated people hear corrupt forms of words used, they are reminded, by the resemblance, of the corresponding correct forms and thereby come to comprehend the meaning ;—for instance, the (incorrect) word '*gā*' leads to the inference (remembrance of) of the (correct) word '*go*' through similarity, according to the theory that 'the incorrect word is expressive only by inference, and the meaning is comprehended from the inferred correct word '; in the same manner when correct words are addressed to women, they remember, through similarity, the corresponding incorrect words whose meaning they know, and thus they come to comprehend the meaning of the words used. Further, the expression in question is a short one consisting of three words only, and these being well-known words, they would be easily comprehensible by ladies also.

Similarly the *Kṣattriya* should use words of which the '*bhavat*' forms the middle ; the actual form being '*bhikṣām bhavati dēhi,*' 'Give me, O Lady, food.' So the Vaishya should use words of which '*bhavat*' forms the end. The word '*bhavaduttaram*' means 'that of which *bhavat* forms the end ';—the compound thus standing for the sentence (give me food, O Lady').

'*Having undergone Initiation*';—the past-participial ending implies that the rule laid down here is to be observed also in connection with the begging for food for daily living (even after the first day of the Initiation) ; and further, what is said in verse 68 below—'such is the procedure of initiation for the twice-born '—is a summing up of the whole section on 'Initiation'; and hence shows that the rule laid down in the present verse applies also to that begging for alms which forms part of the ceremony of Initiation. If we do not take it thus, then what is laid down here would only be taken either as a part of the Initiation-rites (as shown by the context), or as applying to the ordinary begging for food;—in this latter case the implication of the context would be rejected and stress would be laid only upon the sense of the past-participial ending ('having undergone Initiation') As a matter of fact, what is here prescribed is applicable to that 'begging for food' which forms part of the Initiatory Rites, as also to that which is done for the purposes of livelihood.—(49)

VERSE L

FIRST OF ALL HE SHOULD BEG FOOD OF HIS MOTHER, OR OF HIS SISTER, OR OF HIS MOTHER'S OWN SISTER, OR OF SUCH ANOTHER LADY AS MAY NOT INSULT HIM.—(50)

Bhāṣya.

The words 'mother,' etc., have their meanings well known;—'*own*' uterine.

'*As may not insult him*'—'insulting' here means *disregard*; *i.e.*, refusal—'I shall give nothing.' Says the *Gṛhya-sūtra*—'He should beg from such man or woman as may not refuse him.'

What is meant here by '*first*' is the begging that is done by the boy during Initiation. In the course of the subsequent daily begging, he should not fear refusal.—(50)

VERSE LI

HAVING COLLECTED AS MUCH FOOD AS MAY BE NEEDED, AND HAVING OFFERED IT, WITHOUT GUILE, TO HIS TEACHER, HE SHOULD EAT IT, WITH HIS FACE TO THE EAST, AFTER HAVING SIPPED WATER AND BECOME PURE.—(51)

Bhāṣya.

The term '*having collected*' shows that the food should be obtained from several ladies, and a large quantity should not be obtained from a single lady.

'*It*'—refers to that which has gone immediately before this, *i.e.*, the food begged for ordinary eating, and not that which is done as part of the Initiation-rites, with which the context deals; specially as with regard to the latter all that the Gṛhya-Sūtra prescribes is that the food should be 'cooked,' and nothing is said regarding 'eating.' Further, the injunction that 'the boy should fast for the rest of the day' shows that the boy undergoes the Initiatory rite *after breakfast*; so that the actual *eating* of the food cannot be part of that rite.

'*As much as may be needed*';—*i.e.*, just as much food as may be necessary for the satisfaction of hunger; large quantities of food should not be begged.

'*Having offered it without guile to the Teacher*;'—*i.e.*, he should not show the teacher only the inferior articles of food, hiding with these the superior ones, with the view that the Teacher would not take any thing out of the inferior articles. The '*offering*' consists of presenting it to him, saying 'this is what I have obtained.'

What the teacher does not take, '*he should eat*,' after having been permitted by the teacher to do so.

"Why should not the *offering* be regarded merely as an act producing in the food some transcendental effect (and not as a real offering meant to be accepted by the teacher)?"

That it is not so is proved by historical evidence: says the revered Vyāsa in the story of *Hṛtakūpa*, where it is distinctly stated that the teacher actually took what was offered.

That the boy should eat only after being permitted to do so, is laid down in several *Gṛhyasūtras*.

'*With his face to the east, after having sipped water*.'—Some people have asserted that the *facing of the east* is meant to be connected with the sipping of water,—the two being in close proximity. But this is not right; as the rule regarding *sipping*—that it should be done with the face towards the east or north,—will come later on. Hence what is mentioned here is connected with the *eating*.

'*Pure.*'—This means that after *rinsing the mouth* he should avoid, during meals, such things as looking at the *Chāṇḍāla* going to unclean places, spitting and so forth.—(51)

VERSE LII

EATING WITH FACE TO THE EAST, HE DOES WHAT IS CONDUCIVE TO LONGEVITY; EATING WITH FACE TO THE SOUTH, HE DOES WHAT BRINGS FAME; EATING WITH FACE TO THE WEST, HE DOES WHAT BRINGS PROSPERITY; AND EATING WITH FACE TO THE NORTH, HE DOES WHAT LEADS TO THE TRUE.—(52)

Bhāṣya.

The preceding verse has laid down the general compulsory rule that the boy should eat with his face to the East, if he is not desirous of obtaining any peculiar results; the text is now laying down rules that are to be observed with a view to definite desired ends.

'*Āyuṣyam*'—is that which is conducive to longevity; and '*Eating with face to the East, one does what is coducive to longevity*'; when the act of eating brings about longevity, it becomes '*what is conducive to longevity*'; hence the meaning of the text comes to be that 'if one desires longevity he should eat with face to the East.' Thus then, in regard to the East, there are two directions—(*a*) one should *always* face the East, and (*b*) one should do so when desiring the said result; so that if a man desires longevity, he should actually have the particular desire in view; while in the other case he should not have any result in view. Just as, though the *Agnihotra* is an obligatory act, yet if the man seeks heaven, he repeats its performance; and by so doing he fulfills, incidentally, the obligations of the obligatory act also.

Similarly, when one desires fame, he should face the South. All these rules are optional.

Desiring prosperity—the form '*Shriyan*' is formed by adding the present participial affix '*shatṛ*' to the nominal root formed by adding '*kyach*' to the noun '*Shrī*.' Or, we may read '*Shriyam*' ending in *m*; the meaning being '*what brings prosperity*'; just as in the case of the other words '*āyuṣyam*' and the rest.

The use of the root '*bhuj*,' 'to eat,' in its literal sense becomes possible, if we regard 'longevity' and the rest as 'parts of a living being'; the same explanation applies also to the next clause 'he eats what leads to the true.' The meaning thus comes to be that by 'eating with face to the west one obtains prosperity.' In this case we have the reading '*shriyam*' with the Accusative ending. Or, lastly we may read '*shriyai*,' with the Dative ending, which would signify 'for the sake of.'

'*True*' means the *real*, and also the *sacrifice* or Heaven as resulting from the sacrifice. The sense thus is that 'if one seeks heaven he should eat with his face to the north.'

Even though we have no Injunctive affixes in the text, yet, since what is here laid down is something not already known, we take it in the sense of an Injunction, construing the Present Tense as denoting the *fifth* sense (*Lēṭ*, which is expressive of Injunction).

Thus then we have this rule of eating with face to various directions, with a view to various results.

Eating with face towards the subsidiary quarters, which one might be tempted to do under special circumstances, becomes precluded by the obligatory injunction of facing the *East*, etc.

The optional rule here laid down does not apply only to the Religious Student, nor to the eating of the food obtained by begging only, but to all forms of eating by the Householder and others also. That this is so is indicated by the fact that though in the context we have all along had the Injunctive word '*ashnīyāt*,' the present verse has used a different word '*bhuṅktē*'; if the author had definitely intended the present rule to be as restricted in its application as those that have gone before, then he would have used the same word. When however we find him making use of a different word, '*bhuṅkte*,' we begin to doubt if what is meant is the particular eating that has been hitherto dealt with in the context, or a general rule applying to all forms of eating; and the conclusion we are led to is that since a different verb is used, it must stand for a different act, and it cannot be regarded as the same that has been dealt with in the context.

Some people have argued that—"in as much as there is no injunctive word in the present verse, it must be taken as merely laudatory of what has gone before." But this has been answered in *Mīmānsā Sūtra* 3. 5. 21 (where it is asserted that sentences laying down things not already known are to be regarded as *injunctive*). Nor do we find in the present verse any such signs as would indicate that it is meant to be subsidiary to the preceding verse,—such signs, for instance, as the fact of its being wanting in some integral part, if taken apart from the preceding verse, and so forth. It is possible to take the present verse as referring primarily to the Religious Student only, and then to extend its application to all men,—on the ground that what is laid down here is not incompatible with the duties of ordinary men, as the other duties of the Student are; but in that case the results mentioned in the verse would not accrue to the ordinary man. For authoritative writers (*Mīmānsā-Sūtra*, 8. 1. 23, etc.) do not admit of activity by mere implied extension, in cases of special results following from the use of special accessory details. If such rules as 'for one desiring cattle, water should be fetched in the milking vessel,' 'the sacrificial post should be of *khadira* wood when the man desires vigour,' are never applied to the case of those sacrifices which are mere ectypes (of the Darshapūrṇāmāsa); and to which the details of the Darshapūrṇamāsa become applicable by extended implication only.—(52)

VERSE LIII

THE TWICE-BORN PERSON SHOULD ALWAYS TAKE HIS FOOD AFTER HAVING SIPPED WATER AND WITH DUE CARE; AND AFTER HAVING EATEN, HE SHOULD RINSE HIS MOUTH IN THE PROPER MANNER AND TOUCH THE CAVITIES WITH WATER.—(53).

Bhāṣya.

The terms '*āchamana*' and '*spṛsha*' are both synonymous, being found from the usage of cultured people, to signify a particular purificatory act. Though it is true that the root '*spṛsha*' has been declared to have an entirely different meaning, and the root '*chamu*' (from which the word '*āchamana*' is derived) also has been declared to signify the act of *eating*,—yet in actual usage we find that with the particular prefixes (*upa* and *ā*) they are used in a much restricted sense and hence they are taken in that (restricted) sense. So that even though the root '*spṛsha*' has a very wide denotation, yet actual usage limits its significance. Just as though the root '*gaḍi*' denotes only part of the face in general, the term '*gaṇḍa*' (derived from that root) is used in the sense of the *cheek* only, and it is not applied to any other part of the face; similarly the root '*puṣya*' means *to accomplish*, and the term '*puṣya*' is laid down as denoting 'lunar asterism' in general, yet in actual usage this latter name is applied to one particular asterism only; similarly again the term '*dhāyyā*,' though laid down as denoting *Sāmidhēnī* verses in general, is actually used in the sense of the *Āvāpikī* verses only. Hence the term '*upaspṛshya*' means exactly what is meant by the term '*āchamya*'; the actual injunction of this act of '*āchamana*' will come later on. Further, the text itself uses the two terms as synonymous. Having laid down that 'one should always do the *upasparshana*,' it goes on to say that 'this *āchamana*' should be done three times; from which it is clear that the two are synonymous.

Though the 'rinsing of the mouth' has been already laid down in verse 51, it is re-iterated again in order to show immediate sequence: the sense being that one should take his food *immediately after* rinsing the mouth, and no other act should be allowed to intervene. To this end we have the following declaration of the revered Vyāsa—'Oh Lord, I shall remain with such people as take their food with five limbs wet'—this being said by Lakṣmī; the 'five limbs' being the two hands, two feet, and mouth; and these five limbs can remain wet only if one eats immediately after the rinsing, and not if he makes any delay. Manu himself (in 4. 76) is going to declare under the duties of the Snātaka that 'one should eat with the feet still wet'; and there we shall show that there is no needless repetition involved in this.

'*Always*'—this is added in order to guard against the notion that being laid down in the section dealing with the duties of the Student, what is here prescribed applies to him alone; and to show directly that it is applicable to every form of eating.

Some people have held that "the term 'twice-born' is what is meant to make the rule applicable to every form of eating, and that the 'always' is merely an explanatory re-iteration."

This however is not right. This would have been the right explanation if the qualification 'twice-born' were incompatible with the 'student'; as a matter of fact however, the said qualification is quite applicable to the 'student'; hence with the exception of the adverb 'always' there is nothing to indicate that what is here laid down is to be taken as going beyond the particular context.

'*With due care*'—That is, with due consideration of the character of the food and his own (digestive) powers. If one happens to be absent-minded, he cannot avoid indigestible, unwholesome and hot food, nor can he eat only what is wholesome.

'*After having eaten, he should rinse his mouth.*'—That one should remove all traces of oil, etc., has been already prescribed under the section on the 'purification of substances.' The 'rinsing' here laid down is that which one should do after he has eaten and removed all traces of oil, etc.

In this connection some people have held that one 'rinsing' (after food) having been already laid down under 5. 145—where it is said that 'one should rinse his mouth after sleep, sneezing and eating,'—the present verse must be taken as laying down a second 'rinsing,' for the purposes of some transcendental result; there being such a general injunction as 'having rinsed the mouth, one should rinse it again.'

This aspect of the question we shall deal with under Discourse V.

In the proper manner.—This only re-iterates the injunctive and obligatory character of the 'rinsing'; the meaning being that 'one should follow all the details of the Rinsing that have been enjoined.'

'*Should touch with water the cavities.*'—'Cavities,' *i.e.*, holes in the head.

Objection.—"It is already laid down (under 60, below) that the cavities should be touched with water."

To this some people reply that the repetition in the present verse is meant to exclude the 'self' and 'head' (which also are mentioned along with the 'cavities' in 60),—and refers to that rinsing which one already clean, does, without reference to *Eating.* So that according to those who take the first 'rinsing' after food as meant for cleanliness and a second 'rinsing' as leading to some transcendental result,—the 'self' and the 'head' are not 'touched with water' for the purpose of bringing about a transcendental result; this being done for cleanliness alone. The actual process of this rinsing is going to be laid down in 61.—'One desirous of cleanliness should always rinse his mouth, etc., etc.'

Another answer to the aforesaid objection is that what the present verse does is to emphasise the fact of the *Rinsing* being recognised as something enjoined by the scriptures; the sense being that this *Rinsing* is the *scriptural* (prescribed in the Shāstras), not the *ordinary*, rinsing. As a matter of fact, where a certain primary act has become known as equipped with particular accessories, wherever that same act is subsequently spoken of, it is at once recognised as being the same as the former one. So that when the text says '*should rinse his mouth*,' it does not mean merely that a certain substance (water) should be sipped; what is meant is to indicate all that has been prescribed in connection with the scriptural purification, along with its appurtenent details.—(53)

VERSE LIV

HE SHOULD ALWAYS WORSHIP THE FOOD AND EAT IT WITHOUT DISPARAGING IT. WHEN HE SEES IT, HE SHOULD REJOICE AND FEEL GRATIFIED, AND HE SHOULD ALWAYS WELCOME IT.—(54)

Bhāṣya.

'*Food*,' '*ashana*,' is *that which is eaten* (*ashyatē*), *i.e.*, rice and curry, etc. When the food is brought to him, he should look upon it as a 'deity'; *i.e.*, he should have the notion—'this food is my highest deity.' (*a*) The 'worshipping' of the food may consist in regarding it as the source of the birth and sustenance of all living beings; or (*b*) in regarding it as the means of sustaining his life; as the food is declared to have said—'he worships me regarding me as sustaining life'; or (*c*) in receiving it with due obeisance, etc.

'*He should eat it without disparaging it*';—even when there is any such source of disparagement as that the article of food is of bad quality, or it is badly cooked, he should not disparage the food; *i.e.*, he should not make any such disparaging remarks as—'this is most disagreeable,' or 'it is likely to upset the constitution of the body,' and so forth. If the food happens to be really defective, he should simply *not* eat it; he should not eat it and yet find fault with it.

'*When he sees it he should rejoice*;'—he should rejoice just as he does when, on returning from a long journey, he sees his wife and children.

'*He should feel gratified*';—on seeing the food, he should remove from his mind even such displeasure as may have been produced by other causes.

'*He should welcome it*';—'welcoming' consists in acclaiming it as a boon; *i.e.*, receiving it with honour, with such words as 'may we have such food every day.'

'*Always*,'—at all times. The affix '*shas*' has the sense of the locative, according to the option involved in Pāṇini's *Sūtra* 5. 4. 42. Or, we may read '*sarvadā*' (instead of '*sarvashaḥ*').—(54)

VERSE LV

THE FOOD, THUS WORSHIPPED ALWAYS, IMPARTS STRENGTH AND VIGOUR. IF EATEN IRREVERENTLY, IT DESTROYS THEM BOTH.—(55)

Bhāṣya.

This verse is only a valedictory supplement to the rule prescribed above; it is not meant to be the statement of definite results following from the observance of that rule. If it were a statement of results, the rule would be an optional one, to be observed only by one who desires vigour and strength; and in that case the adverb 'always' would have no sense;—as we have in the expression, '*the food thus worshipped always, etc.*' For these reasons the rule must be regarded as one to be observed throughout life, just like the rule regarding *facing of the east* (during meal).

'*If eaten irreverently, it destroys them both,'—i.e.,* vigour and strength.

'*Strength*' is power, the capacity to lift heavy loads without effort; while '*vigour*' stands for energy and courage, which is found even in a man who is lean (and physically weak): while great *strength* is found only when the limbs of the body are well-developed and the body has attained huge proportions.—(55)

VERSE LVI

HE SHOULD NOT GIVE THE LEAVINGS TO ANYONE; HE SHOULD NOT EAT IN BETWEEN; HE SHOULD NOT DO OVER-EATING; AND HE SHOULD NOT GO ANY-WHERE WITH PARTICLES OF FOOD STILL ON HIM.—(56)

Bhāṣya.

The food left in the dish, and become unclean by being touched with the mouth, is called, '*leavings*;'—this he should not give to anyone. The prohibition of the offering of the leavings to any person being already contained in this verse, the necessity of having another prohibition of the offering of the leavings to a *Shūdra*,—which we find among the duties of the *Snātakā*—we shall explain in connection with the latter verse.

[In '*Kasyachit*'] though the dative would be the proper form, we have the genitive in the sense of 'relationship in general,' and what is meant is that it should not be given even to such living beings as do not understand that a certain thing has been given to them,—such for instance, as dogs and cats; in this latter case the act cannot be called '*giving*' in its full sense; as it involves merely the cessation of the proprietary right of the giver, it does not involve the producing of the proprietary right in the recipient [that is why the Dative could not be rightly used: which could imply both *giving* and *receiving*].

The phrase '*antarā*' '*in between*,' means *middle*. There are two times for meals—morning and evening; and one should not eat between these meals. Or, '*in between*' may mean *interruption*; in which case the meaning is that 'having once left off the act of eating, and having interrupted it by some other act, he should not eat the food left in the same dish.' Another *Smṛti* lays down the specific rule that 'one should avoid eating interrupted by rising and washing.' Others again have explained the phrase '*antarā*,' as meaning *disconnection*. The *Shruti* having declared that 'holding the dish with the left hand, one should take up the morsel with the right hand and then offer it to the Life-breath in the mouth,'—it is the *omitting of the act of holding the dish with the left hand* which is meant by the terms '*antarā*.'

'*He should not do over-eating*';—one should not eat too much. This is with a view to health, and hence implies the avoidance of such food as may be either indigestible or unsuitable. Specially because the advice is based upon reason. What is '*over-eating*' can be learnt from the Āyurveda. The sense is that one should eat only that quantity of food which does not quite fill the stomach, and which is properly digested. Of the three parts into which the stomach is divided, one part itself should be filled with food, half a part with water, and one part should be left for the action of the bodily humours. If this is not done, health suffers.

'*He should not go anywhere with particles of food still on him*';—on the very spot where he has eaten, he should clean himself by removing all particles of food from the body and then wash his hands and mouth without rising from the place.—(56)

VERSE LVII

OVER-EATING DESTROYS HEALTH, CUTS OFF LIFE AND BARS HEAVEN; IT IS UNRIGHTEOUS AND DETESTED BY PEOPLE; FOR THESE REASONS ONE SHOULD AVOID IT.—(57)

Bhāṣya.

The present verse proceeds to show that the prohibition of over-eating is based upon ordinary worldly considerations.

'*Destroys health*,'—is productive of such diseases as fever, pain in the stomach and so forth.

'*Cuts off life*,'—destroys life, bringing on such diseases as cholera and the like.

'*Bars heaven*,'—because implying the neglect of one's body, it involves the transgressing of such scriptural injunctions as 'one should guard himself against all things.' The 'barring of heaven' means *going to hell*.

'*Unrighteous*'—productive of misfortune.

'*Detested by people*';—the man who eats too much is always looked down upon as a 'glutton.'

For these reasons one '*should avoid*,'—*i.e.*, not do—over-eating.—(57)

VERSE LVIII

EVERY TIME, THE BRĀHMAṆA SHOULD SIP WATER, EITHER THOUGH THE RECEPTACLE DEDICATED TO BRAHMĀ, OR THROUGH THAT DEDICATED TO PRAJĀPATI, OR THROUGH THAT DEDICATED TO THE 'THRICE-TEN' (GODS); BUT NEVER THROUGH THAT DEDICATED TO THE PITṚS.—(58)

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tīrtha*,' 'Receptacle,' means a clean vessel containing water; '*tīrtha*' (literally) is that which exists for the purpose of saving people, *i.e.*, freeing them from their sins. In some places '*tīrtha*' is explained as 'that by which people descend into water.' In the present context however it stands for that part of the palm of the hand which contains water; and we must take the word '*tīrtha*' as applied to the hand, with a view to eulogise it, only figuratively; for water does not remain in the hand always (and as such it cannot be called *tīrtha* in its literal sense).

Through the said receptacle, *he should sip water.*

'*Dedicated to Brahmā*';—this also is a figurative eulogy. The term means 'that of which Brahmā is the deity'; and certainly the said 'Receptacle,' not being of the nature of a 'sacrifice,' or of a 'Mantra,' could not be said to be 'dedicated to a deity.' The special nominal affix in the word '*brāhma*,' which denotes 'dedication to a deity,' may however be justified on the assumption that the said receptacle resembles a 'sacrifice' in certain characteristics, such as being the means of sanctification and so forth.

'*Every time*'—*i.e.*, for the purposes of cleanliness, as also as part of religious performances.

'*Kāya*'—'Ka' stands for Prajāpati: hence '*kāya*' is that which is dedicated to Prajāpati.

Similarly that which is dedicated to the 'thrice-ten'—*i.e.*, the Gods—is called the '*Traidashika*.' The word '*traidashikam*' is derived from '*tridasha*' with the deific affix '*aṇ*,' and then the reflexive '*ka*.' And the deific character in this case also is of the same kind as before (in the term '*brāhma*').

Through these receptacles one should sip water. The mention of the *Brāhmaṇa* (Vipra) is not meant to be significant here. For special rules for the *Kṣattriya*, etc., are going to be added later on (in verse 62, *et seq.*); and unless we had a general rule, there could be no room for specifications [and it is the present verse alone that could be taken as formulating that general rule, and hence it could not be taken as restricted to the Brāhmaṇa only.]

'*Not through that dedicated to the Pitṛs*'—*i.e.*, never through that of which the Pitṛs are the deity; even in cases where the aforesaid parts of the hand are disabled by the presence of boils and pimples.

Objection.—"The mere fact of *what is sacred to Pitṛs* not having been enjoined makes it impossible to be used (why should the negation be re-iterated)?"

Answer.—There is one danger in that: The next verse supplies the description of 'the receptacle dedicated to Pitṛs'; while there is no use for it laid down in the present context; so that when one would proceed to seek for the use to which this particular receptacle could be put, he might form the idea that it is to be used in connection with the act (*of sipping water*) that forms the subject-matter of the context. When, however, we have the direct prohibition (of this receptacle, in connection with *water-sipping*), we gather the use for it from its very name, and conclude that the offering of water and such other rites for the *Pitṛs* are to be performed with 'the receptacle dedicated to Pitṛs.' In this manner the eulogy also becomes consistent. The 'receptacles' dedicated to Brahmā and the rest being directly enjoined as those to be used, people might be led into the mistake that in the absence of these the other may be used; hence with a view to prevent this it was only right to mention the *Pitrya-tīrtha* also (as that which should never be used).—(58)

VERSE LIX

THE PART OF THE PALM AT THE ROOT OF THE THUMB THEY CALL 'THE RECEPTACLE DEDICATED TO BRAHMĀ'; THAT WHICH IS AT THE ROOT OF THE FINGER 'SACRED TO PRAJĀPATI'; THAT ON THE FINGER-TOPS 'DEDICATED TO THE GODS'; AND THAT WHICH IS BELOW THESE TWO 'DEDICATED TO THE PITṚS.'—(59)

Bhāṣya.

The 'root' of the thumb is its lower part; and the part of the hand just below that root is the 'receptacle dedicated to Brahmā.'—The term 'tala' stands for the inner part (the palm). That inner portion of the hand which extends up to the long palm-line and faces one's own eyes is the part 'dedicated to Brahmā.'

That at the root of the fingers, above the horizontal palm-line is 'dedicated to Prajāpati.'

'*That on the tip of the fingers is dedicated to the Gods.*'—Even though the term '*aṅguli*' forms the subordinate factor in the compound ('*anguli-mulē*'), yet it is construed with the term '*agrē*,' for the simple reason that this latter is a relative term (and hence stands in need of a correlative).

'*That below these two is dedicated to the Pitṛs.*'—This also is to be construed with the terms '*aṅguli*' and '*aṅguṣṭha*,' though both of these form subordinate factors in the two compounds. The 'finger' meant here is the index-finger. Hence it is the part below the thumb and the index-finger which is 'dedicated to the Pitṛs.'

We interpret the text in this manner on the strength of what is prescribed in other Smṛtis, and also upon that of the practices of cultured people; specially as no sense could be got out of the words as they stand. Says Shaṅkha—'Below the thumb and behind the first palm-line is the receptacle dedicated to Brahmā; that between the thumb and the index-finger is dedicated to the Pitṛs; that below the little finger is dedicated to Prajāpati, that at the tip of the fingers is dedicated to the Gods.'—(59)

VERSE LX

FIRST OF ALL HE SHOULD SIP WATER THRICE; THEN HE SHOULD WIPE HIS MOUTH TWICE, AND TOUCH WITH WATER THE CAVITIES, THE SOUL AND ALSO THE HEAD.—(60)

Bhāṣya.

Through any one of the aforesaid 'receptacles' he should three times '*sip water*,'—*i.e.*, he should let water enter his stomach through the mouth.

'*Then*'—*i.e.*, after the sipping of water,—he should '*twice*'—*i.e.*, by repeating the act—'*wipe the mouth*,'—*i.e.*, the two lips. This '*wiping*' consists of removing with a wet hand the drops of water attaching to the lips.

Question.—"Whence do you get the idea that this wiping is to be done *with the hand*?"

Answer.—We learn this from actual usage, and also deduce it from the fact of the context dealing with 'receptacles' (which have been described as parts of the hand);—the terms 'through the receptacle' and 'with water,' though occurring elsewhere, being brought in here also.

Further, inasmuch as the *wiping* is meant only to serve a visible purpose, the term 'mouth' is taken to stand for a part of the mouth (*i.e.*, the lips).

'*Cavities*'—holes;—'*he should touch with water*'—held in the hand. '*Upasparshana*' (of the text) is the same as '*sparshana*.' Since the text has been speaking of the '*mouth*,' the 'cavities' meant to be touched are those pertaining to the mouth (*i.e.*, located in the head). Says Gautama (1.36)—'He should touch the cavities *in the head*.'

'*The Soul*'—stands for the Heart and the Navel. In the Upaniṣads we read that 'one should find the Soul in the heart.' Hence the 'touching of the heart' becomes the 'touching of the Soul,' the all-pervading entity ensouling the body. (We have to take it in this sense, because) there can be no *touching* of the Soul itself, which is something incorporeal. In some law-books it is laid down that 'one should touch the navel'; hence we have included 'navel' also (as indicated by the term 'Soul' of the text).

'*Head*'—this is well known.

Since all *Smṛtis* are meant to serve the same purpose, 'the washing of hands up to the wrists' and such other acts (as are laid down in Gautama 1.36, for instance) also have to be done along with those mentioned in the text; such acts, for instance, as *not making noise*, *keeping silent*, *sprinkling of water on the feet*,—or even *washing* the feet, as laid down in the *Mahābhārata*.—(60)

VERSE LXI

ONE WHO KNOWS HIS DUTIES, WHEN DESIRING CLEANLINESS, SHOULD ALWAYS SIP, THROUGH THE PROPER RECEPTACLE, WATER WHICH IS NEITHER HOT NOR FROTHY,—IN SOLITUDE, WITH HIS FACE TOWARDS THE NORTH OR THE EAST.—(61)

Bhāṣya.

'*Hot*' here stands for boiled; elsewhere we read that the sipping should be done 'with unboiled water.' So that the prohibition does not apply to such water as is naturally hot, or has imbibed the heat of the hot atmosphere.

'*Froth*' is meant to include 'bubbles' also, as elsewhere we read that 'the water should be free from froth and bubbles.'

The terms '*through the proper receptacle*' and '*one who knows his duties*' have been added only for the purpose of filling up the metre.

'*Desiring cleanliness*'—seeking to attain cleanliness, *i.e.*, purity. The sense is that without the sipping of water he can never be clean.

'*Always*'—*i.e.*, not only at the time of eating, as would seem implied by the fact of the rule occurring in the section on 'eating,'—but also at other times, when, for instance, one seeks cleanliness after passing urine or stool, etc.

Though 'water' is the object of the act of *sipping*, yet it is put in the Instrumental Case, with a view to indicate that what is prescribed is meant to be applicable not only to the water that is sipped but also to that which forms the instrument in such acts as the washing of the feet and the like. What we hold is that in the act of *sipping* also the water is only the 'instrument'; specially as the *sipping* does not constitute the sanctification of the water (in which case alone the water could be the 'object').

'*In solitude*'—*i.e.*, in a clean place; a solitary place, being uncrowded by people, is generally clean.

'*With his face towards the North or the East*';—the term 'face' is to be construed along with each of the two terms ('East' and 'North'); as Gauṭama (1.35) says that 'the man should face either the North or the East.' The compound should be expounded as 'he who has his face towards the North, East'; the compound being a pure *Bahuvrīhi*, not a Bahuvrīhi containing another copulative compound [*i.e.*, we cannot expound the compound as 'North *and* East,' and then compound this with the term '*mukha*,' the sense in this case being 'one having his face towards the *North and the East*']. If we made the Bahuvrīhi contain a copulative compound, then if the compound '*prāṅudak*' were taken as an aggregative copulative, it should have an additional '*a*' at the end; nor could it be taken as a segregative copulative. Further, it is not possible for the man to face both the North and the East at one and the same time; for in that case, the rule would mean that one part of the *sipping* should be done with face towards the North, and another part of it with face towards the East; and this would mean that the sipping is not done at one place. Then again, the directions mentioned do not form the principal factor in the predicate of the sentence, which alone could justify their being taken reciprocally; nor does the term '*prāṅudak*' from a well-known name of the North-East quarter, in the manner in which '*dakṣiṇa-pūrva*' does of the South-East quarter; hence there can be no justification for the compound being taken as a *Bahuvrīhi* containing another compound name of a particular quarter, [*i.e.*, we cannot take '*prāṅudak*' as the name of the North-East quarter and then compound it with '*mukha*']. For these reasons the compound cannot be taken as a '*Bahuvrīhi*' containing within itself another compound. From all this it follows that *option* is meant; as is clearly laid down in another *Smṛti*—'Acts of cleanliness should be begun with face towards the North *or* the East' (*Gauṭama* 1.35). This option is just like the option that we have in the case of the Sāman to be sung at the *Ṣaḍoha* sacrifice, where the injunction being in the form that 'the *Bṛhadrathantara* Sāman should be sung,' what is actually done is that on some days of the sacrifice (which lasts for six days) they sing the '*Bṛhat*' while on other the '*Rathantara*' *Sāman*; and never on any one day do they ever sing both the *Sāmans*.—(61)

The 'sipping,' as consisting of the drinking of water, has been prescribed; but the exact quantity of the water to be sipped has not yet been laid down. Hence the Text now proceeds to define the precise measure (of the water to be sipped):—

VERSE LXII

THE BRĀHMAṆA IS PURIFIED BY THE WATER REACHING THE HEART; THE KṢATTRIYA BY THAT REACHING THE THROAT; THE VAISHYA BY WATER THAT IS JUST SIPPED, AND THE SHUDRA BY WHAT IS TOUCHED WITH THE END.—(62)

Bhāṣya.

'*Reaching the heart*'—that which reaches down to the regions of the heart; the word being derived from the root '*gam*' with the 'ḍa' affix, according to Pāṇini, 6. 2. 101; the term '*hṛdaya*' being changed into '*hṛd*' according to Pāṇini's Sūtra, 6. 3. 50.

'*Is purified*'—Reaches sanctity; that is, gets rid of impurity. The water (reaching the heart) would, in quantity, be just a little less than a handful.

'*The Kṣattriya by that reaching the throat*'—*i.e.*, by that which reaches only down to the throat. The term '*bhūmipaḥ*' in the text stands for the Kṣattriya; as the 'lordship of land' is laid down for the Kṣattriya only; and hence this well-known function (of ruling the land) indicates here the *Kṣattriya* caste. If actual 'lordship' of the land were meant, then what is laid down here would have been prescribed among the 'duties of the king.'

'*The Vaishya by the water that is just sipped,*'—*i.e.*, which is just taken into the mouth; even without reaching the throat, the water thus sipped serves to purify the Vaishya.

'*The Shūdra by what is touched with the end*;'—'*antataḥ*' stands for '*antēna*'; the '*tasil*' affix having the force of the instrumental, according to the *Vārtika* on Pāṇini, 5. 4. 44. The term '*end*' (*anta*) means proximity; *e.g.*, the phrase '*udakānta*' means '*near* water'. It also means *a part*; *e.g.*, in such expressions as '*vastrānta*,' '*vasanānta*' and the like. With both these significations the term 'end' (being a relative term) stands in need of a correlative; whenever it is used, one always wants to know—'*near what*' or '*part of what*.' Now in the present case, the water-sipping has been laid down for the other castes as to be done with certain parts of the hand and the lips and the tongue; and it is the 'end' of these that is meant. It cannot mean mere '*proximity*'; because the '*water-sipping*' prescribed cannot be accomplished by mere proximity. Then again, the 'touch' (of the water with the tongue and lips) would involve *sipping* (which has been laid down for the Vaishya); for one is sure to feel the taste of that which is touched with the tongue and lips. Hence the conclusion appears to be that the quantity of water sufficient for the *Shūdra* is just a little less in quantity than that for the *Vaishya*; *e.g.*, while for the Vaishya the water should touch the root of the tongue, for the Shūdra it should touch only its tip.

Water being a fluid substance, its going beyond the limits prescribed would be unavoidable; hence all that is meant is that if the water sipped fails to reach the prescribed limits, it fails to purify the man.

The description of the 'receptacles' (parts of the hand) refers to the right hand; as it is this hand that should be used in all washings; specially as it has been laid down that men should perform (religious) acts with the right hand. It is for this reason that we reiterate this fact in the present connection.—(62)

VERSE LXIII

WHEN THE RIGHT HAND IS HELD ABOVE (THE SACRED THREAD ETC.), THE TWICE-BORN PERSON IS DESCRIBED AS 'UPAVĪTIN'; WHEN THE LEFT HAND IS HELD ABOVE, 'PRĀCHĪNĀVĪTIN,' AND ON ITS HANGING BY THE NECK, 'NIVĪTIN.'—(63)

Bhāṣya.

An *objection* is raised—"As a matter of fact, in treatises dealing with *Dharma*, the meanings of words are accepted to be exactly as they are known in ordinary usage; and the works of Manu and others should not make it their business to explain the meanings of words, in the way in which it is done by grammatical and lexicographical works."

Answer.—We have already answered this before; if treatises on Dharma should be found to supply the explanation of such words as are not ordinarily known, are they to be blamed for doing so? Then again, in the present instance, there is another purpose also in view. The term '*upavītin*' is explained in the course of the explanation of the act of 'water-sipping,' with a view to indicate that the method (of wearing the sacred thread, etc.) is auxiliary to that act. Though it is true that the wearing of the sacred thread,—either as part of a religious observance, or as accomplishing certain desirable results for man,—is known as to be done at all times, yet if the 'water-sipping' were done without it, it would remain incomplete. So that, if we did not have the present text (as indicating the necessity of wearing the sacred thread during water-sipping), there would be some deficiency in the religious act, as also some defect in the agent. If the sipping were done without the sacred thread, it would be as good as not done, and there would be the additional wrong done, in the shape of sipping the water while unclean.

Question.—" How is it that the *Upavīta-method* alone is regarded as auxiliary to the ' water-sipping,' when as a matter of fact, the present text has spoken of another method, the ' *Prāchīnāvīta*,' also ? "

Our answer is as follows :—As for the ' *Prāchīnāvīta* ' method, this has been directly prescribed, in so many words, as pertaining to acts of offering to the *Pitṛs* ; so that when its use has been found in connection with these, it could not be taken as an alternative to the ' *Upavīta* ' method, whose use has not yet been found. Similarly the '*Nivīta* ' method also has its use in connection with acts of sorcery. Though the use of the '*Nivīta* ' has not been laid down in the *Manusmṛti* itself, yet since all *Smṛtis* have the same end in view, the use prescribed in other *Smṛtis* could be regarded as accepted in the present context also.

The term ' *hand* ' stands here for the *arm* ; it is only when the man raises his *arm* that he is called '*Upavīti* ' ; further, we are going to point out later on that the '*Upavīta* ' is the method (of wearing the thread) to be employed at all times (not during religious acts only) ; and no one is called '*Upavītin* ' by merely lifting his *hand*.

'*When the left hand is held above,*' he is called '*Prāchīnāvīti*' ; it is the compounded form ('*prāchīnāvīti* ') that constitutes the name ; the text puts it in the uncompounded form on account of the exigencies of metre.

'*On its hanging by the neck* ' ;—'*Sajjana*,' '*hanging*,' means *being worn*, when the sacred thread, or the piece of cloth, is worn over the neck, and neither arm is held over it, then the man becomes ' *nivītī*.'—(63)

VERSE LXIV

WHEN THE GIRDLE, THE SKIN, THE STAFF, THE SACRED THREAD OR THE WATER-POT BECOMES DAMAGED, HE SHOULD THROW IT INTO THE WATER AND TAKE UP ANOTHER WITH THE PROPER FORMULAS.—(64)

Bhāṣya.

The present verse enjoins that when these things are damaged, they should be thrown into water and others should be taken up; and the sequence of the 'throwing' and the 'taking up' is to be just as it is found in the text. In as much as one has got to take up these things again, they cannot be regarded as forming part of the Initiatory Ceremony itself; if it were part of this ceremony, then all their purpose would have been fulfilled by the completion of the ceremony. The right view therefore is that these should continue to be taken up throughout the 'student-stage.'

"But is it not possible to regard the *throwing into water* here laid down as the *disposal* of the things mentioned, if they happen, during the Initiatory Ceremony—and before its completion,—to be damaged by divine or human adverse forces? The taking up of fresh ones, would, in this case, be necessary for the completion of the ceremony; just as there is of the begging-bowl. Is it absolutely impossible for the text to be taken in this manner, that the mere fact of the *re-taking* being laid down should be made the basis of assuming that the things should continue to be held throughout the student-stage?"

Our answer to the above is as follows:—As for mere '*holding*,' this has been laid down in connection with the *staff* only (during the Initiatory Rite); as for the *girdle* what is to be done during the ceremony is only its *tying* (round the waist); so that what should be done as part of the Initiatory Ceremony is the peculiar *arrangement of strings* (which constitutes the act of *tying*); this being done, the purpose of the Injunction will have been fulfilled; so that if, at some future time, any thing becomes damaged or not, what effect could that have upon the ceremony (which will have been long completed)? As for the particular form of 'disposal,' this helps the Rite only when what has become damaged forms an integral part of the Rite itself. Nor again have the scriptures laid down any purpose for which the girdle, etc., are worn, for the fulfilment of which purpose, the re-taking of them (during the ceremony) would be enjoined (in the present text); it is only when the purpose of a certain object has not been fulfilled, that we take it for granted that that object should be taken up again. For these reasons, because the text lays down (*a*) a particular form of *Disposal*, and (*b*) the re-taking of the things, we conclude that, even though the holding of these may form an integral part of the Initiatory Ceremony, the necessity of this *holding* does not end with the completion of the ceremony. Then again, the girdle, etc., are mentioned in the same category as the 'water-pot,' which continues to be held *after* the ceremony also; and this shows that the other articles also are to continue to be held, and all this 'holding' forms part of the *observances* (of the Religious Student). From all this it follows that the girdle and other things are subservient to both: by the force of 'context,' they form part of the Initiatory Ceremony, and since they are found to be held after the completion of that ceremony, they are to continue as long as the 'student-stage' lasts. That the 'water-pot' has to be carried (always) for the purpose of carrying water is also implied by (the binding and universal character of) the injunction of the 'Disposal'; otherwise (if the *pot* were not meant to be carried *always*), the meaning of the injunction would be that the *disposal* is to be carried out only when the water-pot may be held; and this would make the Injunction partial and limited in its application.

As regards the 'holding of the staff,' this comes to be regarded as part of the 'begging of food,' on the basis of sequence enjoined in the rule 'one should beg for food *after taking up the staff*'; but on the basis of actual practice, it comes to be done in connection with such ordinary *walking* also as is not done for the purpose of 'food-begging.' But it does not mean that the staff should be held *always*; for the boy who may be holding the stick would be unable to do such acts as standing, sitting, sleeping, eating and so forth; similarly in Verse 2.70 it is laid down that the boy, when proceeding to read the Veda, should sit with joined palms (and this would not be possible if he held the staff in his hand).

'*With the proper formulas*'—this means that the retaking of the articles should be in the same manner in which they are taken up during the Initiatory Ceremony; and in that connection formulas are laid down in regard to the wearing of the Girdle, and not in regard to the holding of the staff.—(64)

XIV. —Keshanta—Hair-clipping

VERSE LXV

THE SACRAMENT OF KESHĀNTA IS ORDAINED FOR THE BRĀHMAṆA IN HIS SIXTEENTH YEAR; FOR THE KṢATTRIYA IN HIS TWENTY-SECOND YEAR, AND FOR THE VAISHYA TWO YEARS LATER.—(65)

Bhāṣya.

'*Keshānta*—Hair-clipping is—the name of a particular sacrament. This sacrament should be done, for the Brāhmaṇa, in his sixteenth year, from conception. For a knowledge of the exact form of this sacrament our only source is the Gṛhyasūtra.

'*Two years later*'—*i.e.*, in the year, which is two years later than the twenty-second. Or, the compound may be taken as qualifying 'time,' so that the meaning is—'at the time which comes two years later than the twenty-second,'—'*for the Vaishya.*' The numeral adjective 'two' must be taken as qualifying *years*; as the whole verse refers to *years.*—(65)

XV.—Sacraments for Females

VERSE LXVI

FOR FEMALES, THIS WHOLE SERIES SHOULD BE PERFORMED AT THE RIGHT TIME AND IN THE PROPER ORDER, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SANCTIFYING THE BODY ; BUT WITHOUT THE VEDIC FORMULAS—(66)

Bhāṣya.

'*This whole series*' should be done for females, without the recitation of Vedic formulas.—'*Series*' stands for the entire body of sacraments, beginning with the 'Birth-rites,' along with all the acts that constitute their procedure.

'*For the purpose of sanctifying*'—*i.e.*, purifying—'*the body.*' This means that the purpose of the sacraments in the case of females that is the same as that in that of males.

'*At the proper time,*'—*i.e.*, without letting that time pass which has been prescribed for the several sacraments. The term '*yathā*' here signifies *non-transgression*, and hence, not signifying 'similarity,' it is compounded according to Pāṇini 2. 1. 7.

The same explanation applies to the compound '*yathākramam*' also.

In as much as the text has distinctly asserted that it is only the reciting of Vedic formulas that may be omitted, there could be no idea of the sacraments (for females) being performed at a time, or in an order, other than the prescribed ones; so that the prohibition of other times and another order should be taken as merely describing what is already known, and as added only for the purpose of filling up the metre. All that is really meant by the text is that for females the sacraments should be performed without the Vedic formulas.

The 'series' spoken of above would imply that like the 'Birth-rite' and the other ceremonies, the 'Initiatory ceremony' also should be performed for females; with a view to preclude this idea, the Text adds—

VERSE LXVII

For females the Rites of marriage have been ordained to be their 'Vedic Sacrament,' the serving of the husbands their 'residence with the Teacher,' and the household-duties their 'tending of fire.'—(67)

Bhāṣya.

The ceremony called '*Upanayana*,' 'Initiation,' has been called 'Vedic,' because it is gone through for the purpose of studying the Veda. This ceremony, in the case of females, consists of the 'Rites of marriage,'—*i.e.*, those rites that are accomplished by means of marriage. Thus, since 'marriage' has been prescribed for them in place of the 'Initiation,' the former has been described here as becoming the latter; and this can preclude the necessity of 'Initiation' only if the purposes of this latter were taken as served by the 'marriage.'

Objection.—"Well, the Initiation may be excluded from women, but the study of the Veda and the keeping of the observances have still got to be performed."

With a view to preclude these two also, the Text adds—'*The serving of husband is their residence with the Teacher.*' When the woman *serves*—attends upon and reveres her husband, she does what is meant to be accomplished by 'Residence with the Teacher.' The study of the Veda could be done by the woman only if she resided with the Teacher; and as there is no 'Residence with the Teacher' in her case, how can there be any studying of the Veda? '*Household duties*';—all that she does in the course of her household work,—*e.g.*, cooking, getting together of articles for household use, general supervision, and so forth, which are going to be described in

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discourse IX, 'the husband should employ her in saving wealth &c., &c.' (9. 11). These household duties are for the woman what the 'bringing of fuel' in the morning and evening is for the Religious Student (male). The term '*tending of fire*' stands for all the observances and vows that the student keeps.

By reason of the 'Marriage' having taken the place of the 'Initiatory Ceremony' (for women), it follows that, just as in the case of men, all the ordinances of Shruti and Smṛti and custom become binding upon him after the Initiatory Ceremony, before which they are free to do what they like, and are unfit for any religious duties,—so for women, there is freedom of action before Marriage, after which they become subject to the ordinances of Shrutis and Smṛtis.

Or, we may interpret the text as follows:—Marriage constitutes the Vedic Sacrament—*i.e.*, Upanayana—for females; even though marriage is not really the Upanayana, yet it is spoken of as such attributively. The question arising as to whence lies the similarity by virtue of which Marriage is spoken of as Upanayana, the text adds—'*the serving of the husband* &c., &c.'—(67)

The next verse sums up the contents of the section—

VERSE LXVIII

THUS HAS BEEN DESCRIBED THE INITIATORY CEREMONY OF TWICE-BORN MEN,—THAT WHICH SANCTIFIES THEM AND MARKS THEIR (REAL) BIRTH. LEARN NOW THE DUTIES TO WHICH THEY SHOULD APPLY THEMSELVES.—(68)

Bhāṣya.

So far we had the section dealing with the Initiatory Ceremony. All that has been said here pertains to that ceremony.

"Well, if so, then the *Keshānta* (spoken of in 65) would also pertain to the Initiation."

Not so, as that sacrament has been laid down as to be performed at its own time, which comes long after the

Initiatory Ceremony has been finished. So that, even though it is mentioned in the same context, it becomes connected with other rites by virtue of the force of syntactical connection. Thus it is that some people regard the *Keshānta* as to be done after the Final Bath (to say nothing of the Initiation).

The term '*aupanāyanika*' means *pertaining to the Upanayana*, the initial vowel being prolonged, as in other cases explained before.

'*Birth*'—being born from their parents; this is what is '*marked*'—manifested, perfected—by the said ceremony; even though born, the boy, before Initiation, is as good as not born; as till then he is not entitled to any religious acts. Hence the ceremony is what 'marks' his birth.

'*Sanctifies*'—this has been already explained.

The duties with which the initiated boy becomes connected—to which he becomes entitled,—those that should be performed by the initiated boy—all these are going to be expounded;—these '*now learn.*'—(68)

XVI.—General Duties of Twice-born Men

VERSE LXIX

HAVING INITIATED THE PUPIL, THE TEACHER SHOULD, FIRST OF ALL, TEACH HIM CLEANLINESS, RIGHT BEHAVIOUR, FIRE-TENDING AND ALSO THE TWILIGHT-DEVOTIONS.—(69)

Bhāṣya.

'*Should teach*'—should make him learn.

'*First of all*';—this does not mean that Cleanliness should be taught before Right Behaviour and the rest; in fact, there is no order of sequence intended among those mentioned here; all that the text is going to lay down is that after the Initiation there should be the teaching of the observances; and after the pupil has been instructed regarding the observances, he should proceed with the study of the Veda. Hence if the text meant that the boy should be taught Fire-kindling and the Twilight-Devotions before being taught the observances, it would be laying down for him the reciting of mantras not prescribed anywhere else,—because each of the two acts mentioned is performed with mantras. As for 'cleanliness,' there can be no fixed time for it; and it must be taught on the very day on which the boy has been initiated. So also 'Right Behaviour.' For these reasons it is clear that the phrase 'first of all' is meant to denote *importance*, and it does not mean that it is to be taught before everything else.

'*Cleanliness*'—stands for all those acts that begin with the washing of the private parts, once, &c., &c. (5. 136) and ending with the *sipping of water*.

'*Right Behaviour*'—rising to receive the Teacher and other superiors, offering them seat and saluting them.

'*Fire-tending*'—the kindling of fire, and supplying of fuel.

The *devotion* offered at *twilight*, to the Sun, consists in meditating upon the form of the Sun. This is what is meant by the '*Twilight-Devotions.*' Or, it may refer to what is going to be prescribed below, in verse 101.

This is what constitutes the 'Duty relating to Observances.'—(69)

XVII.—Rules of Study

The author now proceeds to describe the rules relating to *Study* :—

VERSE LXX

WHEN ABOUT TO STUDY, HE SHALL BE TAUGHT WITH HIS FACE TO THE NORTH, WHEN HE HAS SIPPED WATER ACCORDING TO LAW, HAS FORMED THE BRAHMĀÑJALI (WITH HIS HANDS), WEARS LIGHT CLOTHING AND HAS THE ORGANS UNDER FULL CONTROL.—(70)

Bhāṣya.

The Future ending (in '*adhyīṣyamāṇaḥ*') denotes the immediate future; and means 'when engaging in study,' 'when beginning to study,' 'when desiring to proceed with his study.'

'*He shall be taught, with his face to the north.*'—Gautama (1.55) has laid down that 'the pupil should face the east, while the Teacher faces the west.'

'*When he has sipped water according to law*'—refers to the rules prescribed above regarding the sipping of water.

The compound '*brahmāñjalikṛtaḥ*' is to be expounded as 'he by whom Brahmāñjali has been formed,' the past-participal adjective ('*kṛtaḥ*') being placed at the end, according to Pāṇini 2.2.37;—the present compound being analogous to such compounds as '*āhitāgni*' and the like. Or, we may read '*brahmāñjalikṛt*.'

'*Wears light clothing*';—*i.e.*, with clothes thoroughly washed; a thorough washing always makes the cloth 'light'; hence 'lightness' indicates *cleanliness*. Or, 'light clothing' may be taken in its literal sense, the lightness of the clothing being meant to serve a visible purpose: if the boy were heavily clad in thick woolen clothes, he would not feel the strokes of the rope with which he would be struck when found to be inattentive, and not feeling the stroke, he would not study in the proper manner; and if the Teacher, on this account, found it necessary to remove the cloth from the back (each time that the rope would be laid on the back), this would tire the Teacher himself; and further, if the boy were struck with the rope on the naked body, he would feel great pain.

'*One who has his organs under full control*';—*i.e.*, one who has fully subdued all his organs, both external and internal. The sense is that he should not turn his eyes this way and that, should not listen to anything and everything that may be talked of, he should devote all his attention to his own study.—(70)

VERSE LXXI

AT THE BEGINNING AND AT THE END OF THE (STUDY OF) THE VEDA, THE FEET OF THE TEACHER SHOULD ALWAYS BE CLASPED; AND THE VEDA SHOULD BE STUDIED WITH JOINED PALMS; THIS IS WHAT HAS BEEN CALLED THE 'BRAHMĀÑJALI.'—(71)

Bhāṣya.

Though the term '*brahma*' has many meanings, yet, in view of the fact of the present context bearing on 'study,' it is taken here as standing for the *Veda*.

'*At the beginning of the Veda*';—the Locative ending denotes *occasion*; and since the context bears upon 'study,' the beginning meant is that of the action of *study*; and the '*beginning*' stands for the very *first recitation* by the person concerned. And it is at this first recitation that the Teacher's feet are to be clasped. The term 'beginning' here cannot stand for the first letters of the Vedas—'*agnimīlē*' (Ṛgveda), '*ikhē tvorjē*' (Yajurveda), '*agna āyāhi*' (Sāmaveda); because these opening words could never form the *occasion* (for the clasping of the feet); for the simple reason that (being parts of the eternal Veda) they are ever present; while it is only what is itself occasional (occurring only at certain times) that can be the *occasion* for anything. Hence what is meant is that—'when one is going to begin the study of the Veda, he should clasp the Teacher's feet, and having done that he should recite the words of the Veda'; and it does not mean that he should clasp the Teacher's feet every time that he may study the Veda.

"The first moment of the act is what is called its 'beginning'; and it is this *beginning* that is spoken of as the *occasion*. Now it is only what is *existent* that can form the occasion for anything; *e.g.*, when *living existence* is regarded as the occasion for the performance of *Agnihotra*, it is the *existence* that is *present*. It is true that in some cases, the burning of the house and such other *past* events also are spoken of as the occasion for certain acts; but in these cases we accept them as such because that is what is actually prescribed. In the present instance however, the 'beginning of study' and 'clasping of the feet' should be regarded as simultaneous."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—What is called 'beginning' here is the *making up of one's mind to study*, and not the *first moment* of the act. The Boy makes up his mind to study as soon as the Teacher addresses to him the words 'now read'; so that it is after this that the feet are to be clasped. This is intended to be the propitiation of the Teacher who is going to bestow a favour. Just as in the ordinary world, when a person is going to bestow a favour upon another, the latter welcomes him with the words—'it is through you that I have been saved from this sin.'

This clasping of the feet is meant to embody the speechless request—'we are ready to proceed with our study'; for the Teacher is never to be directed with the words 'now teach us.' All that is to be done is that the Boy should approach him (and clasp his feet), with a view to remind him that it is time for study, and it is only after this approaching has been done, that the words of the Veda should begin to be recited.

Further, in view of the rule that 'one should study the Veda with joined palms,' if the boy were to study (with joined palms), he would be transgressing the rule regarding the *clasping of feet* (if the *study* and the *feet-clasping* were meant to be simultaneous) [for one who would have his hands joined could not clasp the feet].

'*End*'—Ceasing, desisting from study.

Though the term '*brahma*' is the subordinate factor in the compound ('*brahmārambhē*') yet, in as much as the term 'end' is a relative term, it is taken as correlated to the term '*brahma*'; specially because there is no other word in the text with which it could be connected.

'*Always*'—implies that this rule regarding the clasping of feet should be observed at the beginning and end of all future study, *every day*. If this word were not present, the rule would be taken as applying to only that 'beginning of study' which comes immediately after the Initiatory Ceremony; on the analogy of the *Ārambhaṇīyā Iṣṭi*, which is performed only at the beginning of the first *Darshapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice performed by the *Agnihotrin*, after he has done the 'Fire-kindling,' and *not* at that of each succeeding *Darshapūrṇamāsa*, which is performed every month.

From morning till such time as the daily routine of reciting two Chapters has not been finished, the whole is regarded as a single act of 'study'; so that if at intervals, there is some obstruction, the resuming of study on the same day is not regarded as 'beginning'; and at each resumption, the feet are not clasped. In another *Smṛti* we read—'The clasping of the Teacher's feet should be done every day in the morning.' Gautama, 2.53).

'*Having joined*'—making them touch one another.

'*Should be studied*';—what is meant is that the hands should be placed in that posture which resembles the tortoise.

'*This is Brahmāñjali*';—this explains the meaning of the term '*brahmāñjali*.'—(71)

VERSE LXXII

THE CLASPING OF THE TEACHER'S FEET SHOULD BE DONE WITH CROSSED HANDS : THE LEFT SHOULD BE TOUCHED WITH THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT WITH THE RIGHT.—(72)

Bhāṣya.

The 'clasping of the Teacher's feet' mentioned in the preceding verse '*should be done with crossed hands.*'

In answer to the question as to what sort of the 'crossing' of hands should be done, the Author adds—'*the left*' foot '*should be touched with the left*' hand; it is mere touching that should be done, the Teacher should not be troubled by the foot being held for a long time. This 'crossing' is obtained by the two hands being simultaneously moved towards one another. That is, the feet having to be clasped by the pupil standing in front of the Teacher; the left hand is moved towards the right and the right towards the left; it is thus that the left foot becomes touched by the left hand and the right foot by the right hand. This is the 'crossing of the hands.'

Others read the text as '*vinyastapāṇinā*,' 'with well-placed hands.' The 'placing' being implied by the *touching*, what the addition of the epithet would imply is that the feet should not be touched merely with the finger tips,—in the way in which a red-hot piece of iron is touched, for fear of burning,—but the hands should be '*well-placed*,' actually held upon the feet. Pressing of the feet would cause pain to the Teacher, and is as such prohibited. Such is the explanation provided of this version of the text.—(72)

VERSE LXXIII

WHEN THE PUPIL IS GOING TO STUDY, THE TEACHER, EVER FREE FROM INDOLENCE, SHOULD SAY—'HO, READ !' AND HE SHOULD CEASE WHEN HE SAYS 'LET THERE BE A STOP !'—(73)

Bhāṣya.

'*When going to study*' and the other expressions have already been explained before. The present verse adds a direction for the Teacher. When a boy is desirous to read the Veda from a Teacher, he should be invited with the words 'ho, read!' Until he is so invited, the Boy should not press the Teacher with such importunate requests as—'please teach us this chapter!' Another *Smṛti* has declared—'One should study on being invited to do so'. (Yājñavalkya, *Āchāra*, 27).

Saying the words '*let there b a stop*,' '*he should cease*'—desist,—'who is to cease?'—The Teacher; as is clear from the nominative case-ending used. Or, it may be taken to mean that the *pupil* should cease only when dismissed by the Teacher, and not according to his own wish; the construction of the passage in this case being—'when the Teacher says *let there be a stop*, then the pupil *should cease*.'

Other people have explained this rule regarding the time of ceasing as applying to all readers—the pupil as well as the Teacher. And this is in accordance with another *Smṛti*, which says—"Having recited the Veda, at the time of ceasing, one should touch the ground with the fore-finger and pronounce '*svasti*' in the case of the Yajurveda, '*vispaṣṭām*' in the case of the Sāman, '*virāmaḥ*' in the case of the Ṛgveda and '*āramasva*' in the case of the Atharva."

'*Free from indolence*'—without sloth; 'indolence' is *sloth*;—the man beset with sloth is called 'indolent'; and when he has given it up he is called '*free from indolence*.' This is meant to be merely descriptive. 'Indolence' here does not mean *fatigue*. The present text should never be taken to mean that what is here laid down is for only one who is free from indolence, while for those beset with indolence there is some other rule.—(73)

VERSE LXXIV

ONE SHOULD ALWAYS PRONOUNCE THE PRAṆAVA IN THE BEGINNING AND AT THE END OF THE VEDA. IF IT IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY THE SYLLABLE 'OṀ' IN THE BEGINNING, IT TRICKLES AWAY; AND (IF IT IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY IT) AT THE END, IT BECOMES SHATTERED.—(74)

Bhāṣya.

Here also, in accordance with what has gone before (under 71), '*one should pronounce the Praṇava in the beginning and at the end of the Veda*';—which means that the syllable is to be pronounced in the beginning and at the end of the action of reading the Veda.

The term '*praṇava*' stands for the syllable '*oṁ*'; as is clear from what the text adds later on—'not accompanied *by the syllable oṁ*.'

'*Always*'—has been added in order to show that the rule applies to every act of study. Without this term it would appear, from the context, that it applies to only that *first* study by the Religious Student which is done for the getting up of the text. When the adverb 'always' has been added, it becomes clear that the rule applies to all forms of studying,—that which is done for the purpose of keeping the memory of the text fresh, or that which is done by the Householder and other people in obedience to the injunction that 'the Veda should be studied every day.' As regards the reciting of Vedic mantras during the Twilight Prayer, etc., the use of the syllable 'oṁ' the author is going to enjoin directly (in Verse 78). What is laid down here is not meant to be a necessary accompaniment of the Veda,—which would mean that the rule is to be followed whenever one pronounces any Vedic passage; thus it is that the Praṇava is not used with Vedic mantras on the following occasions: at oblations poured into fire, or during the *japa* of mantras, or in course of the teaching of scriptures, or at the recitation of the '*Yājyā*' and other hymns, or when Vedic passages are quoted only by way of illustration. From all this it follows that the adverb '*always*' is meant to show only that the rule laid down applies to that study of the Veda which forms the subject-matter of the context. As for the necessity of using the *Praṇava* at the beginning of one's daily study, this is secured by the construing of the term 'always' of the preceding verse with the present one.

In praise of what has been enjoined the text adds—'*If it is not accompanied by the syllable oṁ*, etc.' If, in the beginning, the Veda is not accompanied by the syllable 'om,' *it trickles off*. The compound '*anonkṛtam*' is to be expounded as 'that which is not *accompanied*,—*i.e.*, sanctified—by the syllable *om*,' according to Pāṇini, 2. 1. 32; or, it may be expounded as 'that Veda in which the syllable *oṁ* is not uttered,'—the order of the terms in this case being in accordance with the rule laid down in connection with the '*Sukhādi*' group, according to Pāṇini, 6. 2. 170.

'*At the end*'—at the close. The particle 'and' indicates that the term 'not accompanied by the syllable *om*' is to be construed here also.

'*Trickles off—becomes shattered*.'—Both these terms are meant to indicate the futility of the study. The sense being that that religious act, in which the Veda studied in the said defective fashion is used, absolutely fails to accomplish its purpose. This is an *Arthavāda* meant to be deprecatory of the said method of study. When milk is placed in a pot, the milks passes off all round; and this is what is called '*trickling off*'; and if the milk becomes destroyed after it has been boiled and become solidified, this is what is called '*becoming shattered*.'—(74)

VERSE LXXV

SEATED UPON KUSHA-BLADES POINTING EASTWARDS AND SANCTIFIED BY KUSHA-BLADES, WHEN ONE HAS PURIFIED HIMSELF BY MEANS OF THREE 'BREATH-SUSPENSIONS,'—THEN ALONE HE BECOMES ENTITLED TO THE SYLLABLE 'OṀ.'—(75)

Bhāṣya.

The term '*kūṭa*' means 'kusha-blade';—'*Seated upon*' them, —*i.e.*, seated upon kusha-blades pointing eastwards. The accusative ending in '*kūṭān*' being in accordance with Pāṇiṇi 1. 4. 46, '*adhisthīnsthāsām karma*,' where the latter part consists of the factors '*sthā*'—'*ā*'—'*āsām*.' In the word '*paryupāsīnaḥ*' also we have an '*ā*', the word containing the factors '*pari*'—'*upa*'—'*ā*'—'*āsīnaḥ*'; the prefixes '*pari*' and '*upa*' having no significance at all.

'*Sanctified by kusha-blades*';—*i.e.*, having been made pure. The term '*pavitra*' cannot stand for the *Aghamarṣhaṇa* and other mantras; for the simple reason that at the time that the text is being dealt with, the student has not read those *mantras*. Nor are kusha-blades capable, by their mere presence, to bring about purification for one who does no (purificatory) act; thus then, the necessity of some intervening act being essential, we are led to conclude, on the basis of another *Smṛti*, that this act is in the form of *touching the sense-organs*; Gautama (1.48-50) having prescribed 'the touching of the organs with Kusha-blades and seating upon Kusha-blades pointing eastwards.'

'*Purified by means of three Breath-suspensions.*'—The air passing through the mouth and the nostrils is called '*prāṇa*,' 'breath'; and the '*āyāma*' of this is its *suspension, holding within the body, preventing its going out.* Another *Smṛti* (Yājñavalkya, *Āchāra*, 23) has laid down the measure of the time during which the breath is to be suspended—as also the mantra accompanying it,—"One, witholding his breath, should mutter three times the *Gāyatrī* along with the *Praṇava* and the *Shiras*,—this is what is called 'Breath-suspension'." The revered Vashiṣṭha has added to these the *Great Vyāhṛtis* also. It is the end of the mantra that should mark the end of the *suspension*, no other limit for it being prescribed. In as much as all Smṛtis are meant to serve the same purpose, we must accept this same method of 'Breath-suspension' to be meant by the present text also, specially as there is no inconsistency with it.

Objection.—"What has been said here involves a mutual interdependence: until the Breath-suspensions have been performed one should not pronounce 'Oṁ,' while without this syllable 'Oṁ' there can be no 'Breath-suspension'."

There is nothing wrong in this. When Yājñavalkya lays down that 'one should mutter three times; etc.,' all that is meant is the mental act of *remembering*, *thinking of*, the syllable '*Oṁ*'; for when the breath is suspended, there can be no *utterance* of any syllable; though it is true that '*Japa*,' 'Reciting,' is (in most cases) something that can be accomplished only by an operation of speech. In connection with the reading of the Veda however, what is intended is actual *utterance* of the syllable; and this for the simple reason that the act of reading consists of actual utterance—the root (in '*adhyayana*') signifying the *making of sound*, and *sound* is that which is heard by the *Ear*, and not that which is cognised only by the mind.

What is prescribed here is not something applicable to the syllable 'Oṁ' itself,—whereby it could be made applicable to the uttering of the syllable on other occasions also. It has been said that the syllable should be pronounced at the beginning of Vedic study; but if the rule here laid down were meant to be applicable to all utterances of the syllable, it would have to be observed in connection with such utterances of it in ordinary parlance as when one says 'we say *yes* (oṁ).'

Then again, Gautama (1.49) has declared that 'the three Breath-suspensions extend over fifteen moments.' The term '*mātrā*,' 'moment,' stands for that point of time which is taken up in the pronouncing of a simple unmodified vowel; and in as much as this cannot be consistent with the time-limit prescribed by Yājñavalkya, this latter cannot be accepted as applicable to what is prescribed by Gautama; in which connection again no mantras are laid down. From this it is clear that there can be 'Breath-suspensions' even without the uttering of the syllable 'oṁ.' And thus there need be no mutual interdependence.

Then alone does the man *'become entitled to the syllable oṁ'*;—*i.e.*, to the 'pronouncing' of the syllable,—the word 'pronouncing' having to be supplied if the entire term '*oṅkāra*' is taken as standing for the *Praṇava*. If however we take the term '*kār*' separately in the sense of *making*,—so that '*oṁkāra*' means the *making* or *uttering* of the syllable 'oṁ,'—then we do not need to supply any other word. The uttering of the syllable having been laid down (under 74), where it is called '*praṇava*';—the term '*oṅkāra*' in the present sense simply serves the purpose of explaining what that '*praṇava*' is. So that '*praṇava*' and '*oṅkāra*' are synonymous terms; as we have already pointed out (in the Bhāṣya on 74).—(75)

VERSE LXXVI

OUT OF THE THREE VEDAS, PRAJĀPATI MILKED THE LETTER '*a*,' THE LETTER '*u*' AND THE LETTER '*m*'; AS ALSO THE SYLLABLES 'BHŪḤ-BHUVAḤ-SVAḤ.'—(76)

Bhāṣya.

This verse is a valedictory supplement to the foregoing injunction.

The syllable '*oṁ*' is an aggregate of the three letters '*a*,' '*u*' and '*m*'; and the present verse describes the origin of each of these.

'*Out of the three Vedas*'—from the three Vedas.

'*Milked*'—churned out; just as butter is churned out of the curd.

Not only the three letters, but also something else, in the shape of the syllables '*bhūḥ-bhuvaḥ-svaḥ.*'—(76)

VERSE LXXVII

OUT OF THE THREE VEDAS AGAIN, THE SUPREME PRAJĀPATI MILKED EACH FOOT OF THE SĀVITRĪ VERSE BEGINNING WITH 'TAT.'—(77)

Bhāṣya.

The present verse is a valedictory description of the origin of the *Gāyatrī*-verse beginning with the words '*tat savitur varēṇyam*,' which serves the purpose of introducing the coming injunction. As for the injunction of the *Vyāhṛtis*, this is to be deduced from the valedictory description contained in the preceding verse. As for the actual order in which the several syllables have to be pronounced, that is ascertained from the order in which they are found mentioned in the text. The author is also going to lay down in the next verse—'They should pronounce this syllable (oṁ), and this verse ('*tat savitur*, etc.'), preceded by the *Vyāhṛtis*.'

'*Milked*'—churned out.

"*Beginning with 'tat'*;"—though this being all that the text says, it might refer to an altogether different verse—'*tat savitur vṛṇimahē*, etc.' (Ṛgveda, 5. 82. 1), which is not three-footed,—yet it is the three-footed verse that should be taken as referred to here; and it is the '*Sāvitrī*' verse that is *three-footed.*

In as much as *Kashyapa* and other sages are also called '*Prajāpati*,' the text has added the qualification '*Supreme*'; so that it is Hiraṇyagarbha that becomes specified; as it is He who *dwells on the highest spot*, from where there is no reversion (to worldliness).

This has been added with a view to show the extreme importance of the *Sāvitrī* verse;—it was churned by the highest of all Prajāpatis, out of the Vedas.—(77)

VERSE LXXVIII

RECITING, AT THE TWO TWILIGHTS, THIS SYLLABLE AND THIS VERSE, PRECEDED BY THE VYĀHṚTIS, THE BRĀHMAṆA, LEARNED IN THE VEDA, BECOMES ENDOWED WITH VEDIC MERIT.—(78)

Bhāṣya.

Though this verse is syntactically connected with the section dealing with the Injunction of Vedic study, yet it is to be taken as embodying the injunction of recitation during the Twilight-Prayers; and as regards the '*Gāyatrī*'-verse itself, the mention of it (in the present verse) is merely for the purposes of *reference* (the injunction of its recitation having already gone before), while that of the *Praṇava* and the *Vyāhṛtis* forms the direct injunction of the recitation of these, which has not been enjoined anywhere else.

To this some people make the following objection:—

"This cannot be regarded as an Injunction pertaining to the Twilight Prayers; as these do not form the subject-matter of the present context. Even if it was an injunction, it could only be one pertaining to the Religious Student; as it is the Student whose duties are being propounded in the present context. But this is not possible, since the text has added the qualification '*learned in the Veda*'; and certainly the student just initiated could never be 'learned in the Veda.' Further, the text also adds a particular fruit—'*becomes endowed with Vedic merit*'; while the Injunction of the Twilight-Prayers is a compulsory one. Then again, we do not understand what is this fruit, called 'Vedic merit' which is described as proceeding from the recitation. If what is meant is the merit proceeding from the recitation of the Veda, and if the attaining of this merit is what is meant by being 'endowed with Vedic merit'—then, in regard to this view it has to be noted that so far as the Injunction of Veda-reciting is concerned—which forms the subject-matter of the present context,—there can be no other result proceeding from it, except the understanding of the meaning of the Vedic texts; for the simple reason that no such result has been anywhere mentioned. Further, in as much as there is a perceptible result in the shape of the comprehension of meaning, there can be no room for the assuming of any other results. The injunction of Veda-reciting that there is for the Householder and others,—in the words 'day after day one should recite the Veda'—this also is a compulsory one; and the results mentioned in connection with it, in the shape of 'milk, and honey, etc.,' this is only a valedictory supplement. From all this it is clear that the present verse cannot be regarded as an Injunction (of recitation during the Twilight Prayers). Specially as, if it were taken as an Injunction, all the above difficulties will have to be explained. On the other hand, if the verse be taken as a valedictory reference, then the term 'reciting' could be taken as referring to the Reciting of the Veda, which forms the subject-matter of the context; and in that case it would be possible to construe the term 'Vedic merit' also in some way or the other."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—

It has been already explained that the implications of context are always set aside by those of Syntactical Connection; and for the very reason that the terms 'learned in the Veda' and 'Twilight prayers' are not connected with the subject-matter of the context,—the present Injunction is to be taken as pertaining to something else. The Injunction is simply to the effect that during the two Twilight Prayers one should pronounce the three expressions (*Om—Sāvitrī verse—Vyāhṛtis*); and the term 'learned in the Veda' is merely descriptive?

"But as a matter of fact, it is possible only for persons in the Householder and other stages to be 'learned in the Veda'; the Student can never be so.

What has this *possibility* got to do with the matter? If the term is taken as merely descriptive of what is already known from other sources, then the injunction contained in the verse becomes applicable to people in all stages of life. While if the term 'learned in the Veda' were taken as a significant epithet of the Nominative agent (of the act enjoined), then the student would not be entitled to the act.

"Why should the term be taken as merely descriptive?"

For the simple reason that there would (otherwise) be a syntactical split. The injunction pertaining to the Injunction of the Twilight Prayers, what has to be enjoined regarding it is the reciting of the *Praṇava* and the *Vyāhṛtis*, which has not been enjoined anywhere else. Now, if in addition to these, something else were taken as enjoined,—in the form of 'being learned in the Veda,'—then there would be a syntactical split [the sentence in question containing two injunctions, (*a*) 'should recite the Praṇava, etc.,' and (*b*) 'should learn the Veda'] ; and it is not legitimate to enjoin (by means of a single sentence) several details pertaining to an act already enjoined. Nor is it possible (as another alternative) to take the mention of the *Praṇava* and the *Vyāhṛtis* as merely descriptive [because their injunction has not been met with anywhere else].

From all this it follows that what the Text means is as follows :—'In connection with the *reciting of the Gāyatrī* that has been enjoined in relation to the Twilight Prayers, there is this further detail that the said recitation is to be preceded by the uttering of the *Praṇava* and the *Vyāhṛtis*.'

The mention of the '*Brāhmaṇa*' is only by way of illustration.

It has been argued above that—"the text speaks of a result, while the Injunction of the Twilight Prayers is a compulsory one."

But what inconsistency is there in this ? While what is enjoined is a compulsory act, the result mentioned may follow from the further detail mentioned in the text ; the meaning being that 'the said result follows from the previously enjoined Twilight Prayer, when it is accompanied by the recitation of the *Praṇava* and the *Vyāhṛtis*. Just as when the ordinary Agnihotra is performed with the water brought over in the milking vessel, there comes about the particular result in the shape of cattle ; and this is in accordance with the injunction that 'for one desiring cattle water should be brought in the milking vessel.'

It is on the strength of this last injunction that we have made bold to say what we have said above. In reality the injunction contained in the verse is not an optional one at all (meant only for those desiring the particular result mentioned). Specially as another *Smṛti* (Yājñavalkya, 1. 23) clearly lays it down as a compulsory injunction—'One should recite the *Gāyatrī* along with the *Shiras*, preceded by the *Vyāhṛtis*.' Further, you have yourself argued that the exact nature of the result ('Vedic merit') cannot be ascertained (which is an argument against the text being taken as laying down a result).

As a matter of fact, what 'Vedic merit' means is as follows:—'The merit that has been described in the Veda as resulting from the saying of the Twilight Prayers accrues to man only when he recites all the three expressions—and not by reciting the *Gāyatrī* only.' '*Puṇya*,' '*merit*,' is *excellence*. Since *Smṛtis* are based upon the *Veda*, what is mentioned in the *Smṛtis* is also called 'Veda-merit,' which last expression stands for the '*merit of the Veda*.'

"What is the merit of the Veda?"

That (merit) which is expounded by the Veda. The merit that results from the Veda being recited may also be called 'the merit of the Veda'; but by virtue of the specific relationship, it is what is expounded by the Veda,—and what is *produced* by it—that should be spoken of as 'merit of the Veda.' As for the *producing* of merit, this is done by other things also, such as sacrificial performances and the like; while the *expounding* of it is done by the Veda only.

Some people have taken the last foot of the Verse to mean as follows—"What has been enjoined as compulsory Vedic Study becomes fulfilled merely by reciting the three expressions during the Twilight Prayers."

But this is not right. For if the present text meant this, then it would be providing an option to what has been laid down as the compulsory 'Vedic Study'; and this would mean the partial rejection of this study. But so long as we can avoid it, it is not right to admit the rejection of any injunction.

'*This syllable*'—refers to the syllable '*om.*'

"But this is not a single *letter*, containing as it does, two or three syllables."

Our answer is that the term 'syllable' here stands for 'vowel-sound' and 'contact with consonants.' Hence the term denotes that which forms the subject-matter of the context.

'*This Verse*'—*i.e.*, the *Sāvitrī* verse '*tat saviturvarēṇyam*, etc.'

'*Preceded by the Vyāhṛtis*;'—*i.e.*, that before which the *Vyāhṛtis* have been uttered. Here only the *three Vyāhṛtis* are meant,—these alone having been mentioned in the present context (in verse 76),—and not the *seven*, ending with '*Satyam.*'

VERSE LXXIX

REPEATING THIS TRIAD A THOUSAND TIMES IN OPEN AIR, THE TWICE-BORN PERSON BECOMES FREED, IN A MONTH, FROM EVEN GREAT SIN, AS THE SNAKE FROM ITS SLOUGH. —(79)

Bhāṣya.

The term '*bahiḥ*,' 'in *open air*,' stands for *uncovered spot*; the sense being that it should be done outside towns and villages, on the bank of rivers and such places.

'*A thousand times, repeating*'—reciting it again and again.

"The affix '*kṛtvasuch*' (in the term '*Sahasrakṛtvaḥ*') also signifies *repetition*, which is again denoted by the word '*abhyasya*' also; so there is needless repetition."

The repetition is not objectionable, in view of a distinction between general and particular. That is to say, the word '*abhyasya*' denotes *repetition in general*, and when the question arises as to the *particular* number of repetitions, we have the text adding '*a thousand times.*' Both the general and the particular could not be regarded as signified by the single word ending with the '*kṛtvasuch*' affix; because this latter word always stands in need of a particular act (that has to be done a thousand times). The mere expression '*dēvadattaḥ panchakritvo'haḥ,*' 'Devadatta five times during the day' does not signify anything until the word '*bhunkte,*' '*Eats,*' is added.

"But the term '*repeating*' also does not signify any particular *act.*"

True; but the act of *reciting* forms the subject-matter of the context; so that the *repeating* is understood as pertaining to that act; '*repetition*' standing for *attending to it again and again.*

'*Even from great sin*';—he becomes freed from even such heinous sins as 'Brāhmaṇa-killing' and the like; what to say of minor offences?

'*Api,*' '*Even,*' denotes *possibility,* not *cumulation*; cumulation is expressed when more things than one are mentioned separately; as in the sentence—'there is sovereignty of Devadatta, *and* of Yajñadatta *also.*' There is no such separate mention in the text.

Question—"From what minor offences does the man become freed? *Cow-killing* and such acts have been regarded as 'minor offences'; and for every one of these the scriptures have prescribed distinct expiatory rites along with all their details. While as regards those acts that are not done consciously, but which are regarded as *must have been done,*—though no definite expiation could be prescribed for them, yet they would be got rid of by means of the Twilight Prayers and such other compulsory rites prescribed for daily performance. Then again, if what is mentioned in the present verse were a real expiation, it should have come under the section on Expiatory Rites (Ch. XI); just as it is said (under 11. 77)—'One may recite the text of the Veda while keeping due restraint over food.' Further, if the present verse were meant to prescribe an expiatory rite, the whole section dealing with Expiatory Rites (Ch. XI) would be superfluous. For, what accused person would omit to do the expiation consisting of the mere reciting of mantras, and go in for the very difficult rites endangering the body and very life itself? Says an old saying—'If honey were available in a place within easy reach, wherefore should one go to the hills? The desired end having been accomplished, which wise man could put forth further efforts?'—and again—'What can be obtained for a single coin, no wise man purchases for ten coins.' Nor can the verse be taken as a valedictory supplement to what forms the subject-matter of the context (*i.e.*, Vedic Study), because there is no ground for connecting it syntactically with the context,—such grounds, for instance, as being found defective if taken apart from the context and so forth."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—The present verse is a direct Injunction; and the act laid down is done for the removing of sins. It has been argued that—"What is laid down here (being too easy) could not be regarded as optional with those rites that are prescribed in a different context and are very much more difficult." But it can certainly be taken as optional with those expiations which consist in Mantra-recitations. For instance, the reciting of the *Aghamarṣaṇa-Mantra* has been declared as destroying all sins; and with this what is laid down in the present verse could be taken as optional. In connection with the *Aghamarṣaṇa-Mantra*, three days fasting is prescribed, while according to what is laid down in the present verse, the man becomes freed by doing the reciting for a month, but taking two ordinary meals every day. Thus the difference between the two is not so great as to lead us to regard them as very diverse in character.

Or, what is mentioned here may be taken as purifying the man from such past sins as are indicated by the evil position of planets, etc.; and it is from these sins that the man becomes free. '*Sin*' is something undesirable; from this the man *becomes freed*,—*i.e.*, is not affected by the results of those sins.

'*Just as the snake from the slough*,'—just as the snake becomes freed from the cast-off skin. This means that the sin is completely removed.

For such past sins as are indicated by the discolouring of the skin and such other diseases, other *Smṛtis* have prescribed many expiatory rites. All this we shall explain under the section on Expiatory Rites.

It is in view of what is said in the present verse that we have the saying—'There is no fall for people who go on reciting *mantras* and pouring libations.'—(79)

VERSE LXXX

BEREFT OF THIS VERSE, AND OF THE TIMELY PERFORMANCE OF HIS OWN DUTY, A PERSON OF BRĀHMAṆA, KṢATTRIYA OR VAISHYA BIRTH INCURS THE ODIUM OF GOOD MEN.—(80)

Bhāṣya.

'*By this verse*'—by the *Sāvitrī*.

'*Bereft*';—he who fails to observe the Twilight Prayers and neglects Vedic Study.

'*Odium*'—Blame.

'*Among good men*'—Among the highly cultured people.

'*Incurs*'—becomes open to.

With a view to show what sort of odium he incurs, the Text adds—'*and of the timely performance of his own duty*.' —'*Timely*'—*e.g.*, the sixteenth year for the Brāhmaṇa and so forth. When the man is bereft of these rites, he becomes despised.

From this it is clear that even though the boy may have been *initiated*, and as such become qualified for Vedic Study,—yet, if he is bereft of the *Sāvitrī*, he becomes a '*Vrātya*,' apostate.

What is meant by '*his own duty*' is just that duty which is common to the three castes; and this is the duty of Initiation. It is only when we interpret it thus that the qualification 'timely' comes to have any sense. If the 'duty' meant were the duties of Vedic Study and the rest, the text would have said simply 'performance of his own duty' (without the qualification 'timely').

The term '*yoni*' being synonymous with '*birth*' denotes *caste*. So what is meant is the person of the Brāhmaṇa and other castes.

The present verse is only a descriptive supplement, added for the purpose of making the Expiatory Rites prescribed for the *Vrātya* (apostate) applicable to the omissions mentioned here.—(80)

VERSE LXXXI

THE THREE IMPERISHABLE MAHĀVYĀHṚTIS PRECEDED BY THE SYLLABLE 'OṂ,' AND THE THREE-FOOTED SĀVITRĪ,—THESE SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE 'MOUTH OF BRAHMAN.'—(81)

Bhāṣya.

"*Preceded by the syllable Om*"—in the beginning of which the syllable 'Om' occurs.—'*Mahāvyāhṛtis*';—this refers to the three syllables '*bhūḥ—bhuvaḥ—svaḥ*,' which form the subject-matter of the present context.

'*Imperishable*';—the syllables are so called in view of the fact that the results proceeding from their repetition are long-standing. If this were not meant, then the qualification would be superfluous, as all words are equally imperishable, eternal.

Three-footed Sāvitrī;—the verse '*tat savituḥ, etc.*'

'*The mouth of Brahman.*'—These are called 'mouth' in the sense that they form its opening. Hence this verse is to be regarded as the valedictory supplement of the Injunction that these should be recited at the beginning of Vedic Study.

Or 'mouth' may mean *portal*, the means;—the sense being that *union with Brahman* is reached by this means. This is what is described in the next verse.—(81)

VERSE LXXXII

HE WHO, UNTIRED, RECITES THIS, DAY AFTER DAY, FOR THREE YEARS, TURNS INTO AIR, AND BECOMING TRANSFIGURED INTO ĀKĀSHA, REACHES THE SUPREME BRAHMAN.—(82)

Bhāṣya.

He becomes omnipresent, all-pervading, like *Ākāsha.*

'*Transfigured into Ākāsha*'—means that he acquires the nature of Ākāsha. '*Mūrti*,' 'Figure,' does not stand here for the *Body;* as Ākāsha has no 'body' at all.

"What is this '*Brahman*' into whose form the man is said to become merged?"

It is the Supreme Soul, of the nature of Bliss; He of whom all these embodied souls are mere modes, just as waves are of the ocean perturbed by the force of wind. And just as when the ocean becomes calm, the waves become merged into it, in the same manner the embodied souls become transformed and merged into the Supreme Soul. All this is going to be described in detail in Discourse 12.

What is enjoined in the present context is the mere reciting and study of the *Gāyatrī* verse, not its *Japa*, repetition; this is shown by the fact that the number of repetitions is not stated.

'*Untired*';—this denotes that the recitation is to be carried out again and again; as a single recitation can never tire a person.

What is enjoined here pertains to persons seeking for Final Release.—(82)

VERSE LXXXIII

THE MONO-SYLLABLE IS THE HIGHEST BRAHMAN; BREATH-SUSPENSIONS ARE THE HIGHEST AUSTERITY; NOTHING IS HIGHER THAN THE SĀVITRĪ VERSE; TRUTH IS BETTER THAN SILENCE.—(83)

Bhāṣya.

The '*monosyllable*' is the syllable '*om.*'—It is the '*Supreme Brahman,*' in the sense that it is the means of reaching Brahman. This assertion is based upon the fact that Brahman is attained by the 'repeating,' and 'the meditation upon the signification,' of the syllable (as mentioned in *Yogasūtra* 1. 28). '*Om*' is a name of Brahman; as says the *Yogasūtra* (1. 23)—'The Praṇava is expressive of Him (God).'

"In comparison with what is this the *highest?*"

It is higher than all other forms of Brahman-meditation. The meditation upon the syllable '*om*' as Brahman is superior to all the several forms of meditation mentioned in such texts as 'One should meditate upon food as Brahman' (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 2. 2. 1), 'The teaching is that the Sun is Brahman' (*Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, 3. 19. 1); and this for the simple reason that the attainment of Brahman has been described as proceeding from the mere recitation of that syllable; and also because the word itself has been described as 'Brahman,' in such passages as—'One who is well versed in Brahman in the form of Word attains the supreme Brahman.' (*Maitry-upaniṣad*, 6. 22). Nothing is beyond the reach of words, and of all words the syllable '*om*' is the very source; as says the *Shruti*—'Just as the needle pierces through all the leaves, so in the same manner is all speech pierced by *om*, all this is *om* itself' (*Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, 2. 23. 4). The 'piercing' spoken of in this passage means 'pervasion,' 'becoming the receptacle.'

"But in what manner is all speech *pierced* by *om?*"

Well, as regards the *word* of the Veda, it has already been pointed out (in verse 74) that its source lies in the syllable '*om.*' As regards the words of secular speech, it has been declared by Āpastamba (1. 4. 13. 9) that 'All sentences should be preceded by *om.*'

The above passage (from the Chhāndogya) has been explained differently in the *Upaniṣad-bhāṣya*; we are not reproducing that explanation here, as it has no bearing on the present context.

The term '*breath-suspension*' here stands for the act of suspending the breath along with the entire procedure beginning with the sipping of water.

'*Highest austerity*';—*i.e.*, an austerity higher than the Chāndrāyaṇa and the rest.

"What is the *superiority* here (meant by the epithet '*highest*')?"

It is purely figurative.

'*There is nothing higher than the Sāvitrī*';—*i.e.*, no other *mantra*.

In praise of all this we have the next expression—'*Truth is better than silence.*' '*Silence*' is control of speech. And the result accruing from the telling of truth is superior to that resulting from the control of speech. Since the *telling of truth* implies the acting up to a positive injunction, while in *silence* there is observance of the mere prohibition of telling lies.

This verse is purely valedictory.—(83)

VERSE LXXXIV

ALL VEDIC ACTS OF OBLATION AND SACRIFICE PASS AWAY; WHILE THIS SYLLABLE (OM) IS TO BE REGARDED AS IMPERISHABLE; AND IT IS BRAHMAN, AND ALSO PRAJĀPATI.—(84)

Bhāṣya.

All acts laid down in the Veda—'*oblations*' in the form of *Agnihotra* and the rest,—as also '*sacrifices*' in the form of *Jyotiṣṭoma* and the rest,—'*pass away*'; *i.e.*, either they never bring about their results in their entirety, or even when brought about, those results perish quickly.

'*This syllable*'—'*om*'—is to be known as '*imperishable*,' *i.e.*, bringing about imperishable results; since for one who has become merged into Brahman, there is no return to worldly existence. Thus leading to an imperishable result, the syllable is itself called 'imperishable.' One of the two terms '*akṣara*,' one is a noun, which forms the subject of the sentence, while the other, is the predicate, and is taken in its literal sense.

That same syllable is also Brahman, and Prajāpati.

This also is purely valedictory.

The expression '*juhoti-yajati*' mentions two verbal roots; and the term '*kriyā*' stands for the actions of *Homa* (oblation) and *Yāga* (sacrifice)—as denoted by the two roots. The plural number is due to the multiplicity of the acts. Or, the two verbal roots may be taken as standing for the acts of *Homa* and *Yāga* themselves, while '*kriyā*' stands for the other acts of charity and the like. The whole is a copulative compound—made up of the three terms '*juhoti*,' '*yajati*' and '*kriyā*,'—the acts of *Homa* and *Yāga* being separately mentioned by reason of their importance.

Some people have held that this praise of the syllable '*om*' by itself (as apart from the *Vyāhṛtis* and the *Sāvitrī* verse) is meant to enjoin the repetition of the syllable; and they argue that this cannot be taken as merely supplementary to the foregoing injunction of the reciting of the Sāvitrī along with '*om*,' etc., as no reference to this latter is made in the present verse; as there is in the case of the *Vaishvānara* sacrifice, in connection with which we find two passages—(*a*) '*Yadaṣṭākapalo bhavati gāyatryā chainam brahmavarchasēna punāti*,' and (*b*) '*Yannavakapalastṛvṛtaivāsmimstējo dadhāti*,'—where reference is distinctly made to a foregoing injunction; so that so long as it is found possible (on the basis of this reference) to connect the injunctions syntactically (and treat them as a single injunction), there can be no justification for splitting them up into two distinct injunctions. In the present instance, on the other hand, when it is said that '*this should be regarded as imperishable*,' there is no reference to any thing that has gone before; nor is there any reference made to the *Sāvitrī*, etc. For these reasons, the present text is to be taken as a self-contained injunction, and not as supplementary to something else. Further, the verbal affix in '*jñēyaḥ*' '(should be regarded)' is purely injunctive. And this, taken along with the word '*brahma*,' gives the sense that 'this should be regarded—*i.e.*, meditated upon—as Brahman'; and this '*meditation*' stands for the mental process of repeating the syllable.—(84)

VERSE LXXXV

THE OFFERING THAT CONSISTS IN THE REPEATING OF MANTRAS EXCELS THE ENJOINED (RITUALISTIC) OFFERING TEN TIMES; THE INAUDIBLE (REPEATING) EXCELS THIS LATTER A HUNDRED TIMES; AND THE MENTAL (REPEATING) EXCELS IT A THOUSANDFOLD.—(85)

Bhāṣya.

The '*enjoined offering*' is that which forms the subject of injunctions; such as *Jyotiṣṭoma* and the rest; such acts are called 'enjoined offering,' as they have been enjoined by words like 'should offer' and the rest, and are performed by means of external acts, and with the full accompaniment of priests and other innumerable details.

The *Japa*, 'Repeating of Mantras' is not an 'offering'; but with a view to eulogise it, it has been spoken as an 'offering' only figuratively; consequently this cannot be included under the term 'enjoined offering.'

This latter '*excels*,'—is a better, superior, offering than the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and the rest,—'*ten times*.'

What is meant here is that the Repeating of Mantras is highly efficacious; the meaning being that the results proceeding from the Repetition are the same, but larger, as those proceeding from the Ritualistic Offerings. It is not meant that the Repeating of Mantras actually brings about results larger than those brought about by the ritualistic sacrifices; for if it were really so, who would ever undertake the performance of the latter, which involve much physical hardship and the expenditure of much wealth? For these reasons it is clear that what is said here is a mere praise (of the Repeating of Mantras); just like the assertion that 'One attains all desirable ends by the

Final Oblation.' All that is meant is that from this act also the same results follow, in the shape of Heaven and the rest; but the difference in the amount of human effort involved leads to the difference in the degree of the result. And as the text does not specify any particular result, it should be taken to mean that by the Repeating of Mantras one obtains the same results—in the shape of heaven, landed property, children and cattle—as those proceeding from sacrificial performances.

'*The Inaudible, a hundred times*'—That repeating of Mantras is called Inaudible which is not heard by any other person, however near he may be.

'*A thousand times—the Mental.*'—That in which the Mantra in meditated upon by a mere mental operation.

The 'Inaudible' and other qualifications pertain to all kinds of Repeating Mantras (and not only to the repeating of the *Gāyatrī*, etc.); the continuity of the context, starting from verse 82, having been broken. Hence, whenever there is repetition of Mantras—in the course of either Expiatory Rites, or the rites performed for the allaying of portents, or those intended to bring about prosperity,—the said qualifications become applicable.

The term '*sāhasra*' literally means *that which has a thousand*; and since the noun spoken of is '*guṇa*,' 'times,' 'fold,' the term means 'thousand-fold'; the term 'fold' standing for *part*. That this refers to the *excess of results* is clear from the connection of the entire sentence.—(85)

VERSE LXXXVI

THE FOUR COOKED OFFERINGS, ALONG WITH THE ENJOINED SACRIFICES,—ALL THESE ARE NOT WORTH THE SIXTEENTH PART OF THE OFFERING THAT CONSISTS IN THE REPEATING OF MANTRAS.—(86)

Bhāṣya.

The five 'great sacrifices,' leaving off the *Brahmayajñya*, are what are meant by the 'four cooked offerings.'

'*Enjoined sacrifices*'—those already described (under the preceding verse); along with these latter, the former (four) 'are not worth the sixteenth part'—*i.e.*, are not equal to the sixteenth part.

Or, the root '*arha*' may be taken in the sense of the price paid for the obtaining of a certain thing. The root '*arha*' with the Present-Tense-ending '*tip*' gives the form '*arhanti*.'—(86)

VERSE LXXXVII

IT IS BY MEANS OF REPEATING MANTRAS THAT THE BRĀHMAṆA SUCCEEDS;—THERE IS NO DOUBT IN THIS. HE MAY, OR MAY NOT, DO ANYTHING ELSE, ONE COMES TO BE CALLED A BRĀHMAṆA IF HE IS OF A FRIENDLY DISPOSITION.—(87)

Bhāṣya.

By means of repeating Mantras alone the Brāhmaṇa succeeds;—*i.e.*, acquires all desirable results, and also attains Brahman.

No such doubt on this point should be entertained in the mind, as—"How can one acquire, by means of Mantra-repetition alone, such results as are obtained only by means of such elaborate acts as the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and the rest, which cost much effort, or from deep and prolonged meditations?"—Because as a matter of fact, such success does actually follow.

'*He may do anything else*.'—In the shape of the Jyotiṣṭoma and other non-compulsory acts,—'*or not do it*.'—For 'one comes to be called a *Brahmaṇa if he is of a friendly disposition*.' '*Maitra*' is the same as '*mitra*.' The Brahmaṇa should be friendly to all living beings; and how can there be any *friendliness* (benevolence) in such acts as the killing of animals during the *Agnīṣomīya* offerings?

This passage is purely valedictory; it is not a prohibition of the killing of animals during sacrifices; because it is only supplementary to what has gone before (and as such it cannot be taken as an independent prohibition), and because such killing is directly enjoined in the Veda itself.

Thus ends the process of Repeating Mantras.—(87)

XVIII. Control of Sensual Desires

VERSE LXXXVIII

THE WISE MAN SHOULD PUT FORTH AN EFFORT TO RESTRAIN HIS ORGANS ROAMING AMONG ALLURING OBJECTS; JUST AS THE DRIVER RESTRAINS THE HORSES.—(88)

Bhāṣya.

All that the teaching means is that " one should strive to restrain his organs '; the rest of the text is merely descriptive, up to the verse where we have the injunction regarding the Twilight Prayers (101).

'*Restrain*'—means the avoiding of addiction to prohibited objects and the avoiding of excessive addiction to even those objects that are permitted. That the prohibited things should be avoided we learn from those prohibitions themselves: hence the present verse and the verses that follow should be taken as laying down the avoiding of over-addiction to even such things as are not prohibited.

This is what is meant by the expression—'*roaming among objects,*'—*i.e.*, in course of their natural functioning.

'*Alluring.*'—Things that attract, draw to themselves, overpower, the man, are called 'alluring objects,' those that captivate the mind. *Roaming* among these means 'functioning among them in manifold ways.' If the organs did not operate among them, what could even the most alluring objects do? Or, even if the organs were devoid of all restraint, if the objects themselves were repellant, it would be a very simple matter for the agent to restrain himself. As a matter of fact, however, both are at fault (the objects are alluring and the organs are operative among them); hence it becomes necessary to put forth special effort, the organs being hard to control.

'*As the driver restrains the horses.*'—'*Driver*' is the *charioteer*. Just as the charioteer puts forth special effort to control the horses that are naturally restive, and are prone to run wild along the wrong way, and the horses become obedient to him,—in the same way one should curb the organs to his own will.—(88)

VERSE LXXXIX

THOSE ELEVEN ORGANS WHICH THE ANCIENT SAGES HAVE NAMED I SHALL NOW FULLY DESCRIBE IN DUE ORDER.—(89)

Bhāṣya.

This enumeration of the organs is as laid down in other sources of information; and the present text is not intended to lay down the number of organs. The description is provided by our author only on account of his good will towards his audience. The organs have been *named by the ancient sages*; and I shall now describe their names and also their function.

'*In due order.*'—Implies *absence of confusion.*

The reference to the '*ancient sages*' is meant to indicate that the enumeration of the organs is not something invented by the logicians, it was something already known among the ancient teachers. In fact, people not knowing this are ridiculed by men as 'not learned in the scriptures'; hence these should be properly understood.

The meaning of the words of the text are well known, and have been already explained.—(89)

VERSE XC

(THEY ARE) THE EAR, THE SKIN, THE EYES, THE TONGUE AND THE NOSE AS THE FIFTH; THE ANUS, THE GENERATIVE ORGAN, THE HANDS AND FEET, AND SPEECH DESCRIBED AS THE TENTH.—(90)

Bhāṣya.

The *Ear* and the rest are well known. We have '*Eyes*' in the Dual, in view of the two different *substrata* (of the Visual Organ); in other places we have the singular number in view of the fact that the *Faculty* itself, subsisting in the said substrata, is *one* only.

The '*Generative Organ*,'—the organ secreting the semen (in males), and the ovule and its receptacle (in females).

'*Hands and feet*'—'*Hastapādam*';—the copulative compound has been put in the singular number according to Pāṇini 2. 4. 2, by which copulative compounds consisting of terms expressive of limbs of living beings are put in the singular.

'*Speech*' here stands for that part of the body which consists of the Palate and the rest, and serve to manifest sound.

This verse mentions the names (of Organs).—(90)

VERSE XCI

OF THESE THE FIVE BEGINNING WITH THE EAR IN DUE ORDER THEY CALL "ORGANS OF SENSATION'; AND FIVE OF THESE, BEGINNING WITH THE ANUS, "ORGANS OF ACTION."—(91)

Bhāṣya.

The author now proceeds to describe the functions of the organs, with a view to determine their precise nature. [This is necessary, because] they are not perceptible.

'*Organs of Sensation*';—*i.e.*, the organs productive of sensation; they bring about effects in the form of sensations. The Genitive (in the compound '*buddhīndriyāṇām*') denotes the relation of cause and effect.

'*Beginning with the Ear, in due order*';—the phrase '*in due order*' has been added with a view to prevent the notion that the term '*ādi*' signifies *kind*. "*Order*" again is in accordance with position; hence what is meant is the order in which the organs have been mentioned in the foregoing verse.

'*Organs of action*';—it is the 'action' of *motion* that is meant here.—(91)

VERSE XCII

THE MIND IS TO BE REGARDED AS THE ELEVENTH, WHICH, BY ITS OWN QUALITY, IS OF TWO-FOLD NATURE; AND ON THIS BEING SUBDUED, BOTH THE AFORESAID FIVE-MENTIONED GROUPS BECOME SUBDUED.—(92)

Bhāṣya.

The *Mind* is what completes the number *eleven*, which is the number of sense-organs.

The '*own quality*' of Mind is volition, desire; it is with the Mind that people will or desire both what is good and what is bad. [This is what is meant by its being '*of two-fold nature*']. Or, the Mind may be regarded as 'of two-fold nature' in the sense that it partakes of the character of both sets of organs—those of sensation as well as those of action; as the functioning of both these sets of organs is rooted in volition.

'*On this being subdued*,' both five-membered groups,—*i.e.*, the group of the organs of sensation, as well as that of the organs of action, which have been described above,—become subdued.

This only describes a real fact.—(92)

VERSE XCIII

BY ATTACHMENT TO THE ORGANS ONE INCURS EVIL, WITHOUT DOUBT; WHILE BY SUBJUGATING THOSE SAME HE ATTAINS SUCCESS.—(93)

Bhāṣya.

'*Attachment*' means *addiction*; '*by*' this, as the means, one '*incurs*'—attains—'*evil*,' visible as well as invisible. There is no doubt in this; it is absolutely certain.

'*By subjugating these*—organs—one subsequently '*attains success*,'—the attainment of the desired end; *i.e.*, he acquires in its entirety all the fruits of the performance of acts enjoined in *Shruti* and in *Smṛti*.—(93)

VERSE XCIV

NEVER IS DESIRE APPEASED BY THE ENJOYMENT OF DESIRES; IT ONLY WAXES STRONGER, LIKE FIRE BY CLARIFIED BUTTER.—(94)

Bhāṣya.

That no longing for sensual objects should be entertained by reason of the teaching of the scriptures may rest aside for the present; in fact there is even apparent happiness proceeding from the cessation of desires. When sensual objects are enjoyed, they only tend to produce stronger desires. For instance, even after a man has eaten his fill, even to the distension of the stomach, and is fully satisfied, there is still a longing in his heart—'why cannot I eat more?'—and it is only through sheer inability that he does not eat more. This shows that desire can never cease by enjoyment.

'*Desire*'—longing.

'*Of Desires*'—*i.e.*, of things desired, longed for.

'*Enjoyment*'—addiction to.

'*Is appeased*'—ceases.

'*Stronger*'—more and more.

'*By ghṛta*'—by clarified butter.

'*Kṛṣṇavartmā*'—Fire.

Longing is a form of pain; until one has experienced a certain taste, he has no longing for it.

This verse only describes the true state of things. It has been thus described—'Whatever corns and grains, gold, cattle and women there are on the earth are not enough to satisfy a single person;—pondering over this, one should betake himself to tranquil restraint.'—(94)

VERSE XCV

AS BETWEEN ONE WHO WOULD ATTAIN ALL THESE, AND ANOTHER WHO WOULD RENOUNCE THEM ALL, THE RENUNCIATION OF DESIRES SURPASSES THE ATTAINMENT OF THEM.—(95)

Bhāṣya.

The present verse formulates the conclusion deduced from the reasons adduced in the foregoing verses. [The sense being] in as much as Desire only waxes stronger by fulfilment, hence if a pleasure-seeking person—in the shape of a young king—'*should attain*'—be addicted to—'*all those*' desires;—while another person—in the shape of the life-long celibate—'*renounces them all*,'—*i.e.*, does not touch even the slightest thing;—between these two, the latter surpasses the *attainer*, the enjoyer. That is, the man who renounces pleasures is vastly superior.

This is self-evident.—(95)

VERSE XCVI

THESE (ORGANS), BEING CONTAMINATED WITH OBJECTS, ARE NOT CAPABLE OF BEING SUBJUGATED BY MERE ABSTINENCE, AS THEY ARE BY EVER PRESENT KNOWLEDGE.—(96)

Bhāṣya.

"Well, if this is so, then the right course would appear to be that one should retire to the forest; as there will be no objects within reach; and being beyond reach, they would naturally never be sought after."—With a view to such notions, the text adds that the organs should not be subjugated by mere abstinence; as in that case the man would have no pleasures at all, while the *Smṛti* has distinctly declared that—'Acquiring merit, wealth and pleasures, one should see that his mornings, mid-days and evenings are not useless' (*Gautama*, 9. 46); and further, the continuance of the body itself would become impossible, by total abstinence. What therefore is meant is to prohibit excessive longing; and even though one may enjoy pleasures, this excessive longing ceases under the influence—(*a*) of '*knowledge*,' of defects in the objects, as described in the scriptures, such for instance as in 6. 76 below,—(*b*) of one's own experience, whereby the said pleasures are found to be unpleasant in their consequences,—and (*c*) of the constant and gradual practice of non-attachment arising from the due examination of the effects of the pleasures. It is not possible for the said longing to be renounced all at once.

'*Ever present*';—this qualifies '*knowledge*.'

'*Contaminated*'—active, since objects are beset with defects, the addiction to them is called 'contamination.'

The '*shas*' used here is one that is frequently used by Vyāsa, Manu and other great sages,—in such expressions as '*nityashaḥ*,' '*anupūrvashaḥ*,' '*sarvashaḥ*,' '*pūrvashaḥ*,' and so forth. But exceptional efforts have to be made in order to establish the correctness of such usage. And in as much as the rule regarding the use of the affix '*shas*' as laid down in *Pāṇini* 5. 4. 43, is that *it is added to singular nouns, in the sense of repetition*,—it is necessary to make the words in question imply, somehow or other, the notion of *repetition*. Other people have explained the expression '*shas*' as a noun formed from the root '*shas*' to stand, with the affix '*kvip*'; and the word thus formed would be neuter and would be treated as an adverb, the meaning being—'*by knowledge which is ever-standing*.'—(96)

VERSE XCVII

THE VEDAS, RENUNCIATION, SACRIFICES, RESTRAINTS AND AUSTERITIES NEVER ATTAIN FULFILMENT FOR ONE WHOSE DISPOSITION IS VITIATED.—(97)

Bhāṣya.

The present verse is clearly injunctive.

'*The Vedas*'—*i.e.*, the study and recitation of them.

'*Renunciation*'—means *charity*, figuratively; or, it may mean the renouncing of the taking of even such meat and wine as are not prohibited, under the impression that such abstention brings its own reward.

He whose '*disposition*'—*i.e.*, mind—'*is vitiated*.'

'*Never attain fulfilment*'—they do not bring about their due results, at any time. From this it follows that at the time of the performance of the said acts, one should not allow his mind to turn towards objects of sensuous enjoyment; for it is only thus that he may disregard all other thoughts and concentrate his mind upon the act itself.

What this text enjoins is that one should avoid of all thought of sensual objects,—this avoidance being a necessary accompaniment of all acts; as in its absence the act becomes futile. The 'vitiation of disposition' consists in the fact that at the time when the man is engaged in the performance of an act, he ceases to have his mind concentrated upon that act, and allows it to turn towards vice.—(97)

VERSE XCVIII

THAT MAN IS TO BE KNOWN AS HAVING SUBJUGATED HIS SENSE-ORGANS, WHO, ON HAVING HEARD, OR TOUCHED, OR SEEN, OR TASTED, OR SMELT, ANYTHING, NEITHER REJOICES NOR GRIEVES.—(98)

Bhāṣya.

'*Having heard*,'—such things as the sound of the flute, singing, etc., or such flattering words as 'you are Bṛhaspati himself,'—'*does not rejoice*.'

'*Does not grieve*'—does not suffer mental sorrow; '*grief*' means sorrow.

'*Having touched*';—such things as garments made of the hair of the *Raṅku* deer, or of silk, or of the wool of sheep and goats, he touches with equal feelings. Similarly he has exactly the same feelings in regard to the sight of beautiful young women or of enemies; he eats with equal feelings food cooked with plenty of butter and milk, as well as coarse *kodrava* grains; he has the same feelings when smelling such things as the oil of *Devadāru* and the oil of camphor, etc.

The man should behave so that he is not touched by mental joy or sorrow; it is thus that his organs become subjugated; and not by mere inactivity. So that restraint should be practised up to the said point.—(98)

Objection—" Contact with women alone having been prohibited for the Religious Student, why should the taking of nicely cooked food received in alms be prohibited for him?"

In answer to this we have this next verse:—

VERSE XCIX

FROM AMONG ALL THE ORGANS, IF ONE HAPPENS TO OOZE OUT, THEN THEREBY HIS WISDOM OOZES OUT, JUST LIKE WATER FROM ONE PART OF THE LEATHERN BAG.—(99)

Bhāṣya.

[In the term '*indriyāṇām*'] the Genitive has the force of specification.

If even *one organ happens to ooze out*;—*i.e.*, if on functioning freely in regard to its object, it is not checked,—then '*his wisdom oozes out*';—*i.e.*, his steadiness in regard to the other organs also (disappears).

'*Leathern bag*';—a vessel for carrying water, made of the skin of the goat and other animals. Even though all the other parts of this bag be closed, if water trickles out of a single part of it, the whole bag becomes empty.

In the same manner, the man's steadiness acquired through continuous practice of wisdom,—or even true wisdom and knowledge itself—(becomes entirely lost). That is, being addicted to several objects, he has his mind always turned towards them, so that the subjects dealt with by reasonings and scriptures do not present themselves to him in the right manner.—(99)

VERSE C

HAVING BROUGHT THE HOST OF ORGANS UNDER CONTROL, AND HAVING ALSO SUBDUED THE MIND, ONE SHOULD ACCOMPLISH ALL HIS PURPOSES, TAKING CARE NOT TO INJURE HIS BODY.—(100)

Bhāṣya.

The present verse sums up the section.

Even though the Mind also is an 'organ' yet it is mentioned separately by reason of its importance.

'*Grama*,' '*host*,' means *group*.

Having brought under subjection the organs and the Mind, '*one should accomplish*'—bring about—'*all his purposes*'—all those results that are accomplished by means of rites laid down in *Shrutis* and *Smṛtis*.

'*Not injuring*'—causing pain to—his body.

'*Yogataḥ*,' '*taking care*,'—*i.e.*, by careful means. This is added with a view to such cases in which a person with delicate constitution suffers great pain if, all on a sudden, he takes to such austere ways of living as sleeping upon hard beds and wearing the deer-skin and so forth. The sense is that people, who are accustomed to well-cooked and delicious food, and to soft beds, etc., should not abandon these all at once; they should only gradually accustom themselves to things other than those they are accustomed to.

The term '*Yoga*' may stand for well-graduated activity. In this sense the epithet '*Yogataḥ*' is to be construed with '*having brought under control*.'

Or, we may construe the epithet just as it stands, the meaning being that 'he should have recourse to such methods as not to injure his body.' That is, he should not hurriedly renounce what may be necessary for his body.

Or again, '*Yoga*' may stand for *care*; and the '*tasi*' affix in this case has the sense of the instrumental; the sense being 'he should protect his body with care.'—(100)

XIX. Twilight Prayers

VERSE CI

EVERYDAY DURING THE EARLIER TWILIGHT ONE SHOULD STAND REPEATING THE SĀVITRĪ, TILL THE SUN BECOMES DISTINCTLY VISIBLE; AND DURING THE LATER TWILIGHT HE SHOULD SIT TILL THE STARS ARE CLEARLY SEEN.—(101)

Bhāṣya.

'*Earlier twilight*' is that when the morning is ahead; and the 'later twilight' is that when the sun sets. During the former '*one should stand, repeating the Sāvitrī*'; *i.e.*, rising from the seat, one should desist from moving and continue to remain at the same place. The '*Sāvitrī*' has already been described as the verse '*tatsavitur varēṇyam*'; and it is this verse that has been referred to in the verse 2. 78 laying down the pronouncing of the syllable '*om*,' etc., in connection with the reciting of the Twilight Prayers.

'*Till the sun is visible*'—till the blessed God Sun becomes seen.

The present verse contains the injunction of the *Repeating* (of the *Sāvitrī*) and the *Standing*.

Question:—"What is the use of laying down the limit? The 'twilight' naturally ceases at sun-rise. For the very definition of 'Twilight' is that 'it is that time during which darkness is not all gone, nor is light quite complete.' It is also thus described—'When there is brightness in the sky and darkness on the earth, this time has been called *Sāvitra*, sacred to the Sun.' In the *Nirukta* also it is said that 'When there is ruddiness below, it is the *Sāvitra* time.' In works dealing with animals also it is said—'From what similarity—because it is ruddy underneath, and black underneath.' And as a matter of fact, darkness ceases entirely at sunrise. It is 'twilight' when the characteristics of neither day nor night have ceased. The Accusative ending in '*Sandhyām*' denotes *duration*; hence the meaning is that so long as the time of twilight continues he should remain standing; and after that the man is naturally free."

In answer to this some people have held that the Accusative ending here does not denote *duration*, it denotes the *objective* itself, in accordance with the declaration of the author of the *Vārṭika* that 'time comes to be called the object of intransitive verbs.' As regards Pāṇini's rule (2. 3. 5) laying down the use of the Accusative in the sense of 'duration of time and space,' it refers either to (1) such sentences as do not contain a verb signifying some action,—*e.g.*, 'the river crooked *for two miles* (*krosham*),' 'blessed *throughout the night* (*sarvarātram*),'—or (2) where the verb used is a transitive one,—*e.g.*, 'the book is studied *for a month* (*māsam*).' In the present instance however, in the sentence '*pūrvām sandhyām tiṣṭhēt*,'—the root '*sthā*' is intransitive. Hence the injunction in the text must be taken as meant to imply simply that the acts of *standing* and *sitting* should be done during the two Twilights. The precise time for the beginning of the acts is not directly laid down; for the simple reason that it is already implied: the time for the beginning of the enjoined act is the same as that of the period of 'twilight.' This period of 'twilight' is not a lengthy one, like that of the 'Full Moon Day' and the like; so that if there were any delay (in the beginning), the time would be difficult to detect; because the time falling between the end of night and the beginning of day is extremely subtle, and the sequence between these two is as difficult to discern as that between the rising of one and the dipping of another pan of the weighing scale. The Sun-god is extremely swift in his movements; and the time intervening between his passing from one zodiacal sign and entering into another has been regarded by astronomers to be a mere 'truṭi,' infinitesimal. Similarly with the rising and setting of the Sun as indicating the beginning and end of the day. Before sun-rise it is 'Night,' and after sun-rise it is 'Day'; and under this explanation there is no such time as 'Twilight'; the rising of the sun having put an end to the night. It is for this reason that the performance is begun at times approximating to sunrise and sunset; and it ceases as soon as either the sun or the stars become distinctly visible. And hence one who continues the performance during such time is regarded as having fulfilled the injunction at the proper time. Thus what is meant by 'Twilight' here is just that time which is '*Sāvitra*'—pertaining to the Sun,—and not that infinitesimal point of time postulated in astronomical works, which has been referred to above.

Objection.—"If this is so, then the offering of Twilight Prayers becomes impossible for those for whom the said time is exactly at which they perform their *Agnihotra*."

Answer.—What is this objection? In the first place it is only right that what is enjoined in the *Smṛti* (*i.e.*, the Twilight Prayers) should be set aside by what is enjoined in the *Shruti* (*i.e., the Agnihotra*). But as a matter of fact, there is no incompatibility between the two acts; for the Agnihotra-oblations (laid down by *Shruti*) could very well be offered by one while he is *standing* or *sitting* (which two acts are enjoined by the present verse).

"But it is not only *standing* and *sitting* that are enjoined by the present text; the repeating of the threefold Mantra is also prescribed. So that while one is repeating the *Sāvitrī* (according to the present verse), how could he, at the same time, recite the Mantras prescribed in connection with the *Agnihotra*-oblations?"

Well, in that case, the repeating (of the *Sāvitrī*, etc.) might be set aside; but there would be no such incompatibility in connection with the acts of *standing* and *sitting*, which are the principal factors in the present injunction. And in accordance with the principle enunciated in Jaimini's *Sūtra* (10. 2. 63), it is only right that the act of *repeating the Sāvitrī*,—which is only a subordinate factor—should be set aside. That the acts of *standing* and *sitting* are the principal factors is shown by the fact that the injunctive words '*tiṣṭhēt*, (should stand) '*āsīta*' ('should sit') directly enjoin those acts only; and that the *repeating* of the *Sāvitrī* is the subordinate factor is shown by the fact that it is spoken of by means of the present participial epithet ('*japan*,' 'repeating'), which shows that it is only a qualifying adjunct. And the real connection with the injunction is of the acts of *standing* and *sitting* only; as is also made clear by what follows in the next two verses.

Some people have held that in the present context *standing* is the subordinate and the act of *repeating* the predominant factor, as it is from the latter that we have read of results following (in verse 78).

In answer to this we make the following observations: The present context is not intended for persons moved by personal desires; hence why should the text speak of any desirable results? As regards the misconception that people have regarding the declaration in verse 78—'He becomes endowed with Vedic merit'—describing the syllable '*om*,' etc., as being a description of results,—this we have already disposed of under that context. Hence we conclude that in the present context, *standing* and *sitting* are the predominant factors.

Or, it may be that those who perform the *Agnihotra* shall recite the *Sāvitrī* only once, or shall repeat it thrice; and this much of it will not interfere with the time prescribed for the *Agnihotra*. [Just as even though it is stated that 'in the evening one becomes free by muttering prayers for a long time,' yet this does not interfere with the performance of the *Agnihotra*. The term '*ashna*' stands for *long time*.] And yet the said recitation of the *Sāvitrī* would accomplish the purpose of the Twilight Prayers; specially as the assertion that the repeating is to go on *till the sun is seen* is only a subordinate factor in the Injunction (and hence need not be necessarily followed).

[The above applies to such *Agnihotrins* only as have adopted the time before sun-rise for their offerings.] As for those who have adopted the time *after sunrise*, (the difficulty does not arise, and) the Agnihotra-oblations would naturally be offered after the Twilight Prayers have been offered.

Gautama (2. 17) speaks of the two Twilight Prayers as to be offered '(*a*) while the stars are still visible (at dawn) and (*b*) till such time as the stars become visible (after sunset)'; and all that this means is that the time described is to be regarded as 'Twilight'; and it does not mean that this time mentioned is part of the Injunction; nor does it follow that the *Sāvitrī* is to be repeated during the whole of the time stated. Just as in the case of the Injunction 'One should offer sacrifices on the full-moonday,' it does not mean that the act of sacrificing is to be repeated during all the time comprised in the time mentioned; exactly in the same manner, when we have such assertions as that "the Earlier Twilight-Prayers are to be repeated while the stars are visible, and the later ones while the sun is still visible,"—all that is meant is the definition of the two times; the meaning being that 'such and such a time is what is meant by the term *Twilight*; and it is at that time that the Twilight-Prayers should be offered.' Thus then, the term 'Twilight' standing for the period of time mentioned, if one should perform the *standing* or *sitting* and *mantra-repeating* for only a minute, or for any three or four points of time, he will have accomplished what is prescribed by the Injunction.

The term '*Sadā*,' '*Every day*,' signifies the compulsory character of the act; and it is to be taken as pertaining to both *Twilights*.

'*Should sit*';—' '*sitting*' standing for any position other than *standing*, the meaning is that he should be seated.

'*Ṛkṣa*' means *stars*. '*Ā*'—*i.e.*, *till*—they are seen;—the '*ā*' ('till') occurring in connection with '*arkadarshanāt*' (in the first time) should be construed also along with '*ṛkṣavibhāvanāt*.'

'*Samyak*,' '*clearly*,' qualifies both '*darshana*' and '*vibhāvana*'; the sense being—(*a*) 'when the sun is seen *clearly*,—*i.e.*, the whole disc becomes visible,'—and (*b*) 'when the stars are bright, shining in their full splendour, and not dimmed by the stronger light of the sun.'—(101)

VERSE CII

ONE WHO, DURING THE MORNING-TWILIGHT, REPEATS (THE SĀVITRĪ) STANDING, REMOVES THE SIN OF THE (PRECEDING) NIGHT; WHILE HE WHO, DURING THE EVENING-TWILIGHT, REPEATS IT SEATED, DESTROYS THE SIN COMMITTED DURING THE DAY.—(102).

Bhāṣya.

The present verse describes the motive for the act in question.

'*Sin*'—the guilt born of having recourse to such acts as are prohibited.

'*Removes*'—sets aside.

'*Of the night*'—that which comes about—is committed—during the night.

The term '*malam*' is synoymous with '*ēnaḥ*.'

This cannot mean that the act under question is sufficient expiation for all the sin that one may have committed during the night and day. For if it were so, then there would be no point in the prescribing of the *Kṛchchhra* and other specific expiating rites; for the simple reason that—'when one can find honey in a frequented place why should he go to the mountain?'—as the well known saying has it. All that the present verse means is that the act removes just those minor sins that one might commit by chance (not habitually), or which could not be avoided,—for which no specially expiatory rites are prescribed. For instance, when a sleeping man throws about his arms or turns upon his sides, he might cause the death of small insects; or he may, during sleep, happen to scratch his private parts, the unnecessary touching of which has been prohibited; or the uncleanliness that might be caused by the flowing out of saliva, which is not cleaned immediately; or the having recourse to prohibited things at improper times. It is in view of such minor sins that we have the assertion that 'the man who does not offer the Twilight-Prayers should at all times be regarded as unclean.

The mention of such results following from the act in question does not deprive it of its compulsory character; as the sins described are always liable to be committed. For instance, during the day also while passing on the road one comes across strange women, and looks at their faces, and has his mind affected by emotions arising therefrom; or, he may happen to talk in anger, or of indecent things;—all such sins are removed by the performance of the two Twilight-Prayers.—(102)

VERSE CIII

BUT HE WHO DOES NOT STAND DURING THE MORNING-TWILIGHT, AND WHO DOES NOT SIT THROUGH THE EVENING-TWILIGHT, SHOULD BE EXCLUDED, LIKE THE SHŪDRA, FROM ALL THAT IS DUE TO TWICE-BORN PERSONS.—(103)

Bhāṣya.

The present verse, describing the evil accruing from the non-performance of the Twilight-Prayers, serves to emphasise the compulsory character of these.

He who does not keep standing during the morning-twilight and who does not keep seated during the evening-twilight, should be regarded as a *Shūdra*.

'*From all that is due to twice-born persons*';—*i.e.*, entertaining as a guest, honouring, offering of gifts and so forth.—'*He should be excluded*,'—*i.e.*, discarded.

For this reason, in order to avoid being treated as a *Shūdra* one should observe the Twilight Prayers every day.

This verse also points out the motive behind the performance; and *standing* and *seating* during the repeating of the *Sāvitrī* are the acts enjoined in the present context; and that act is to be regarded as of primary importance with which the motive happens to be connected; so that all the rest of what is said in the present connection is only subsidiary and of secondary importance.—(103)

VERSE CIV

CONVINCED OF THE NECESSARY CHARACTER OF THE INJUNCTION, AND RETIRING TO THE FOREST ON A SPOT NEAR WATER, ONE MAY EVEN RECITE THE SĀVITRĪ ONLY, WITH A CLEAN BODY AND A COLLECTED MIND.—(104)

Bhāṣya.

This is another injunction in connection with Vedic study; and as what is here stated has not been mentioned in any other context, the 'study' herein laid down must be different from that 'study' which is undertaken for the purpose of getting up the Text.

'*Forest*'—stands for some solitary spot outside the village;—'*retiring*' to such a spot;—'*near water*'—on the bank of a river or tank, etc.; or in the absence of these, even near water contained in the water-pot and such other vessels.

'*Niyataḥ*'—may mean either 'with clean body,' or 'with due effort.'

'*Samāhitaḥ*,' '*with collected mind*,'—*i.e.*, free from all mental distractions.

'*One may even recite the Sāvitrī*;—*i.e.*, if on account of the interference of some sort of business, he is unable to recite many hymns or sections or chapters.

'*Convinced of the necessary character of the injunction.*'—'*Naityaka*' is the same as '*nitya*.'—Having made up his mind that the injunction is a compulsory one.

The injunction of studying the Veda for the purpose of getting up the Text forms the 'archetype'; and of that the present injunction is the 'ectype,' and as such it includes all the details of the former; so that the rules regarding the pronouncing of the syllable '*om*' at the beginning of Vedic Study (laid down in 74) and the sitting upon Kusha-grass with ends pointing towards the East (laid down in 75), appertain to the present injunction also.

Others have explained the term '*vidhi*' to stand for '*vidhā*,' *method, procedure*; the meaning (of the phrase '*naityakam vidhimāsthitaḥ*') being 'taking his stand upon the procedure laid down for the study of the Veda, which is necessary for,—must be done by—the Religious Student.' The compulsory character of this method would have to be deduced from what follows in verse 106 below, regarding 'this being called *Brahmasatra*.'

The former explanation appears to be the right one; for as a matter of fact, the term '*vidhi*' is not known to be denotative of *method*. Further, if the term '*naityakam*' stands for what should be done by the Religious Student, then the same term as occurring in verse 106 will also have to be taken in the same sense; and in that case the prohibition of 'non-study' therein contained would come to apply to the same,—*i.e.*, to that which must be done by the Religious Student (which is absurd).—(104)

XX. Non-observance of Holidays

VERSE CV

THERE IS NO REGARD FOR (OBSERVANCE OF) DAYS FORBIDDEN FOR STUDY IN CONNECTION WITH THE APPURTENANCES TO THE VEDA, AND WITH THE MANTRAS RECITED DURING OBLATIONS.—(105)

Bhāṣya.

'*Appurtenance*' is that which helps; *i.e.*, aids to Vedic study; the subsidiary treatises on Kalpasūtra, Nirukta and so forth. When these are being studied, no regard—no attention—need be paid to 'days forbidden for study'; similarly *with the Mantras recited during oblations,*—holidays need not be observed: that is, all this study should be carried on also during the days forbidden for study.

Another reading (for '*anurodhaḥ*') is '*nīrodhaḥ*,' meaning *cessation*; the meaning being that even on 'days forbidden for study' there is no cessation of the study of what are specified in the verse.

Though it is one of the necessary conditions of the injunction of 'study' that there should be no study on holidays, and this injunction pertains to the 'study' of '*Svādhyāya*,' which is Veda,—and the subsidiary treatises are not called 'Veda,'—yet people might be led to think that these latter also are interspersed with passages from the Veda: hence the Text makes it quite clear.

Or, the 'subsidiary treatises' may be taken only as an instance; the sense being that 'just as there is no holiday in the case of the subsidiary Treatises so is there none in the case of the Veda also.'

'*With Mantras recited during oblations*';—*i.e.*, those Mantras that are recited during the Agnihotra-oblations, or those recited during the *Sāvitra* and other propitiatory oblations. All this is merely by way of illustration. This fact, which is fully sustained by reason, is explained here for the benefit of persons who might think that the rule regarding the ceasing of study on holidays pertains to the uttering of any and every Vedic passage, such as the Mantras included under the '*Shashvat-japa*' and '*Praiṣas*,'—all which form the subject-matter of the injunction of Vedic Study,—and might conclude that on the *Chaturdashī* and such other holidays, even the Mantras in connection with oblations should not be recited. As a matter of fact, the observing of holidays laid down in connection with Vedic Study prescribed by the injunction of Study does not pertain to all Veda; and there are no holidays in connection with Mantras recited during the performance of religious rites.

'*In connection with the daily study of the Veda*';—*i.e.*, in connection with that study of the Veda which has been enjoined in a preceding text as compulsory for men in all stages of life.—(105)

VERSE CVI

THERE IS NO "DAY FORBIDDEN FOR STUDY" IN REGARD TO THE DAILY RECITATION; SINCE THIS HAS BEEN CALLED "BRAHMASATRA"; IT IS MERITORIOUS, BEING OFFERED WITH THE OFFERING OF STUDY, AND BEING MAINTAINED BY THE SYLLABLE "VAṢAṬ" IN THE SHAPE OF THE RECITATION MADE ON FORBIDDEN DAYS.—(106)

Bhāṣya.

This verse supplies the valedictory supplement to the foregoing Injunction.

For the following reason, '*in regard to the daily recitation, there is no day forbidden for study*,' because '*it has been called Brahmasatra*.' That is called '*Satra*' which is performed continuously; just as the *Satra* continues to be performed for thousand years and more without a break—and the sacrifice consisting of Vedic Study also is a *Satra*; and because it is a *Satra*, there should be no break in it; for if there were a break, it would cease to be '*Satra*.'

That the Recitation is a *Satra* is further explained by means of a metaphor. (1) This *Satra* is offered with the offering of 'Brahman'—*i.e.*, study; just as the ordinary *Satra* is offered with the offering of Soma. The root '*hu*' in this connection stands for *unceasing offering*, verbal roots being capable of several significations. The term '*Brahma*' indicates the act of study pertaining to the Veda. The 'study of Brahma' is like an 'offering'; this compound ('*Brahmāhuti*') being in accordance with Pānini 2.1.56.

The recitation that is done on the forbidden days supplies the place of the syllable '*vaṣaṭ*.' In the ordinary *Satra*, at the end of each Yājyā-hymn the continuity is maintained by the uttering of the syllable '*vaṣaṭ*'; and in the same manner, the continuity of 'Vedic Study' is maintained by the recitation that is made on the *Chaturdashī* and other forbidden days; and this recitation therefore takes the place of the syllable '*vaṣaṭ*.'

The term '*vaṣaṭ*' here indicates the syllable '*rauṣaṭ*.'

The *Satra* is '*maintained*'—*i.e.*, accomplished—by this syllable. The compound ('*vaṣaṭkṛtam*') being in accordance with Pāṇini 2.1.32.—(106)

VERSE CVII

HE WHO, CLEAN AND SELF-CONTROLLED, RECITES THE VEDA, IN DUE FORM, FOR ONE YEAR,—FOR HIM THIS CONSTANTLY POURS OUT MILK, CURD, CLARIFIED BUTTER AND HONEY. —(107)

Bhāṣya.

This also is supplementary to the Injunction under consideration. The Injunction has been understood to be a compulsory one ; and the mention of results in connection with compulsory injunctions is purely valedictory ; nor do we find any Injunctive affix (in the present verse) ; so that the principle enunciated in the *Mīmāmsā Sūtra* 4.3.5 not applying to the present case, the mention of 'milk, curd and the rest' could not be taken as laying down a fresh motive for another action ; and when the compulsory character of the Injunction has been ascertained, the principle of the '*Rātrisatra*' also is not applicable ; so that 'milk' and the rest could not be regarded as of any use. For all these reasons the passage must be regarded as a purely valedictory description ; and it is based upon the fact that one who studies the Veda regularly becomes famous among people, and hence becoming the recipient of gifts of cattle, he naturally obtains large quantities of milk, etc.

'*Svādhyāya*'—Veda ; —'*adhītē*'—recites ;—'*for one year*'—for one full year ;—'*in due form,*'—*i.e.*, seated upon Kusha-grass with its tips pointing eastwards ;—'*self-controlled,*'—*i.e.*, with the organs under his full control ;—'*clean*'—by means of bathing, etc., ; '*for him*'—for that man ;—'*constantly*'—as long as he lives ;—'*pours out*'—makes to flow, supplies ;—'*this*'—recitation ;—'*milk, curd, etc.*'

Others hold that the terms '*payaḥ*' ('milk') and the rest stand respectively for Merit, Worldly Prosperity, Pleasure and Final Liberation. Merit is called 'milk' because the two are similar in the point of purity ; Worldly Prosperity is called 'curd,' because it resembles the latter in being a source of strengthening the body ; Pleasure is called 'clarified butter,' because of the resemblance consisting in both containing '*Snēha*' (smoothness) ; Final Liberation is called 'honey' because it combines in one all flavours. The meaning thus is that all the purposes of man are accomplished in a single year, what to say of the study being continued for a longer time !

As the whole passage is purely valedictory, we need not be very particular as to what is the right signification of the terms 'milk' and the rest.—(107)

XXI. Continuation of the Duties of the Initiated Boy

VERSE CVIII

THE TWICE-BORN PERSON, WHOSE INITIATION HAS BEEN PERFORMED, SHOULD CONTINUE TO DO, TILL THE FINAL BATH OF "RETURN" (SAMĀVARTANA), THE KINDLING OF FIRE, THE BEGGING OF FOOD, THE SLEEPING ON THE GROUND AND THE ACTING FOR THE TEACHER'S WELL-BEING.—(108)

Bhāṣya.

'*The kindling of fire*'—*i.e.*, setting the fire aflame every morning and evening by supplying fuel to it.

'*Sleeping on the ground*';—*i.e.*, not ascending a bedstead, not actually sleeping on the bare ground.

'*Teacher's well-being*,'—*i.e.*, service consisting of the fetching of water in jars and such other work. As for the doing of things beneficial to him, this is to be done throughout life.

All this should be done till that Final Bath, which consists in returning from the Teacher's house, and which constitutes the end of Religious Studentship; for the simple reason that all this is included in the Injunction of 'Vedic Study.' As a matter of fact, the life of the 'student' and its appurtenant details have to continue till the Veda is completely got up; so that as soon as this getting up is done, the discontinuance of the details follows as a matter of course.

The reiteration of the 'kindling of fire' and other duties in the present verse is meant to indicate that the duties other than these—which have been previously prescribed for students—are incumbent upon persons in the succeeding stages of life also (and are not confined to the 'student' only). As says Gautama (3.9),—'All this is not incompatible with the succeeding stages of life.'

"But why cannot we have this that the duties specified in the present verse are to continue during the whole studentship stage, while others might be discontinued even beforehand ?"

The opinion of other *Smṛtis* on this point has been already shown to be that all rules are laid down in connection with their principal time; (and this time in the present case being the entire studentship-stage) if the course just suggested were adopted (and some of the present duties were dropped before the end of that stage), we would be needlessly going against this principle.

In place of the expression '*gurorhitam*' the right form would have been '*guravē hitam*' in the Dative, accordingly to Pāṇini 2. 1. 36, which lays down the use of the Dative in connection with the term '*hita*.'—(108)

XXII. Specially qualified Pupils

VERSE CIX

THE TEACHER'S SON, ONE WHO IS EAGER TO DO SERVICE, ONE WHO IMPARTS KNOWLEDGE, ONE WHO IS RIGHTEOUS, ONE WHO IS CLEAN, A NEAR RELATIVE, ONE WHO IS COMPETENT, ONE WHO GIVES MONEY, ONE WHO IS GENTLE, AND ONE'S OWN (SON)—THESE TEN SHOULD BE TAUGHT FOR THE SAKE OF MERIT.—(109)

Bhāsya.

In verse 233 below the author is going to declare that 'Of all gifts the gift of the Veda is the best'; and the question arising as to the sort of person to whom knowledge should be imparted—the present verse proceeds to describe the characteristics of the recipient of knowledge. And this contains the injunction of *teaching*, which is connected with the section dealing with the duties of the student.

'*The Teacher's son.*'—'*He who is eager to do service,*' *i.e.*,—personal attendance, or other household work in accordance with his strength, such as rubbing the body and so forth.

'*One who imparts knowledge,*'—such knowledge as may not be known to the Teacher, but which may have been learnt somehow by the pupil; *e.g.*, sciences dealing with property, love and the arts, or with Dharma; the teaching of such a pupil is by way of exchange of knowledge.

'*One who is righteous*';—he who makes it his chief business to perform the Agnihotra and such religious acts.

'*One who is clean*';—one who keeps his body clean with clay and water.

The three words 'righteous,' 'clean' and 'gentle' are not needless repetitions,—their use being similar to the use of such expressions as '*go-balīvarda*' (where the second term serves to qualify the first).

'*A near relative*'—a friend or closely related person.

'*One who is competent*'—capable of getting up and remembering texts.

'*One's own son,*'—who has been previously 'initiated.'

These ten, even though 'initiated' by others, should be taught.

"The text uses the term *dharmataḥ*, which means that by teaching them one acquires merit. But one who pays money clearly brings a visible benefit to the teacher; wherefore then can there be any justification for the assuming of an unseen result—in the shape of *merit*—in this case?"

Who says that there is to be an *assumption* of unseen results? There can be no *assumption* of what is directly stated. It has been distinctly declared that "these ten should be taught '*for the sake of merit.*'"

The revered teacher however says that what the term '*dharmataḥ*' means is that what is here stated is the rule of the sacred law; by teaching these persons there is no transgression of the law. It does not mean that by imparting knowledge to one who pays money the teacher acquires the merit that results from the act of imparting knowledge.—(109)

VERSE CX

ONE SHOULD NOT INSTRUCT ANY ONE UNLESS HE IS ASKED; NOR ANY ONE WHO ASKS IN AN IMPROPER MANNER. EVEN THOUGH KNOWING (THE TRUTH), THE WISE MAN SHOULD BEHAVE, AMONG MEN, AS IF IGNORANT.—(110)

Bhāṣya.

If a person, who is not his regular pupil, but is reading near him, should murder the text, or omit certain letters, or read with a wrong accent,—the learned man should not, unless he is asked to (correct), instruct the student and tell him 'you have murdered the text, you should read it thus.' If the reader happen to be his own pupil, then he should instruct him, even without being asked. If again the student were to ask, but ask in an improper manner,—then also he should not instruct him. The 'proper manner' of asking is to ask with due humility, in the manner of a pupil, with such words as—'in this matter I have a doubt, pray instruct me on this point.' In cases other than this, '*even though knowing the truth, the wise man should behave*'—continue to live—among men, '*as if ignorant,*'—as if he were dumb; *i.e.*, he should remain silent, as if he did not know anything.

This prohibition regarding the explaining of doubts without being asked refers to scriptural matters; as regards temporal matters, the author is going to declare that—'Employed or not employed (by the king) the man knowing the law should expound it.' Others have held that the prohibition contained in the present verse applies equally to both scriptural and temporal matters.—(110)

VERSE CXI

HE WHO INSTRUCTS IN AN UNLAWFUL MANNER, AND HE WHO ASKS IN AN UNLAWFUL MANNER,—OF THOSE TWO ONE OR THE OTHER EITHER DIES (UNTIMELY), OR INCURS THE ILL-WILL (OF THE PEOPLE).—(111)

Bhāṣya.

The present text describes the evil effects of transgressing the above prohibition.

He who instructs a pupil—'you should read this'—in an unlawful manner, either when he is not asked, or when he is asked in an unlawful manner; and he also who asks in an unlawful manner;—both of these die, before time. If only one of them happens to be the transgressor, then he alone dies. When asked in an unlawful manner, if the wise man does not explain, then the questioner dies; but if he does explain, then both of them die. This indication of the evil effects proceeding from improper questioning clearly implies that for the questioner also there is a proper manner of putting questions.

'*Or incurs the ill-will*'—enmity—of the people.—(111)

VERSE CXII

WHERE MERIT AND WEALTH ARE NOT POSSIBLE, NOR IS THERE AN ADEQUATE DESIRE TO SERVE, THERE KNOWLEDGE SHOULD NOT BE IMPARTED ; JUST AS HEALTHY SEED (IS NOT SOWN) ON BARREN LAND.—(112)

Bhāṣya.

It has been said above (in 109) that 'these ten should be taught for the sake of merit'; of that same injunction the present verse supplies a brief reiteration; it does not prescribe anything new, being merely elucidatory of the preceding injunction.

'*Wealth*' should be taken as standing for *benefit* of all kinds; since the preceding verse has spoken of teaching by way of exchange of knowledge also.

'*Adequate*';—*i.e.*, commensurate with the teaching; there being much service if the teaching is much; and little service if the teaching is little.

'*There knowledge*';—the term 'knowledge,' '*vidyā*,' stands for that *by means of which all things are known*; *i.e.*, the reading of the text as well as the grasping of the meaning. The meaning is that he who does not bring any benefit should not be taught the text of the Veda, nor should the explanation of the meaning of Vedic texts be expounded to him.

'*Uṣara*'—stands for that plot of land where, on account of the defects in the soil, seeds do not sprout.

'*Healthy*';—corn-seeds of good variety are sown with the help of the plough, etc. Similarly knowledge also bears excellent fruits when sown (imparted) on good soil.

It should not be thought that, when one imparts knowledge when paid for it, it becomes a case of mere barter; because the action (of teaching) is not preceded by any bargaining as regards the price to be paid, such as—'if you give me such and such an amount, I shall impart to you such an amount of teaching'; while such bargain is the necessary condition of all 'barter'; and the mere conferment of the slightest benefit does not constitute 'barter.'

Though verse 215 below says that 'one should not confer any benefit upon the teacher previously,'—yet this does not quite prohibit the previous conferring of benefits; it is merely supplementary to the injunction that 'when the pupil is going to take the Final Bath, he should, when asked to do so, bring for his Teacher all that may lie within his power'; and it is not an independent statement by itself.—(112)

VERSE CXIII

THE EXPOUNDER OF THE VEDA MAY RATHER PERISH ALONG WITH HIS KNOWLEDGE; BUT HE SHOULD NEVER SOW IT ON BARREN SOIL, EVEN IN DIRE DISTRESS.—(113)

Bhāṣya.

The term '*samam*' means 'along with.'

It is better that the '*expounder of the Veda*'—the student of the Veda—should die along with his knowledge—unexpounded to any person, and famishing in his own body—than that it should be taught to unfit persons.

From what is here said it follows that one who has studied the Veda should also teach it as a duty, and not merely for making a living; and that it is not only a person desiring a certain result that is entitled to the teaching; just as to the giving of water and such other acts it is not only persons with some motive that are entitled. Says the Shruti—'He who, having studied the Science, does not expound it to those who need it, becomes an undoer of what he has done;—one should open the door to welfare; and should teach others; this function of words the poets describe as leading to fame; all this rests in this act; those that know this become immortal.'

When the text calls the man 'an undoer of what he has done,' what it means is that the omission of teaching constitutes an offence; and this implies that teaching is something that must be done.

'*On barren soil*';—*i. e.*, to a person in whose case none of the three purposes are fulfilled.

'*Even in dire distress*';—*i. e.*, even in times of troublous calamity; the 'distress' here meant is the absence of properly qualified pupils.

All this would be justified only if teaching were something that must be done.

"Teaching being compulsory, if fully qualified pupils be not available, one might fulfil his duty of teaching by getting hold of substitutes for qualified pupils; just as in the absence of *Vrīhī* corn, sacrifices are accomplished by means of *Nīvāra* corn."

(With a view to guard against this, the text has added that) under the said circumstances—when properly qualified pupils are not available, the necessity of performing the work of teaching should cease; just as when a properly qualified guest is not available, the necessity of the duty of 'honouring the guest' ceases.

'*Sow*';—this term which is directly applicable to the seed, indicates figuratively the work of *teaching*. Just as the seed sown in the field produces a large outturn, so does knowledge also.

Others have explained '*distress*' as standing for 'want of wealth.' The sense in this case being that even though the man may be in the worst of conditions, he should not sow in barren soil, he should rather die; and by so doing the man could not be transgressing the injunction that 'one should protect himself from all dangers,' even though he could have within his reach the means of livelihood in the shape of teaching unqualified pupils.

This explanation however is not right. The pupils who pay money cannot be called "barren soil"; the term 'barren soil' being only a reference to what has gone in the preceding verses. If the 'giver of wealth' also were not a qualified pupil, then how could there be any chance of the teacher undertaking the work of teaching him in times of distress,—which chance is prohibited in the present verse?—(113)

VERSE CXIV

LEARNING HAVING APPROACHED THE BRĀHMAṆA SAID TO HIM—"I AM THY WEALTH, GUARD ME; IMPART ME NOT UNTO A SCORNER; THUS MAY I BECOME EXTREMELY POWERFUL."—(114)

Bhāṣya.

This verse is a purely valedictory description.

'*Learning*'—in an embodied form, having approached a certain teacher, said to him.

'*I am thy wealth*'—treasure—'*guard me.*'

The question arising as to what would the 'guarding' of Learning,—it is added—'*Impart me not unto the scorner*'—one who talks ill of, who despises. That is, never teach a scorner.

'*Thus may I become extremely powerful.*'—I shall be extremely useful to you. '*Vīrya,*' '*power,*' here stands for great efficiency in accomplishing what is useful.

The insertion of the cerebral '*ṣ*' in the phrase '*shevadhiṣṭēsmi*' is an imitation of a Vedic form.—(114)

VERSE CXV

"EXPOUND ME UNTO THE BRĀHMAṆA WHO GUARDS HIS TREASURES AND IS NEVER CARELESS,—AND WHOM THOU KNOWEST TO BE PURE, SELF-CONTROLLED AND A DULY QUALIFIED STUDENT."—(115)

Bhāṣya.

That pupil whom thou knowest to be '*pure*' '*self-controlled*' —*i.e.*, having full control over his senses; and a '*qualified student,*' ever attentive;—'*unto him expound me.*' He who *guards his treasures,* being never careless; he never commits mistakes, never fails, being ever attentive to his business.

What is deduced from this valedictory description is the advice that learning should be imparted to the pupils already described above as qualified (under 109), only when they fulfil the conditions described in the present verse.—(115)

VERSE CXVI

HE, WHO MAY ACQUIRE VEDA, WITHOUT HIS PERMISSION, FROM ONE WHO IS RECITING IT, BECOMES CORRUPTED WITH THE SIN OF STEALING THE VEDA, AND FALLS INTO HELL.—(116)

Bhāṣya.

When one is reciting the Veda with a view to getting up the text, or when one is expounding the Veda to another person,—if some one were to come by and acquire the Vedic text for the first time, or should surreptitiously have his own doubts (on some point connected with the Vedic text) removed,—then to him occurs the sin here described; so long as he does not secure the Teacher's permission, preferring his request in such words as—'just as these pupils are reading with you, so may I also read, kindly accord me your permission.' And it is only when the pupil has received this permission that he should be taught. Otherwise, the reading of the Veda would be like '*stealing*'; and the learner, being *corrupted with this sin of stealing the Veda, falls into hell*—*i.e.*, into a place of condign punishment.

The ablative ending in '*adhīyānāt*,' '*from one who is, reciting it*,' is according to Pāṇini 1.4.29, according to which 'the source of proper instruction is put in the Ablative';—or the Ablative may have the sense of *separation*,—separation being implied by the fact that the teaching appears to *issue from* the Teacher;—or the Ablative may have the sense of the participle, being used in place of the affix '*lyap*,' the meaning being—'he learns after *having heard* another person who is reciting it.'—(116)

XXIII. Rules regarding Salutation

VERSE CXVII

One should first salute him from whom he receives knowledge, either temporal or scriptural or spiritual.—(117)

Bhāṣya.

The subject taken up having been finished, rules regarding salutation are next taken up.

'*Laukika,*' '*temporal,*' is that which pertains to worldly affairs; *i.e.*, the teaching of popular usage and custom; or it may mean the teaching of the arts of singing, dancing and playing upon musical instruments; or, it may mean the knowledge of what is contained in works dealing with the Arts, such as those of Vātsyāyana, Vishākhin and others.

'*Vaidika,*' '*scriptural,*' is that which is expressed by Vedic injunctions; that is the knowledge of the Veda, the Vedāṅgas and the Smṛtis.

'*Knowledge spiritual*' stands for the esoteric science of the spirit or soul; or figuratively, it may stand for that pertaining to the Body, *i.e.*, the science of medicine.

From whom one learns all this knowledge, such a teacher, he *should salute first of all*; when one meets him for the first time (in the day) he should invite his attention to himself, by means of words indicated later on, for the purpose of obtaining from him words of blessing.

'*First.*'—*I.e.*, the pupil should address him first; he should not wait for being addressed by the teacher; it is only in this way that he would be a 'saluter.'

Objection.—"If this is what is implied by the root *salute* itself, the term '*first*' becomes superfluous."

Not so; it is only by virtue of the term 'first' that we deduce the said meaning. If we took only the root and the prefix (in the verb '*abhivādayēt*'), we could only get the sense of *speaking* ('*vadanam*') *in front* ('*ābhimukhyēna*'); and this *speaking in front* is possible also when the speaker has been previously addressed by another person.

Some people have explained the term 'first' to mean 'before saluting one's parents.' But this does not deserve consideration, as this relative precedence bears no relation to the context.—(117)

VERSE CXVIII

BETTER THE BRĀHMAṆA KNOWING THE SĀVITRĪ ALONE, IF HE IS THOROUGHLY SELF-CONTROLLED,—AND NOT HE WHO KNOWS ALL THE THREE VEDAS, BUT IS NOT SELF-CONTROLLED, AND EATS ALL THINGS AND SELLS ALL THINGS.—(118)

Bhāṣya.

This verse is in praise of the rules regarding Salutation, etc.

He for whom the *Sāvitrī* is the sole essence, his all in all, is called '*Sāvitrīmātrasāraḥ*,' '*knowing the Sāvitrī alone.*'

'*Better*'—Superior;—'*the Brāhmaṇa*,' if he is thoroughly *self-controlled*, *i.e.*, who governs himself entirely in accordance with the scriptures.

One who is '*not self-controlled*,' '*even though knowing the three Vedas*'—fully conversant with the scriptures.

'*Eats all things*,'—things even though not actually prohibited, yet against custom and usage.

Similarly '*sells all things*.'—'Selling' is mentioned only by way of illustration, it stands for all that is prohibited.

The meaning of all this is as that one becomes as much open to censure by omitting to rise to receive the teacher and other practices as he is by the omission of other rules of conduct.

Objection.—"How is it that we have the form '*varam* (neuter) *vipraḥ* (masculine)'; the correct form would be '*varo vipraḥ*' (both masculine)."

In answer to this some people say that the phrase opens with the general and ends with the particular: the construction being—'*It is better*,'—"What is better?"—'that the Brāhmaṇa be self-controlled.'

Others however explain that the term '*vara*' has no particular gender of its own; and it is used in the neuter gender also.—(118)

VERSE CXIX

ONE SHOULD NOT SIT WITH A SUPERIOR UPON THE COUCH OR SEAT PREPARED FOR HIM. AND IF HE HIMSELF SHOULD HAPPEN TO BE SEATED ON A COUCH OR SEAT, HE SHOULD RISE TO MEET (THE SUPERIOR) AND SALUTE HIM.—(119)

Bhāṣya.

The copulative compound '*shayyāsanē*' is formed with the terms '*shayyā*' and '*āsana*,' the singular number being in accordance with Pāṇini 2.4.6, by which 'terms expressing inanimate genuses form copulative compounds in the singular.'

'*On a couch and seat*,' '*one should not sit*'—along with—'*a superior*';—*i.e.*, one who is superior in learning, such as the teacher and others.

In view of the question as to whether one should not sit with his superior anywhere, the text has added the word '*adhyācharitē*,' '*prepared*,' *i.e.*, made up, as the couch or a seat; so that there is no harm in sitting upon a seat of stone or such other things.

This is only a re-iteration of what is going to be said under 204 below that—'One may sit with his teacher on slabs of stone, a boat.'

Others explain the term '*adhyācharitē*' to mean '*occupied*'; and '*should not sit*' to mean that 'he should not sit upon it even afterwards.' And (according to this explanation) the present prohibition does not apply only to sitting along with the superior; as this prohibition is already contained in 203; and so long as the present verse can be taken as an independent injunction, it is not right to take it as a mere re-iteration.

(In view of this last objection) some people point to a difference (between what is said here and what comes later on in 203), based upon usage. That couch or seat which is known to belong specifically to the Teacher,—that whereupon he, as a rule, lies down and sits,—on that the pupil should never sit, either in the presence or absence of the Teacher; while that couch or seat upon which the Teacher has slept or sat, once by the way,—sitting upon that during the Teacher's presence is what is prohibited. And it is this latter that is meant by the term '*adhyācharita*' in the text; which does not mean actual *possession* of the couch by the Teacher.

While one is seated upon a couch or seat, if the superior should happen to come, he should rise to meet him and offer his salutation. What is meant by the second line of the verse is that the pupil should descend from this seat on the advent of the Teacher; the meaning being that standing upon the bare ground he should entirely relinquish the couch or seat. While as for superior persons other than the Teacher,—in their case the rising to meet is done even while one remains (standing) upon the seat.—(119)

VERSE CXX

ON THE ELDER APPROACHING, THE VITAL BREATHS OF THE YOUNGER RUSH OUTWARD; AND HE RECOVERS THEM BY THE ACTS OF RISING TO MEET AND SALUTE HIM.—(120)

Bhāṣya.

This verse is commendatory to what has gone before.

'*On the elder*'—the person of higher age—'*approaching*'—coming up,—'*the vital breaths*'—the sources of life, the inner airs—'*of the younger*'—'*rush outward*'—move out; *i.e.*, giving up their functions, they intend to cut off his life.

When however he rises to meet him and salutes him, the breaths proceed, as before, to sustain his life.

'*Recovers*'—becomes resuscitated.—(120)

VERSE CXXI

FOR ONE WHO IS IN THE HABIT OF SALUTING AND CONSTANTLY REVERING ELDERS,—FOUR THINGS PROSPER: *viz.*, LONGEVITY, MERIT, FAME AND STRENGTH.—(121)

Bhāṣya.

The '*habit of saluting*' stands, not only for the uttering of words of salute, but for the act of addressing all men with respect and in the proper manner. The term '*habit*' indicates that the man does it without any personal motive at all.

'*Constantly reveres elders*'—by talking agreeably, and also attends upon them with such service as he can render.

'*For him four things prosper—longevity, merit*'—which is the tree that bears fruit in the other world, in the shape of Heaven,—'*fame and strength*'—as described above.

Though this verse is purely valedictory, yet it serves to afford some idea as to the effects that ensue.—(121)

VERSE CXXII

THE BRĀHMAṆA, WHEN GREETING AN ELDER, SHOULD, AFTER THE ACCOSTING, PRONOUNCE HIS NAME, (SAYING) "THIS HERE, I AM NAMED SO AND SO."—(122)

Bhāṣya.

'*Accosting*' here stands for that word by which the other person is addressed, is made to answer, either with words of benediction, or with an inquiry after welfare. '*After this accosting*'—*i.e.*, after the word expressing such accosting,—*i.e.*, in immediate sequence to the word, one should pronounce the following expression—'*This here I am, named so and so.*' '*This so and so,*' '*asau,*' is a pronoun standing for all particular name-forms. The use of this expression is meant to attract the attention (of the person accosted); the sense being—'you are being greeted by me,' *i.e.*, 'you are being invited to pronounce your benediction'; and being thus addressed, the other person, having duly comprehended the invitation and request, proceeds to answer the greeting by means of words expressing benediction.

But the mere use of the generic pronoun 'this' would not provide the idea that 'you are being accosted by me who am named this'; and in that case the other person would not fully comprehend the invitation, and hence to whom would he address the words of benediction? For this reason, it has been declared that '*he should pronounce his name*'; so that where accosted with the words 'I am named Devadatta,' the person fully comprehends the greeting.

Objection.—"There being no use for the word '*this,*' we see no purpose in its use."

Answer.—Writers often make use of expressions borrowed from the usage of other *Smṛtis*; for example, they use the term '*Dvitīyā,*' in the sense of the *Accusative*, in accordance with the usage laid down by Pāṇini in his Sūtra 2.3.2. In regard to the present subject, we find it formulated in the *Yajñasūtra* that 'the mentioning of one's own name is to be done with the word *this*.'

Objection.—"In that case that the name should be pronounced having been already expressed by the words '*he should pronounce his name,*'—it is superfluous for the text to repeat the term 'name,' in the expression '*this I am named.*'"

That expression has been added for the purpose of securing the use of the term 'name'; the sense being that, one should pronounce his name saying 'I am *named* so and so' (and not merely 'I am so and so.')

According to others, both expressions mean the same thing 'this here I am such and such a person'; so that the use of the one or the other expression is optional.

According to this verse, the exact form of the words of greeting comes to be this—'*abhivādayē devadattanāma'ham bhoḥ,*' 'I accost thee, Sir, I who am named Devadatta'; the use of the 'Sir' being prescribed in the following verse (124).

'*Elder*'—the addition of this word in the text is meant to imply that there should be *accosting* of equals and inferiors also, but in their case, the form is not as laid down here, which is meant for the case of *elders* only.—(122)

VERSE CXXIII

TO THOSE PERSONS WHO DO NOT COMPREHEND THE (SIGNIFICANCE OF THE) NAME (PRONOUNCED) IN THE WORDS OF GREETING, THE WISE ONE SHOULD SAY 'I'; SIMILARLY TO ALL WOMEN.—(123)

Bhaṣya.

From what has come before it might be understood that even an unlearned person deserves to be saluted, by reason of the large amount of wealth he might possess; the present verse serves to preclude such a notion.

'*Those who,*' being uneducated;—'*of the name*'—in its Sanskrit form that may have been pronounced,—'*the significance, as pronounced in the words of greeting*'; persons, not conversant with grammar do not understand the words to mean that 'I have been accosted by this person,'—they do not understand the Sanskrit language.—To such persons, as also to women who deserve to be saluted,—these do not comprehend the Sanskrit language—the wise one should say simply 'I salute thee,' thus omitting only the mention of his name, which forms one part of the full injunction. If the persons thus accosted should fail to understand even this much, then they should be saluted even with corrupt vernacular forms of words; it is in view of this that the text has added the epithet '*wise*'; *i.e.*, when one realises the difficulty of the other person's understanding, he should find out some such form of greeting as might suit each particular case, and he should not stick to the precise form enjoined in the preceding verse.

'*Similarly to all women*'; the term 'all' implies that the same applies even to the wives of teachers,—even though they be capable of understanding Sanskrit words.

Some people have explained that one should pronounce his name only when it so happens that he is known among people by a pseudonym—some such as '*Vanamālīvarṇaḥ*'—so that the real name given to him by his father is not known, and what is known is not his real name.

Others have explained the verse to refer to those who do not know the correct form of answering the salutation; for instance, Pāṇini (8.2.83) has laid down that the vowel at the end of the name pronounced in answering a salutation should be pronounced ultra-long; and to those who do not know this, the wise one should simply say 'I.' The author of the *Mahābhāṣya* (Patañjali) also has said the same in course of his explanation of the uses of the Science of Grammar—"Ignorant people who do not know that in answering a salutation, the name should be pronounced with an ultra-long vowel,—to such persons one may freely say simply 'I,' just as to women." These writers have said that the term '*abhivāda*,' 'salutation,' in the present verse has got to be taken in the sense of 'answering a salutation,' specially on account of what has been said in other *Smṛtis*. If the present verse is not explained on these lines, then, the prohibition of salutation, occurring in verse 126 below would come to be taken as prohibiting the saluting of all unlearned persons; and this would be contrary to what other Smṛti-rules have laid down regarding the use of the simple form 'it is I' (in the saluting of unlearned persons). If, on the other hand, we adopt the explanation as here suggested, then the said prohibition (occurring in 126) might be taken as purely commendatory, and not mandatory; and this would be quite consistent with the present explanation.—(123)

VERSE CXXIV

IN SALUTING, ONE SHOULD PRONOUNCE THE TERM "OH, SIR" AT THE END OF HIS OWN NAME; SINCE IT HAS BEEN DECLARED BY THE SAGES THAT THE FORM "OH, SIR" REPRESENTS THE FORM OF ALL NAMES.—(124)

Bhāṣya.

'*At the end of his own name one should pronounce the term Oh, Sir.*' The epithet '*own*' has been added with a view to precluding the possibility of the name of the saluted person being understood to be meant.

The rest of the verse is purely valedictory.

The term should be pronounced, immediately after the letters of the name, but after some other letters also, such as the expression 'I am' (as laid down in verse 122, above). The presence of the particle '*iti*' (in verse 122, after '*ahamasmi*') is meant to define the actual form of the expression to be used; the sense being that such is the actual form of the expression to be used. Further, if the expression were wrongly used in the form 'Devadatta, Oh, Sir, I am,' the comprehension of its meaning (by the accosted person) would be delayed, and this would still further delay the inviting of his attention; and this would defeat the purpose of the salutation. And it may also happen that when the expression used is one not amenable to simple construction, the other party does not comprehend it at all.

'*Form*'—the existence of very essence. Or, it may mean that it comes in lieu of the name of the accosted person; *i.e.*, comes in place of the name; and the name of the accosted person is not pronounced. The term '*bhāva*' may mean either that which is accomplished by means of existence, or that which is accomplished by means of an agent.

Or, we may read '*svarūpabhāve*,' with the locative ending.

'*The form, Oh, Sir*';—*i.e.*, the presence, the existence, of the term 'Oh, Sir'—'*is the form of all names.*' Just as one is addressed by having his name uttered—'Oh, Devadatta, listen to me,' similarly the term *bhoḥ'* (Oh, Sir)—which ends in the Vocative case-ending—is used for the purposes of address; this has been so declared by the sages.—(124)

VERSE CXXV

ON SALUTING, THE BRĀHMAṆA SHOULD BE ANSWERED WITH THE WORDS 'BE LONG LIVED, O GENTLE ONE'; AND AT THE END OF HIS NAME THE VOWEL "A," WHICH OCCURS AT THE END OF THE CONSONANT, SHOULD BE PRONOUNCED ULTRA-LONG.—(125)

Bhāṣya.

On salutation having been done, the answering greeting should be made by the Father to the accoster, with the words —'Be long-lived, Oh Gentle One.' The particle '*iti*' in the text is meant to show that the preceding words constitute the formula. The use of such expressions also as (*a*) '*āyuṣmān ēdhi*,' 'Prosper O Long-lived One,' (*b*) '*dīrghāyurbhūyāḥ*,' 'Be long-lived,' (*c*) '*chirañjīva*,' 'Live long'—is permitted by the usage of cultured men.

'*The vowel "a"*'—which occurs at the end of the name of the person whose salutation is answered—'*should be pronounced ultra-long*.' The term '*pluta*,' 'ultra-long,' stands for the vowel that is drawn out to the length of three moras. The vowel 'a' is mentioned only by way of illustration; it stands for 'i' and other vowels also. The '*end*' spoken of in the text is in relation to the vowels only; so that in the case of names ending in consonants also, the lengthening applies to the vowel that happens to be the *last*, 'at the end.'

The term '*pūrvākṣaraḥ*' qualifies the 'vowel *a*,' which is to be lengthened; and '*akṣara*' here stands for the *consonant*; and the compound means 'that vowel of which the preceding syllable is a consonant'; *i.e.*, the vowel occurring along with the consonant. What is meant is that it is the vowel 'a' already there that is to be lengthened, and not any such vowel as might be added; that is, the vowel that is already present in the name is to be lengthened out.

All this explanation is in accordance with the rules of the revered Pāṇini; as in the matter of the use of words and their meaning, the revered Pāṇini is more authoritative than Manu and other writers. And Pāṇini has laid down (in 8.2.83) that 'in answering the greeting of a non-shūdra, the *ṭi* should be ultrā-long'; and the name '*ṭi*' is given to that syllable of which the last vowel forms the beginning (which in the present case is the '*a*,' which is regarded as a part of itself and hence 'having the last vowel for its beginning'). No significance is meant to be attached to the specification of the '*Brāhmaṇa*' in the present verse; as what is here prescribed is applicable to the *Kṣattriya* and others also. The usage sanctioned by other Smṛtis is also the same, and no separate rules are laid down for these other castes.

As an example we have such expressions as 'Be long-lived, O Devaḍattā'; and one containing a name ending in consonant,—'Be long lived, O Somasharmān.'—(125)

VERSE CXXVI

THE BRĀHMAṆA WHO KNOWS NOT THE RETURN-GREETING OF THE GREETING OF SALUTATION DOES NOT DESERVE TO BE SALUTED BY THE LEARNED; HE IS EXACTLY AS THE SHŪDRA IS.—(126)

Bhāṣya.

Objection.—"It would have sufficed to say 'he who knows not the return-greeting'; the addition of the phrase 'of the greeting of salutation' is superfluous and not quite compatible."

It is not so; the construction is—'the return-greeting *in keeping with the* greeting of salutation.' For instance, propriety demands that (*a*) if the salutation has been offered with the name of the accoster duly pronounced, then in the return-greeting, the final vowel of the name should be pronounced ultra-long; (*b*) and he who salutes with the form 'It is I, Oh, Sir,' is to be answered without his name being uttered and without the elongation of any vowel.

'*Does not deserve to be saluted*';—this prohibits the uttering of the words of greeting; the sense being that 'salutation may be offered,' but not with the words 'it is I, Sir,' —the circumstances under which these words are to be used having been shown before (under 123).

'*As the Shūdra*,'—this appears to be by way of illustration; for as a matter of fact the Shūdra also, when of great age, is held to be deserving of salutation.

'*By the learned*';—this has been added only for the purpose of filling up the metre.—(126)

VERSE CXXVII

HAVING MET A BRĀHMAṆA, ONE SHOULD ASK HIM HIS "WELFARE," A KṢATTRIYA HIS "FREEDOM FROM DISTEMPER," A VAISHYA HIS 'PROSPERITY,' AND A SHUDRA HIS 'FREEDOM FROM DISEASE."—(127)

Bhāṣya.

When a greeting has been offered and answered, and friendly relations have thereby become established, occasion arises for enquiry; and the present verse lays down the verbal forms whose diversity is based upon distinctions of caste; and the caste-distinction pertains to the persons questioned, not to the questioner. And, in as much as there is not very much of a difference in the meaning of the words laid down, the restriction is with reference to the verbal forms only. For instance, the terms '*anāmaya*,' 'freedom from distemper,' and '*ārogya*,' 'freedom from disease,' mean the same thing; nor is there much difference in the meanings of the terms '*kushala*,' 'welfare' and '*kṣēma*,' 'prosperity.' Though the term '*kushala*' denotes *expertness*, yet it is also used in the sense of the *non-deficiency of the body* and other things related to it.

The words here laid down must be used; but this does not mean that the man should not make use of other words also, if he wishes to make detailed enquiries; as has been clearly shown somewhere in the *Mahābhārata*.

On the strength of the expression '*having met*,' some people explain this verse to mean that the questions are to be put only to persons of equal age, and they do not apply to the case of the teacher and other superiors; for the teacher has to be '*approached*,' not '*met*.'

But, as a matter of fact, there is 'meeting' in 'approaching' also; so there is no force in the said explanation.—(127)

VERSE CXXVIII

A PERSON WHO HAS BEEN INITIATED (FOR A RITE), EVEN THOUGH HE BE YOUNGER, SHOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED BY NAME; ONE WHO KNOWS THE LAW SHOULD ADDRESS HIM BEGINNING WITH SUCH TERMS AS "SIR" AND "YOUR WORSHIP."—(128)

Bhāṣya.

At the time of answering a greeting, as also on other occasions, one who has been '*initiated*,'—that is, during the time beginning from the performance of *Dīkṣaṇīyā Iṣṭi* and ending with the Final Bath—should not be addressed by name; *i.e.*, his name should not be uttered.

'*Younger*'—born not very long ago.

The term '*api*,' 'even,' leads us to infer that of the elder person one should not utter the name, even though he be *not initiated*. Says Gautama (2.23)—'The name and gotra of one's superior should be uttered with *māna*, reverence';—'*māna*' here stands for *reverence*; and the meaning is that the name should be uttered with reverence; *e.g.*, in some such form as 'the highly revered lord, Janārdana Mishra.'

Question—"How then is one to converse with an initiated person, on matters of business?"

It should begin with such terms as 'sir' and 'your worship.' That is, one should address the initiated person, after having pronounced the word 'Sir,' and then by such names as 'Initiate' (*Dīkṣita*), 'sacrificer' ('*yajamāna*') and the like, which are applicable to him in their denotative sense. It does not mean that after having pronounced the term 'sir,' he should be addressed by name.

The passage being construed as—'the address which is preceded by the terms *sir* and *your worship*,'—in view of the fact that it is not possible to use both the terms in the same sentence, people have laid down the following rule—(*a*) when one is conversing with him directly, then he should be addressed with the term *sir*, *Bhoḥ*, which contains a vocative ending; (*b*) and when his qualities are being described to some one else, then one should use such words as 'such and such a thing has been done by his worship the Initiate,' 'his worship does so and so.' The text mentions only the basic from '*bhavat*' ('your worship'), and it is to be used with such case-endings as may fit in with the sentence in which it is contained.—(128)

VERSE CXIX

A FEMALE WHO IS THE WIFE OF ANOTHER PERSON, AND IS NOT RELATED TO ONE BY BIRTH, SHOULD BE ADDRESSED AS "LADY," AND ALSO "BLESSED," OR "SISTER."—(129)

Bhaṣya.

When conversation is held with a female in connection with some business, then one should do as directed in this verse.

She who is the wife of another person should be addressed either as 'blessed lady,' or as 'lady, my sister.' The term '*bhavati*' ending in the short vowel is derived from the base '*bhavat*' with the feminine affix, and with the vocative case-ending. The particle '*iti*' after '*bhavati*' indicates that it is used in addition to the terms 'blessed' and 'sister.'

'*One should address*';—this conclusively proves that the terms in question are meant to be used in their verbal forms.

If the lady happens to be an elderly one, she should be addressed as 'mother,' 'glorious one' and so forth; and if she is younger in age, she is to be addressed as 'daughter,' 'long-lived one,' and so forth.

The presence of the term 'wife' shows that the form laid down is not to be used in connection with unmarried girls.

'*Who is not related to one by birth*,'—one who, like the daughter of the maternal uncle, has not become a 'relative' either from the father's or the mother's side. Special rules regarding these are going to be laid down below (under 132).

Objection.—"In that case this latter verse would suffice to signify that the present rule does not apply to relatives; and the general rule here laid down would be applicable to other cases; under the circumstances, where is the use of adding the clause 'who is not related, etc.'?"

Answer.—This being a metrical treatise, we should not be very particular about superfluous repetitions.—(129)

VERSE CXXX

ONE SHOULD RISE AND SAY 'HERE (SO AND SO) I AM,' TO SUCH MATERNAL UNCLES, PATERNAL UNCLES, FATHERS-IN-LAW AND SUPERIORS AS HAPPEN TO BE YOUNGER.—(130)

Bhāṣya.

The plural number in the word 'superiors' indicates that this word does not stand for those superior persons that are mentioned in the present verse ; it is meant to be a generic name, standing for persons superior in the point of wealth, etc., as mentioned by Gautama (in 6.20).

These when they are 'younger'—whose age is lower than that of the nephew, etc.

'*Here I am*'—indicates the name of the accoster ; the term 'I' being meant to come after the name.

When the said persons have arrived, one should rise to meet them and accost them in the manner here prescribed. The present direction prohibits the use of the vocative term '*bhoḥ*,' 'sir,' in the greeting. Gautama also has said—'There should be rising to meet ; these are not to be saluted.' (6.9).—(130)

VERSE CXXXI.

MOTHER'S SISTER, MATERNAL UNCLE'S WIFE, MOTHER-IN-LAW, AND FATHER'S SISTER DESERVE TO BE HONOURED LIKE THE TEACHER'S WIFE ; ALL THESE ARE EQUAL TO THE WIFE OF THE TEACHER.—(131)

Bhāṣya.

These '*deserve to be honoured like the Teacher's wife*'—by rising to meet them, saluting them, offering them seat and so forth.

The equality of these to the Teacher's wife having been already mentioned by the phrase 'like the Teacher's wife,' the addition of the words '*they are equal, etc*.,' is meant to indicate that one should do for these persons other things also ; —such as carrying out their wishes and so forth—that one does for the Teacher's wife. If this were not so indicated, the implication of the context would be that it is only in the matter of salutation that they have to be treated 'like the Teacher's wife.'

The text speaks of only ladies of older age ; but in the case of younger ladies also the same rule of salutation has to be observed.—(131)

VERSE CXXXII

THE BROTHER'S WIFE, IF OF THE SAME CASTE, SHOULD BE CLASPED IN THE FEET DAY BY DAY ; BUT THE WIVES OF OTHER PATERNAL, MATERNAL AND OTHER RELATIVES SHOULD BE SO CLASPED ONLY WHEN ONE HAS GONE ON A JOURNEY.—(132)

Bhāṣya.

'*Brother's*'—should be understood to mean 'of the elder brother.'

'*Should be clasped in the feet,*'—should be saluted on their feet.

'*Of the same caste*'—belonging to the same caste as her husband. As for the brother's wives who belong to the *Kṣattriya* and other castes, they are to be treated as ordinary relatives.

'*The wives of other paternal and maternal relatives—only when one has gone on a journey*';— *i.e.*, by one who has *returned* from a journey ; for no clasping of the feet could be done by one who is away on a journey.

'*Jñāti*' stands for paternal relatives ;—'*Sambandhi*' for maternal relatives ; as also other relatives, such as the father-in-law and the rest. The wives of these —when they are of older age ; this is clear from the fact that 'the clasping of the feet' is a form of worship which cannot be right in the case of relatives of younger age.—(132)

VERSE CXXXIII

TOWARDS HIS FATHER'S SISTER, HIS MOTHER'S SISTER, AND HIS OWN ELDER SISTER, ONE SHOULD ADOPT THE SAME BEHAVIOUR AS TOWARDS HIS MOTHER ; BUT THE MOTHER IS MORE VENERABLE THAN THESE.—(133)

Bhāṣya.

The present text serves to indicate the propriety of behaving, as towards one's mother, towards the sister of his father, and the sister of his mother, and also towards his own elder sister.

Objection.—"The treatment to be accorded towards the father's and the mother's sister has already been prescribed under 131 above. It might be argued that in verse 131 it is said that they should be treated like the *Teacher's wife*, while in the present verse they are described as to be treated like one's *mother*. But this makes no difference; as the behaviour towards the mother is precisely the same as that towards the Teacher's wife."

To this some people make the following answer : The venerable character of the father's and the mother's sister has been re-asserted only for the purpose of adding that '*the mother is more venerable than these.*' The meaning is that when one's mother directs him one way, and the father's sister and the rest another way, he should act according to the directions of his mother, and not according to those of the others. It will not be right to argue that this (superiority of the mother) is also already declared under verse 145; because this latter verse is purely valedictory.

Others however hold that there is some difference in the treatment to be accorded to the mother and to the Teacher's wife. In the case of the Teacher's wife, worship, etc., are necessary; while in the case of the mother, it is often otherwise also, because of the son being too young, or because of the mother being too fond of him. And since the father's sister and the mother's sister also fondle the child (like his mother), it is only natural that these should be treated like the mother. Fondling during childhood is done by one's own elder sister also. But when one has passed beyond childhood, his treatment of these relatives should be like that of his teacher's wife. All this is not got out of the present verse only. And if we did not have both declarations (one in the present verse, and another in 131), then the mere assertion of 'behaviour as towards his mother' would be liable to be understood as referring to salutation only, as it is this that forms the subject-matter of the context; while as a matter of fact, it is the *loving behaviour* that is here intended to be accorded.—(133)

XXIV. Degrees of Respect

VERSE CXXXIV

AMONG CITIZENS FRIENDSHIP AND EQUALITY ARE REGARDED AS RANGING WITHIN TEN YEARS (OF AGE-DIFFERENCE); AMONG ARTISTS, IT IS REGARDED AS RANGING WITHIN FIVE YEARS; AMONG LEARNED MEN, IT PROCEEDS UP TO THREE YEARS; AND AMONG BLOOD-RELATIONS, IT RANGES ONLY WITHIN A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.—(134)

Bhāṣya.

It has been said above (under 120) that 'the life-breaths of the younger men rush outwards at the approach of the elder'; now the present verse proceeds to determine by how many years one may be regarded as an 'elder'; among ordinary men people come to be regarded as 'elderly' when they become grey-headed.

Among citizens, equality and friendship are regarded as subsisting among people who differ in their age by ten years, so that among these, one comes to be regarded as 'elder' when he happens to be more than ten years older; and those less than that should be treated as 'friends and equals'; and hence accosted as 'Oh, Sir,' as declared by Gautama (6.14)—"Equals in age should be accosted as 'Oh, Sir'; when the difference in age is more than ten years, the person should be regarded as 'elder.'

In the expression '*dashābdākhyam*,' '*ākhyā*' stands for '*ākhyānam*,' '*description*'; and the compound, a three-termed *Bahuvrīhi*, means 'that whose description is ten years'; the years being construed as qualifying 'friendship' on the basis of 'description,' and no significance being attached to the difference between cause and effect (the 'years' being the cause of the 'friendship'), all that the compound means is that—'one who is senior by about ten years is an equal friend.'

'*Pauras*,' '*citizens*,' are 'persons living in cities.' The mention of 'cities' is only by way of illustration; the same rule holds good among inhabitants of villages also. Among people living in the same village, all those come to be regarded as 'friends' among whom there happens to be some ground for close intimacy.

Those persons who practise some sort of *art*—crafts, music and the rest,—among these one who is older by less than five years is an 'equal'; beyond that he is 'elder.'

'*Tryabdam*' means 'that which is preceded by three years'; and of this kind is the 'equality' among learned men.

'*Among blood-relations, it ranges within a very short period of time*';—*i.e.*, among persons belonging to the same family, he who is senior by only a few days is also 'elder.'

"What period of time is to be regarded as *very short*?"

It cannot be *three years*; for having spoken of three '*years*,' the text mentions 'short,' which means that it must be less than that. It cannot mean *two* years, because of the singular number. Nor lastly, can it mean *one* year, as in that case there would be no point in the qualification '*very short*.' Because 'year' is the name given to a well-defined period of time; so that a period of time which is less than that even by a single day ceases to be a 'year.' For these reasons '*short*' must refer to time in general (unspecified), the only peculiarity being that it should be less than a year.

The particle '*cha*' should be taken as standing for '*eva*,' '*only*'; the meaning being '*friendship* ranges only within a very short period of time, beyond that the man becomes *elder*.'

All this should be taken as holding good only among people of the same caste, possessed of similar qualifications; so that the definition of 'elder' as something relative in sense is that obtaining among ordinary people.

Other persons explain the verse as follows:—This verse does not define what is the characteristic of being 'elder'; it only serves to define 'Friendship.' It could be taken as defining 'elderliness' only if we abandoned its direct meaning; as only then could it be taken to mean that 'during such time one is a friend, and after that he becomes an *elder*.' As a matter of fact, what the verse means is as follows:—(*a*) People who live in the same city for ten years become 'friends'; (*b*) among people knowing the arts—sixty-four in number—companionship during five years establishes 'friendship'; (*c*) among blood-relations, friendship is established by living together even for a very short time. Thus then, one does not become a 'friend' simply because he happens to be of equal age, in fact the 'friend' is as described; but the said conditions of 'friendship' all require that the parties concerned be of equal age.

All this may be true; but this explanation is inconsistent with the next verse; in the latter, 'caste' is mentioned as the pre-eminent factor, and not the age; and the reason is that if the mere fact of being so many years older in age were to make one 'elder,' then we could not get rid of the contingency of persons of different (and inferior) castes being regarded as 'elders.'

Older commentators have all adopted the first explanation (put forward by us).—(134)

VERSE CXXXV

THE BRĀHMAṆA OF TEN YEARS AND THE KṢATTRIYA OF A HUNDRED YEARS SHOULD BE KNOWN AS FATHER AND SON; AND OF THE TWO THE BRĀHMAṆA IS THE FATHER.—(135)

Bhāṣya.

One since whose birth ten years have elapsed is 'of ten years.' The *time* is the *determining* and the *Brāhmaṇa* the *determined* factor; but it is not possible to determine, by means of *time*, either his tallness or shortness or thinness, etc.; what can be determined by it is only a certain act of his; and this act can only be that of *maintaining his life-breath*, which subsists in him continuously since his birth.

The same explanation applies to the epithet '*of a hundred years.*'

They should be looked upon as 'father and son.'

'*Of the two*'—as compared with each other,—'*the Brāhmaṇa is the father.*'

All that this means is that even when the Kṣattriya is very old and the Brāhmaṇa very young in years, the former should rise to meet and salute the latter.—(135)

VERSE CXXXVI

WEALTH, RELATION, AGE, ACTION AND LEARNING, AS THE FIFTH,—THESE ARE THE GROUNDS OF RESPECT; (AMONG THEM) THAT WHICH FOLLOWS IS WEIGHTIER (THAN THAT WHICH GOES BEFORE IT).—(136)

Bhāṣya.

Caste has been described as a ground of superiority; so that one belonging to a higher caste should be respected by one of a lower caste. The text now proceeds to describe the relative strength of those factors that entitle persons of a caste to salutation and honour among themselves.

Age is mentioned here again only for the purpose of indicating its position as compared with others.

In the case of all that is mentioned here it is the connection of the person with them that entitles him to respect. That is, *the possession of wealth* and the *possession of relations* constitute titles of respect. It is not meant that the peculiar relationship borne by the man—such as that of being a paternal or a maternal uncle—constitutes the title of respect; what is meant is that one who has many relations deserves to be respected.

'*Age*'—*i. e.*, advanced age. The term is generally used in this qualified sense; *e. g.*, in such passages as 'Even though the son be of age, he should be advised by his father.' Verse 134 has already explained what age entitles one to respect.

'*Action*'—such as is laid down in *Shrutis* and *Smṛtis*; *i. e.*, one's assiduity in performing such actions.

'*Learning*,'—the knowledge of the Veda along with the subsidiary sciences and their auxiliaries.

Objection.—"In view of such declarations as 'the learned man offers sacrifices,' 'the learned man officiates at sacrifices,' the unlearned person can never be entitled to the performance of religious acts; under the circumstances, how can mere 'action,' without 'learning,' be a ground for respect?"

Answer.—There is no force in this objection. *Excellence* is what is meant here. Superior or efficient learning is what constitutes a title to respect; and as for the performance of actions, this can be done also by men possessed of limited learning; for a man is entitled to perform actions in accordance with the knowledge possessed by him: specially as '*learning*' entitles a person to the performance of actions simply because it serves to capacitate him for it, and not because it has been declared to be a necessary condition.

"But the man devoid of learning cannot know the form of the action to be performed, and being capable of acting only like lower animals, to the performance of what could he be entitled?"

Even such a person can, on having heard a few Smṛti-texts, perform austerities and repeat *mantras*. It is only in the performance of the Agnihotra and such other Vedic rites that one requires the knowledge of Vedic texts. But here also the title to perform the rites is dependent upon the extent of knowledge possessed by the man; *e. g.*, one who knows the meaning of the texts bearing upon the *Agnihotra* is entitled to its performance; the knowledge of other sacrifices is of no use in that.

The following argument might be urged here—"We have the injunction 'the entire Veda should be studied,' which pertains to the whole Veda, and implies the thorough understanding of the whole; and when it is necessary to understand the meaning of the entire Veda, how can there be any such partial knowledge as could justify such an assertion as that 'he who knows the meaning of the texts bearing on the Agnihotra shall be entitled to the performance of that act, even though he be ignorant of the meaning of other texts?'"

Our answer to the above is as follows:—It is the study of one Vedic Recension that is necessary; and what we mean is that he who has studied one Recension and has fully understood its meaning, becomes entitled to the performance of Vedic acts, even without studying the other Recensions.

"The purpose of the Scripture is the same in all cases; even though there may be some difference in the order of a few words and syllables, yet the main feature of the Scripture remains the same. Then again, as for the understanding of the meaning, this is obtained by the due comprehension of the meanings of words and reasonings; now, neither the meanings of words, nor the reasonings, differ in the different Recensions. So that the means by which one learns the meaning of one Recension serves the same purpose in regard to the other Recensions also; and one does not stand in need of any other learning; so that if one Recension has been learnt, all become learnt."

True. Such Agnihotra, etc., as are enjoined in one Recension may not differ from the same acts as enjoined in other Recensions; but there are certain actions which are not enjoined at all in certain Recensions. *E.g.*, the *Shyēna* and other malevolent rites in connection with the Darsha-pūrṇamāsa are not found in the Ashvalāyana Recension of the Ṛgveda; nor the Somayāga, the Vājapēya, the Bṛhaspatisava and so forth. So that when a man has learnt one Recension, he becomes entitled to that Agnihotra and that Jyotiṣṭoma, etc., which are enjoined in that Recension; and if one who has not studied another Recension, and has neither read nor heard of it, how can he know anything about the acts enjoined in that other Recension? Nor are the Soma-sacrifices compulsory; so that, through fear of incurring the sin of omitting a compulsory act, one might be forced to seek for the knowledge of them from other Recensions. As for the 'Kindling of Fire,' even though this also is not found enjoined in the said Āshvalāyana recension of the Ṛgveda, yet it does contain the injunction of preparing the 'Āhavanīya' fire; as is clear from such passages as 'bring up the Āhavanīya'; so that, not understanding the meaning of this passage with the help of ordinary people, the student naturally seeks, from other Recensions, for the knowledge of what this '*Āhavanīya*' is; and thus he comes to look over the entire section of the other Recension dealing with the 'Kindling of Fire.' Similarly having heard the passage—'Having offered either the Amāvāsyā or the Paurṇamāsa libations, etc.,' one seeks from other Recensions for the knowledge of the exact form of the two acts (of Amavāsyā and Paurṇamāsa offerings). Similarly in the case of other compulsory and optional acts that have to be performed, when it is found that some of their details are not laid down in a certain Recension,—such details, for instance, as pertain to the Adhvaryu (and are mentioned in the Yajurveda) or to the *Udgātṛ* (and are mentioned in the Sāma-Veda),—the requisite knowledge is sought for from those other texts. It is not possible for one to know the act that is laid down in Recensions other than the one studied by him. To the student who learns several Recensions, and studies their meanings, all this becomes quite clear. But even in the absence of such knowledge as this last, the performance of acts is quite possible. Or, such performance could be possible even on a slight understanding (of the Vedic texts).

The sense of all this is that in the case of one whose learning is flawless, and who is fit to explain all sciences, such learning constitutes a title to respect.

'*Weightier.*'—The comparative ending indicates that the comparison is between two and two out of the five mentioned. Thus one who is fully versed in all the fourteen sciences, is respected through his '*learning*,' even though he be not entitled to it on account of being lame, blind or poor.

The text points out the relative superiority of these, with a view to cases where there may be a conflict among them.—'*Among these that which follows is weightier than that which precedes it.*' For instance, when one man has vast wealth, and the other has many relations, then the latter deserves higher respect than the former; for that which follows is 'weightier' than that which precedes it. Similarly *Age* is weightier than *Relation*. And from this it follows that *Age* is weightier still than *Wealth*. From all this it is clear that 'Learning is superior to all, for all Dharma is based upon it,' as has been declared by Gautama (6-21—22).

Objection.—"Since the preceding factor is not *weighty*, how can we have the comparative form '*weightier*'? It is only when there are two *weighty* things that one can be called *weightier*; and since in the present case *weightiness* is, *ex hypothesi*, in relation to something preceding there can be no *weightiness* in 'wealth,' which is not preceded by any thing else."

What is meant is that the whole lot of five being 'weighty' in common, the comparative ending is rightly used as showing that one is *weightier* than the other.

'*Māna*' means *respect*; '*sthāna*' means *ground, cause.*

If we adopt the reading '*Mānyasthānāni*,' the term '*mānya*' is to be explained as having the force of the abstract noun; '*mānya*' standing for '*mānyatva*.'—(136)

It has just been declared that among persons each of whom possesses only one of the qualifications mentioned, one possessing the latter is to be regarded as superior to one possessing the former. Now the question arises—between two persons, one of whom possesses two former qualifications and the other possesses only one latter qualification, who is to be treated as superior? The following verse answers this question.

VERSE CXXXVII

AMONG THE THREE (HIGHER) CASTES, HE, IN WHOM THERE ARE PRESENT MOST OF THESE FIVE, AND OF HIGH DEGREE, DESERVES (GREATER) RESPECT; AS ALSO THE SHUDRA WHO HAS REACHED THE TENTH STAGE (OF LIFE).—(137)

Bhāṣya.

'*Of these five*' grounds of respect;—he in whom there are '*a larger number*'—not all—'*deserves respect.*' And here the mere sequence (or posteriority) of the qualifications should not be much heeded. For instance, when one man possesses *wealth* and *relations*, and the other possesses only *old age*,—the former gets preference over the latter.

But even when there are several qualities present, if they are not of high degree,—while the single quality possessed by the other person is of very high degree,—then both are equal; and the larger number do not get over the latter (superior) qualification.

When the former verse uses the term '*weightier*,' it only means superiority in comparison to one (not several) of the preceding ones.

When however in one person there are a *larger number of preceding qualities* and also *of high degree*,—of great excellence,—while in the other person there are present the same number of *succeeding* qualities,—so that the number of preceding and succeeding qualifications (possessed by the two men) are equal,—then, there is no getting over the one by the other, simply on the ground of precedence (in enumeration); in this case both are to be regarded as equal.

"Since what the text declares is that he is deserving of respect in whom the qualities are of high degree,—it would be right to conclude that in the case just mentioned where the two persons possess an equal *number* of qualities (but the preceding ones are of higher degree), the presence of the preceding set should get over the other."

Not so; the epithet '*of high degree*' is meant to apply to the case where the two sets of qualities are equal; *e.g.*, where the one as well as the other is possessed of *learning*, superiority belongs to one whose learning is of the superior order. Similarly with the other qualities.

'*Among the three Castes*,'—*i.e.*, among Brāhmaṇas, Kṣattriyas and Vaishyas. If the said qualities, many in number and of high degree, belong to the *Kṣattriya*, then such a Kṣattriya deserves to be respected by the Brāhmaṇa possessed of inferior qualities, even though he belongs to the higher caste. The Vaishya, similarly, is to be respected by the Kṣattriya.

Similarly by all the twice-born castes the *Shūdra* should be respected, '*when he has reached the tenth stage*.' The '*tenth*' stands for the last stage of life, and indicates *extreme old age*. Thus then, in case of the Shūdra, 'wealth' and 'relations' do not constitute grounds of respect, in relation to the three higher castes. This is clear from the fact that the Text specifies the 'tenth stage.' 'Action' and 'Learning' are not possible in the Shūdra; for the simple reason that he is not entitled to these.

'*Most*';—all that is meant by this is *excess*, not *plurality of number* (which would mean at least *three*); hence what is asserted applies to the presence of *two* qualities also. There is nothing to justify the notion that the term '*bahu*' (from which '*bhūyāmsi* is derived') denotes *number*. Further, the term actually used is '*bhūyaḥ*,' not '*bāhu*'; and the former is often found to be used in the sense of *excess*, *much*: *e.g.*, '*bhūyāṅshchātra parihāro*,' 'there is *much* that can be said in answer to this,' '*bhūyābhyudayēna yokṣyē*,' 'I shall become endowed with *much* prosperity.' Nor is any significance meant to be attached to the plural number in '*bhūyāmsi*'; the plural number in this case denoting only *kind*, according to Pāṇini 3-2-58, which lays down that 'when a kind or genus is spoken of, the plural number is optionally used.' If significance were really meant to be attached to the plural number, then a person possessed of only one quality (of however high degree) would never be entitled to respect; and this would run counter to what we have learnt from the foregoing verse. Further, by speaking of —'*the Shūdra who has reached the tenth stage*'—where mere *age* (only one quality) is mentioned as a ground of respect, —the Text has made it clear that no significance is meant to be attached to the plural number (in '*bhūyāmsi*'). Usage also points to the same conclusion.—(137)

VERSE CXXXVIII

WAY SHOULD BE MADE FOR ONE IN A CHARIOT, FOR ONE WHO IS IN THE TENTH STAGE OF LIFE, FOR ONE SUFFERING FROM DISEASE, FOR ONE CARRYING A BURDEN, FOR A WOMAN, FOR THE PERSON WHO HAS JUST PASSED OUT OF STUDENTSHIP, FOR THE KING AND FOR THE BRIDEGROOM.—(138)

Bhāṣya.

Another method of showing respect is also described by the way.

'*Chakrin*' is the person in a chariot, one who is occupying a cart or some such conveyance. For him '*way should be made.*' '*Way*' is that path, that part of the Earth, by which one goes to a village and such other places; while one is on such a 'way,' if a man in a chariot should happen to come either in front of him or behind him, then the man on foot should move off from the spot where he might be obstructing the passing of the cart.

'*One who is in the tenth stage of life*'—one who is far advanced in age.

'*One suffering from a disease*'—one who is suffering very badly from some malady.

'*One who is carrying a burden*'—one who is carrying grains and other heavy things; such a man also finds it difficult to move, and hence must be favoured.

'*A woman,*—*i.e.*, simply by reason of her being a woman, irrespective of her caste or qualifications, or of the position of her husband.

'*King*'—stands here for the master of a kingdom, not for the mere *Kṣattriya.* For in the conclusion (which comes in the next verse) we have the term '*Pārthiva,*' which means the 'lord of the Earth,' '*pṛthivyāḥ īshvaraḥ.*'

Objection.—"In as much as in the opening verse (the present) we have the term '*rājan,*' it would be more reasonable to interpret the term '*parthiva*' (in the next verse) in accordance with, and as standing for, the '*Rājā*' (than that 'Rājā' should be taken as standing for the '*pārthiva*'), and the word '*Rājan*' is well-known as denoting the *Kṣattriya* caste; and as this forms the principal denotation of the term, it should be accepted in the opening of the passage, specially as there does not appear to be any incongruity in it. In the next verse, where the relative merits are mentioned, it is quite possible to take the term '*pārthiva*' as referring to the *Kṣattriya*; in view of the fact that the 'protecting of the Earth,' which is connoted by the term '*pārthiva.*' is a duty prescribed specifically for the *Kṣattriya.* So that it cannot be right to take the term as referring to other castes, merely on the strength of their being '*in possession of land*' ('*pṛthīvyāḥ īshvaraḥ*')."

To the above we make the following reply:—What is asserted here (in the next verse) is *capability of being respected*;—when, *e.g.*, the person who has just passed out of his studentship is described as deserving to be honoured by a king. Under verse 35, it has been pointed out that the term '*bhūmipa*' stands for the *Kṣattriya* caste; and since the Kingly caste is merely indicative, what is mentioned here is understood to pertain to such a Kṣattriya as happens to be the 'lord of men.'

The '*bridegroom*'—who is going to marry. For these persons '*way should be made*;'—what is meant by '*dēyaḥ,*' '*should be made,*' is simply that one should give up the road;

and as 'giving up' only means *moving off* (and not actual *giving*), the Dative ending has not been used.—(138)

VERSE CXXXIX

AMONG THESE, WHEN THEY COME TOGETHER, THE MAN WHO HAS JUST PASSED HIS STUDENTSHIP AND THE KING DESERVE TO BE HONOURED ; AND BETWEEN THE PERSON JUST PASSED HIS STUDENTSHIP AND THE KING, THE PERSON JUST PASSED HIS STUDENTSHIP RECEIVES THE RESPECTS OF THE KING.—(139)

Bhāṣya.

'*Among these, when they come together*,'—when they happen to meet,—'*the person just passed his studentship and the King deserve to be honoured*'—by the 'making of way,' which is the particular form of 'honouring' mentioned in the present context.

'*Receives the respects of the King*'—*i.e.*, obtains honour from the King.

The genitive case-ending has the sense of *selection* (according to Pāṇini 2.3.41)

Among the rest—the person riding a chariot and others—there is option, dependent upon their respective capacity.—(139)

XXV. Meaning of the Title 'Āchārya'

VERSE CXL

THE BRĀHMAṆA WHO, HAVING INITIATED A PUPIL, TEACHES HIM THE VEDA ALONG WITH THE RITUALISTIC AND ESOTERIC TREATISES,—HIM THEY CALL, 'ĀCHĀRYA,' 'PRECEPTOR'—(140)

Bhāṣya.

The present section is taken up for determining the exact signification of '*Āchārya*' (Preceptor) and other terms. As a matter of fact, people make use of these names on the basis of certain qualifications; and this particular matter has not been dealt with by Pāṇini and other writers on the subject of the meanings of words. What the present text says regarding the meaning of the titles is based, like the Smṛti of Pāṇini and others, upon usage, not upon the Veda; as it does not prescribe anything *to be done*; that such and such a word means such and such a thing is a *well-established fact*, not something *to be accomplished.*

'*Having initiated,*'—*i.e.*, having performed the Initiatory Rite,—'*he who teaches*'—makes him get up—'*the Veda*'—is the 'preceptor.' The 'getting up' of the Veda here meant consists in the remembering of the exact words of the text, independently of other learners.

'*Kalpa,*' '*Ritualistic Treatise,*'—stands here for all the Subsidiary Sciences.—'*Esoteric Treatises*' are the Upaniṣads. Though these latter also are included under the name 'Veda,' yet the text has mentioned them separately by the name 'Esoteric Treatises,' with a view to remove the misconception that these are not Veda,—a misconception that might arise from the fact that they have a second name '*Vedānta*,' where the term '*anta*' denotes 'proximity' (only, not *identity*).

Others have explained the term '*rahasya*,' '*Esoteric Treatises*, to mean 'the meaning of the Vedic texts'; and by this explanation, the teaching of the verbal text only would not make one a 'Teacher,' it would be necessary for him to explain the meaning also. To this effect we have the following declaration in the *Abhidhāna-Kosha*;—'He who expounds the meanings of mantras is called the *Preceptor*";—here the term '*mantra*' stands for all Vedic passages.

In accordance with this explanation, the learning of the meaning also, and not the mere getting up of the Text, would be prompted by the injunction of 'becoming a Preceptor'; so that for every man the injunction of Vedic study would come to be carried out by other persons.

"That may be so; but even when the Injunction of Vedic study is carried out by other persons, the purpose of the student becomes accomplished all the same."

In that case then, since 'becoming a Preceptor' is a purely voluntary act, if the Teacher does not have recourse to the necessary activity, then the carying out of the injunction of Vedic study would remain unaccomplished; so that this injunction of Vedic study would no longer be compulsory.

Then again, as a matter of fact, the term '*rahasya*,' '*esoteric treatise*,' is not ordinarily known as denoting the 'explanation of the meaning of Vedic texts.'

From all this it is clear that the purpose of adding the term '*rahasya*' is as explained before.

Or, the separate mention of the '*Upaniṣads*,' may be explained as indicating the importance of that part of the Veda.

As regards the declaration quoted above—'he is called Preceptor who explains the meaning of mantras,'—this is not a *Smṛti* (and hence not authoritative). Nor is there any ground for taking the term '*mantra*' as standing for *Vedic texts* in general.

For all these reasons it is clear that the purpose of the present Injunction lies in the reading of the mere Text. So that when the boy has accomplished the getting up of the words of the Veda, this also means that he has carried out the injunction of 'becoming a Teacher.'—(140)

VERSE CXLI

HE IS CALLED "UPĀDHYĀYA," "SUB-TEACHER," WHO TEACHES, FOR A LIVING, ONLY A PART OF THE VEDA, OR ONLY THE VEDIC SUBSIDIARY SCIENCES.—(141)

Bhāṣya.

'*A part of the Veda.*'—The Mantra only or the Brāhmaṇa portion only;—Or, without the Veda itself, only the Vedic subsidiary sciences;—he who teaches this,—and also even the whole Veda, (but)—'*for a living,*'—*i.e.*, not prompted purely by the injunction of 'becoming a preceptor,'—he is an *Upādhyāya*, a 'Sub-teacher,' not an Āchārya, 'Preceptor.'

He who may teach even the entire Veda to a pupil initiated by another person, is not a 'Preceptor'; nor is he a 'Preceptor' who, having initiated a pupil, does not teach him the entire Veda.

"If the *teaching of a portion of the Veda* is made the distinguishing feature of the 'Sub-Teacher,' and the *Initiating* is the characteristic of the 'Preceptor,'—then what would be the character of that person who does *not* do the initiating, but teaches the *whole* Veda? He would be neither a 'Preceptor' (since he has not done the initiating), nor a 'Sub-teacher' (as he has not taught only a *portion* of the Veda). Nor has any other name been heard of for such a teacher."

Our answer is as follows:—According to what is going to be said in 149 such a person would be the 'Teacher,' '*Guru*,' who is inferior to the 'Preceptor,' but superior to the 'Sub-teacher.'

The terms '*api*' '*punaḥ*' in the Text only serve to fill in the metre.—(141)

VERSE CXLII

THAT BRĀHMAṆA, WHO PERFORMS, IN THE PRESCRIBED MANNER, ONE'S SACRAMENTAL RITES BEGINNING WITH THE RITES OF IMPREGNATION, AND SUPPORTS HIM WITH FOOD, IS CALLED THE "GURU," "MENTOR."—(142)

Bhāṣya.

The mention of the 'Rites of Impregnation' indicates that the present verse lays down the fact of the Father being a 'Mentor.'

'*Niṣēka*' 'Impregnation,' is the 'Sprinkling of the semen':—those acts of which the 'Impregnation' is the first or beginning; the term 'beginning' shows that all the Sacramental Rites are meant.

He who performs these rites and also '*supports*'—fosters—'*with food*.'

'*Chaivainam*' is another reading (for '*chānnēna*'). The meaning remains the same; as 'supporting' can be done only by means of *food*. The only additional sense obtained from this other reading is the reference, by means of the pronoun '*ēnam*,' to the boy.

"As a matter of fact, '*ēnam* is only a relative pronoun; and the 'Boy' does not appear anywhere here as its antecedent."

There is no force in this; for whom else (if not for the *boy*) are the Rites of Impregnation and the rest performed? And 'reference' is often only *implied*, not always expressly stated.

He who does not fulfil these two conditions, but gives one birth, is only a 'progenitor,' not a 'mentor.' Nor should the notion be entertained that, not being a 'mentor,' he should not be respected; as a matter of fact, he is the very first to deserve respect; as says the revered Vyāsa —'The Father is the master, the source of the body, the benefactor, the life-giver, the mentor, the advisor, of all that is good, the visible God.'

The mention of the '*Brāhmaṇa*' is only illustrative.—(142)

VERSE CXLIII

He who, being duly appointed, performs, for one the Fire-laying Rite, the Cooked Sacrifices and the Agniṣṭoma and other sacrifices,—is called his "officiating priest."—(143)

Bhāṣya.

The rite that brings about the existence of the *Āhavanīya* and other (sacrificial fires) is called the 'Fire-laying Rite,' prescribed in such sentences as 'the Brāhmaṇa should lay fire during the spring.'

'*Cooked sacrifices*'—the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* and the rest.

'*The Agniṣṭoma and other sacrifices,*'—*i.e.*, the Soma-sacrifices. The term '*makha*' is synonymous with '*kratu*,' '*sacrifice*.'

He who perfoms these acts for one is called his '*officiating priest*.' '*For him*' and '*his*' denote relation; the meaning being that 'the performer is the officiating priest of only that man for whom he performs the acts, and not of any other person.'

All these terms, 'Preceptor' and the rest, are words denoting relation.

'*Being appointed*'—being requested; *i.e.*, whose appointment has been made in accordance with the rules laid down in the scriptures.

The 'Priest' has been described here, in connection with the mention of persons entitled to respect; and priests have nothing to do with the duties of the religious student. This description is supplied here only for the purpose of indicating that the Priest also is entitled, like the Preceptor and the rest, to respect.—(143)

VERSE CXLIV

HE WHO RIGHTLY FILLS ONE'S BOTH EARS WITH THE VEDA SHOULD BE REGARDED AS HIS FATHER AND MOTHER; ONE SHOULD NOT, AT ANY TIME, DO HIM HARM.—(144)

'*He who fills both ears with the Veda*'—by teaching—'*should be regarded as his Father and Mother.*'

The present verse does not enjoin that the words 'Father' and 'Mother' denote the teacher; because these two terms, 'Father and Mother,' have their denotations as well known as the words 'Āchārya' and the rest,—that the term 'Father' denotes the *progenitor*, and 'mother' the *progenitress.* As a matter of fact, these two terms have been applied here for the purpose of indirectly eulogising the Teacher; just as in such expressions as 'the ploughman is an ox.' In ordinary experience the father and the mother are known as one's best benefactors; they give one birth, bring him up with food, and seek to do good to their child, even at the risk of their body. Hence, the Teacher also, being a great benefactor, is eulogised as being equal to them; the sense being that he who helps one by imparting learning is superior to all other benefactors.

'*Rightly*'—is an adverb; the sense being that the Veda imparted is *right,* correct; not vitiated either by the omission of letters or by wrong accent.

'*Harm*' stands for *injury,* and also for *disrespect.*

'*At any time*'—*i. e.*, even after the learning of books has been accomplished, one should do him no harm. Says the author of the *Nirukta*—'The Brāhmaṇas who, after being taught, do not honour their teachers, by word, mind and act, etc., etc.';—'*Do not honour,*' *i.e.*, disregard;—'Just as such pupils are of no use to the teacher'—bring him no benefit—'so also does the learning bring no benefit to the pupils.'

'*Ātṛṇoti*' is another reading (for '*āvṛṇoti*' in the Text), which means 'pierces' or 'penetrates' the two ears; which figuratively implies 'teaching'; as we find in the line—'he is called a man with *unpenetrated ears* whose ears have not been reached by learning.'

This verse prohibits the doing of harm, by one even after he has acquired all the learning, to all the three kinds of *Teachers*—the Preceptor, the Sub-teacher and the Mentor. —(144)

VERSE CXLV

In veneration, the Preceptor excels ten Sub-teachers; the Father a hundred Preceptors, and the Mother a thousand Fathers.—(145)

Bhāṣya.

This verse lays down the relative superiority among the persons intended to be eulogised. The Preceptor is superior to the Sub-teacher, the Father is superior to the Preceptor, and the Mother is superior even to the Father. The specification of the numbers 'ten' and the rest is purely valedictory. All that is meant is that the following is superior to the preceding; hence it is that we have the expression 'a thousand Fathers.'

'*Excels ten Sub-teachers*'—*i.e.*, he is superior to ten Sub-teachers.

"Why have we the Accusative ending here?"

The '*ati*' (in '*atirichyatē*) is a preposition; the construction being—*upādhyāyān ati* (in reference to Sub-teachers);—and this means that 'surpassing each of the ten sub-teachers, he becomes endowed with greater honour.' Or, the '*atirēka*,' *excelling* (denoted by the verb '*atirichyatē*'), means *excess*, the verbal root being used here in the sense of 'subjugation caused by excess'; the sense being that 'by excess of respect he subdues ten sub-teachers. Lastly, if we take the verb '*atirichyatē*' as the reflexive passive form, the Accusative ending becomes quite consistent; specially as the Vārtika (on Pāṇini, 3.1.87) speaks of 'wide usage' in connection with such transitive verbs as 'milk,' 'cook' and the like.

Objection.—"The very next verse is going to assert that the 'Father who imparts the Veda is the superior'; while the present verse declares the Father to be superior to the Preceptor; and this is mutually contradictory."

There is no force in this objection. According to etymologists the "*Āchārya*' is not one who *teaches*; hence in the present verse the term stands for one who only performs the sacramental rites and teaches merely the rules of conduct;—Āchārya being one who makes one learn *usage, āchāra.* It is not necessary that one should always use only such names as are current in one's own science; *e.g.*, the term '*guru*' in the present treatise, has been declared to stand for the *father*, and is also used here and there for the *preceptor.* From all this it is clear that the superiority of the father here meant is only over that person who confers upon one only a slight benefit, who only performs the Initiatory Rite and teaches the Rules of Conduct, and does not do any teaching.

The order of precedence being as here laid down, it follows that at a place where all these are present, the Mother is to be saluted first, then the Father, then the Preceptor, then the Sub-teacher.—(145)

The question arising as regards the order of precedence when the real Preceptor and the Father who has performed the Initiatory Rite are both present,—the next verse supplies the answer.

VERSE CXLVI

BETWEEN THE PROGENITOR AND THE IMPARTER OF THE VEDA, THE IMPARTER OF THE VEDA IS THE MORE VENERABLE FATHER; FOR THE BRĀHMAṆA'S "BIRTH" IS THE VEDA, ETERNALLY,—HERE AS WELL AS AFTER DEATH.—(146)

Bhāṣya.

'*Progenitor*'—is one who gives natural birth; '*Imparter of the Veda*' is one who teaches;—both these are '*fathers*'; and between these two 'fathers,' that Father is '*more venerable*' who imparts the Veda. So that when the Father and the Preceptor are both present, the Preceptor should be saluted first.

The text adds a valedictory statement in support of what has been said—'*The Brāhmaṇa's birth is the Veda*'; *i.e.*, is for the purpose of learning the Veda; the compound '*brahmajanma*' being expounded as '*brahmagrahaṇārtham janma*,' according to the *Vārtika* on 'Pāṇini' 2.1.60. According to this explanation of the compound, the Initiatory Rite would be 'the birth for the learning of the Veda.' Or, the compound '*brahmajanma*' may be explained as 'birth consisting in the form of learning the Veda.'

This, for the Brāhmaṇa, is *eternally*—ever—*beneficial*—'*here*' and '*beneficial after death*' also.—(146)

VERSE CXLVII

WHEN TNE FATHER AND MOTHER BEGET ONE THROUGH MUTUAL DESIRE,—THIS THAT HE IS BORN IN THE WOMB IS TO BE REGARDED AS HIS "PRODUCTION."—(147)

Bhāṣya.

These two verses are purely valedictory.

'*When the Father and Mother beget him*'—the child—'*through mutual desire*'—in secret, under the influence of desire.

'*Should be regarded as his production*;'—that the child is born in the womb of the Mother—*i.e.*, becomes endowed with his several limbs—this is mere *production*. And those entities that have their *production* are sure to be destroyed; so that what is the use of that 'production' which is doomed to immediate destruction?—(147)

VERSE CXLVIII

BUT THE "BIRTH" WHICH THE PRECEPTOR, WELL-VERSED IN THE VEDA, BRINGS ABOUT FOR HIM, IN THE LAWFUL MANNER, BY MEANS OF THE SĀVITRĪ,—THAT IS REAL, IMPERISHABLE, IMMORTAL.—(148)

Bhāṣya.

The 'birth' that the Boy obtains from his Preceptor is however indestructible. When the Veda has been got up and its meaning duly comprehended, then alone is one enabled to perform religious acts, by which he obtains Heaven and Final Release; and since all this is due to the Preceptor, he is superior.

'*That birth which the Preceptor brings about*'—*i.e.*, the sacramental rite called '*Upanayana*,' 'initiation,' which is called the 'second birth,' which he accomplishes—'*by means of the Sāvitrī*'—*i.e.*, by the expounding of it;—'*that*'—birth—'*is real, imperishable, immortal*.' Though all these words mean the same thing, yet they have been used with a view to pointing out that the 'birth' named 'Initiation' is superior to that which one obtains from his mother. As a matter of fact, 'perishing' and 'death' are not possible for 'birth,' as they are in the case of living beings; if mere 'indestructibility' were meant, this could have been expressed by means of a single word; and yet this is not what is done (which shows that the meaning is as explained above).

The construction of the sentence is as follows:—'*Vedapāraga āchāryo yānjātim vidhivat sāvitryā*—*i.e.*, by means of the full details of the Initiatory Rite, which is what is indicated by the term *sāvitrī*—*utpādayati*—is what is superior.' '*Jāti*' stands for '*janma*,' birth.—(148)

VERSE CXLIX

IF ONE BENEFITS HIM BY MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE, MORE OR LESS,—HIM ALSO ONE SHOULD REGARD HERE AS THE "MENTOR," BY VIRTUE OF THAT BENEFIT OF KNOWLEDGE. —(149)

Bhāṣya.

That teacher who *benefits* a pupil:—'*shrutasya*,'—*i.e.*, *by means of knowledge*,—'*more or less*'—this is an adverb;—'*him also*'—who helps with a little knowledge only—'*one should regard as the mentor.*

The following construction is better:—'*yasya shrutasya*'—these are in apposition—*i.e.*, of the knowledge of the Veda, or of the Vedic subsidiaries, or of other Sciences, or of Reasoning and Art—*alpam vahu vā—tena*—this has to be supplied—*upakaroti*' [The meaning, by this construction being —'that knowledge by a little or more of which he benefits him, etc., etc.']

The word '*shrutopakriyayā*' is an appositional compound; the apposition being based upon the fact of the 'knowledge' being the means of the 'benefit.'

What is meant by this is that the teacher referred to should be called and treated as a 'mentor': just as we have had above in the case of the terms '*Āchārya*' and the rest. —(149)

VERSE CL

THE BRĀHMAṆA, WHO BRINGS ABOUT HIS VEDIC BIRTH, AND TEACHES HIM HIS DUTY,—EVEN THOUGH HE BE A MERE CHILD,—BECOMES IN LAW THE FATHER OF THE OLD MAN (WHOM HE TEACHES).—(150)

Bhāṣya.

The 'birth' that is for the purpose of getting up the Veda is called '*Vedic birth*'—*i.e.*, the Initiatory Rite.—He who brings about this; and *'he who teaches him his duty'*—instructs him in it, by expounding the meaning of Vedic texts,—such a Brāhmaṇa,—*'even though he be a child,'*—becomes the father of the old man. That is, even though the pupil be older in age, he should treat the teacher as his Father.

Question.—"How can the younger man 'initiate' the older? Specially as initiation is performed in the eighth year; and until one has duly learnt and studied the Veda, he is not entitled to act up to the injunction of 'becoming a teacher.'"

Answer.—Well, in that case, we can take the term '*Vedic birth*' to mean not necessarily the Initiatory Rite, but only the getting up of the Veda. *One who* '*brings about*' this—*i.e.*, the *Teacher*,—and '*he who teaches*'—expounds—'*him his duty*'—*i. e.*, the meaning of the Vedic texts,—'*becomes his father*.'

'*In law*;'—this means that the treatment of the father should be accorded to him; so that what the phrase '*in law*' means is that the parental character of the teacher is based upon the treatment accorded to him. The 'treatment of the father' has not yet been declared as to be accorded to the teacher and the expounder; hence it has been laid down here; in the same manner as the injunction that 'the Kṣattriya should be treated as the Brāhmaṇa.'—(150)

VERSE CLI

THE CHILD KAVI, THE SON OF AṄGIRAS, TAUGHT HIS FATHERS; AND HAVING RECEIVED AND TRAINED THEM BY KNOWLEDGE, HE CALLED THEM "LITTLE SONS."—(151)

Bhāṣya.

The preceding verse has laid down the 'fatherly treatment' (of a youthful teacher); the present verse supplies, in its support, a descriptive eulogy of the kind called '*Parakṛti*.'

The '*son of Aṅgiras*,'—'*Kavi*' by name,—'*the child*,' youthful. '*His fathers*'—*i.e.*, his paternal and maternal uncles;

the sons of these, and other elderly persons, equal (in dignity) to the father.

'*Taught*,'—instructed.

Whenever occasion arose for calling them, he called them with the words '*little sons*, come here.'

'*Having received and trained them*'—*i.e.*, having accepted them and made them his pupils.—(151)

VERSE CLII

THEY, HAVING THEIR ANGER AROUSED, QUESTIONED THE GODS ABOUT THIS MATTER; AND THE GODS, HAVING MET TOGETHER, SAID TO THEM—"THE CHILD HAS ADDRESSED YOU IN THE LAWFUL MANNER."—(152)

Bhāṣya.

The said persons, substitutes of the father, '*having their anger aroused*,'—their resentment excited—by being called 'little sons'—'*questioned the gods about this matter*'—of being addressed as 'little sons': 'We are called by this boy *little sons*, is this proper?'

'*The gods*,' thus questioned,—'*having met together*'—convened a meeting, and having arrived at a unanimous decision,—'*said to them*'—the fathers of Kavi,—'*the child has addressed you in the lawful manner*'—*i.e.*, properly.—(152)

VERSE CLIII

THE IGNORANT PERSON IS VERILY A "CHILD," WHILE THE IMPARTER OF MANTRAS IS THE "FATHER." THEY HAVE CALLED THE IGNORANT MAN "CHILD," AND THE IMPARTER OF MANTRAS, "FATHER."—(153)

Bhāṣya.

It is not by reason of his younger age that one is known as 'child'; it is the '*ignorant*'—uneducated person—who, even though old in age, is called 'child.'

'*Imparter of mantras*'—is used figuratively; the sense being that 'he who *imparts,—i.e.,* teaches and expounds,—*the Mantras—i.e.,* the Vedas—becomes the father.'

The particle '*vai,*' 'verily,' indicates the support of other scriptures; and these scriptures (thus referred to) must have been regarded by the said gods as ancient and authoritative. Hence it is that we have the term '*they have called,*' which points to a traditional belief.

'*The ignorant*'—uneducated—'*person,*'—'*they*'—*i.e.,* even the ancients—have called '*child*';—*and* '*the imparter of mantras, the father.*' The particle '*iti,*' occurring after the term '*bāla,*' points to the exact form of the traditional belief;—the construction being—'*ajñam bāla iti ētena shabdēna āhuḥ,*' 'the ignorant person they have called by the name *child.*' It is on account of the presence of this '*iti*' that the accusative ending is absent in the term '*bāla.*'

This story about the child (Āṅgirasa) occurs in the Chhāndogya, and the author of the *Smṛti* (Manu) has reproduced it here only in sense.—(153)

VERSE CLIV

NEITHER BY YEARS, NOR BY GREY HAIR, NOR BY WEALTH, NOR BY RELATIVES (IS GREATNESS ATTAINED); SINCE THE SAGES HAVE MADE THE LAW THAT 'HE WHO TEACHES IS THE GREATEST AMONG US.'—(154)

Bhāṣya.

This is another eulogy of the teacher.

'*Hāyana*' is synonymous with '*samvatsara,*' 'years.' One does not become *great*—venerable—by being advanced in age by many years;—'*nor by grey hair*'—*i.e.,* by the hairs of the head and beard becoming white;—'*nor by* (*much*) *wealth*;—'*nor by relatives,*'—does one acquire the aforesaid title to respect. One does not become 'great' even by all these taken together; but by *learning* alone. And this because '*the sages* *have made the law,'* —'*Ṛṣi,*' '*sage,*' is so called by reason of his sublime vision. The meaning is that the 'seers' of the text and meaning of the entire Veda, have come to the conclusion and laid down this law—'*he who teaches*'—'teaching' means instructing in the Veda along with all its subsidiaries—'*is the greatest*'—most venerable —'*among us.*'

The term '*made*' stands for *laying down*, not for bringing into existence what did not exist before.—(154)

VERSE CLV

AMONG BRĀHMAṆAS SENIORITY IS BY KNOWLEDGE; AMONG KṢATTRIYAS BY VALOUR; AND AMONG VAISHYAS BY GRAINS AND RICHES; AMONG SHUDRAS ALONE IT IS BY AGE.—(155)

Bhāṣya.

This also is a purely commendatory description.

It has been asserted above that *knowledge* singly is superior to wealth and other things taken together; and the same idea is re-iterated in greater detail, in this verse.

'*Among Brāhmaṇas, seniority is by knowledge*'—not by wealth, etc.

'*Among Kṣattriyas by valour*';—'*valour*' stands for the 'efficiency' of a substance and also for 'firmness of strength.'

'*Among Vaishyas by grains and riches.*';—'*grains*' being mentioned separately, the term '*riches*' is to be taken as signifying *gold*, etc.; just as in the expression '*brāhamaṇa-parivrājaka.*' [Where the Brāhmaṇa being mentioned separately, the term '*parivrājaka*' is taken as standing for the renunciate of other castes.]

The Vaishya possessing a large quantity of wealth is regarded as senior.

The affix '*tasi*' (in the words '*jñānataḥ,*' etc.) denotes *cause*, and is used in accordance with Pāṇini 2.3.23.—(155)

VERSE CLVI

ONE DOES NOT BECOME VENERABLE BY THE FACT THAT HIS HAIR HAS TURNED GREY; THE GODS KNOW HIM TO BE VENERABLE WHO, THOUGH YOUNG, CONTINUES TO STUDY.—(156)

Bhāṣya.

One is not called '*venerable by the fact that his head has turned grey*';—*i.e.*, the hairs of his head have become white.

How then?

He who, '*though young*'—is of young age—and yet carries on his study,—him '*the gods know*'—declare—'*to be venerable.*' The gods know all things, hence this is a praise (of the learned man).—(156)

VERSE CLVII

AS THE ELEPHANT MADE OF WOOD, AS THE DEER MADE OF LEATHER, SO THE NON-LEARNING BRĀHMAṆA,—THESE THREE MERELY BEAR THEIR NAMES.—(157)

Bhāṣya.

This verse praises learning and the learner.

'*Made of wood*';—the form of the elephant made of wood by means of the said and other implements; just as this is useless, does not serve any useful purpose for the king, in the shape of killing his enemies and so forth,—so the Brāhmaṇa who does not learn is like a piece of wood, not fit for anything.

'*The deer made of leather*';—similarly the deer that has been made out of leather is useless; it is of no use for purposes of hunting, etc.

'*These three only bear their names*'—and do not fulfil what is signified by these names.—(157)

VERSE CLVIII

As THE EUNUCH IS USELESS AMONG WOMEN, AS THE COW IS USELESS AMONG COWS, AS A GIFT TO THE IGNORANT PERSON IS USELESS, EVEN SO IS THE BRĀHMAṆA USELESS WHO IS DEVOID OF THE VEDA.—(158)

Bhāṣya.

'*Eunuch*'—he who is without masculine virility, having both (male and female) signs and incapable of intercourse with women,—just as this person is '*useless among women*';—as again is '*the cow useless among cows*';—'*even so is the Brāhmaṇa useless who is devoid of the Veda*,'—*i.e.*, who does not learn.—(158)

XXVI. Chastisement of Pupils

Seven or eight verses praising the learner and the learned have been finished; next the Author proceeds to prohibit excessive chastisement—in the form of beating, chiding, etc.—to which the Teacher becomes inclined, when his anger is aroused by seeing that the pupil is lacking in attention and his mind wanders away hither and thither:—

VERSE CLIX

TEACHING FOR GOOD SHOULD BE IMPARTED TO LIVING BEINGS, WITHOUT INJURY TO THEM; AND SWEET AND SOFT WORDS SHOULD BE EMPLOYED BY ONE WHO SEEKS FOR MERIT.—(159)

Bhāṣya.

'*Without injury*'—without beating.

'*To living beings*'—*i.e.*, to one's wife, children, servants, pupils and brothers;—'*teaching for good should be imparted.*' The generic term 'beings' has been used with a view to guard against the notion that what is stated here should be done to *pupils* only. '*Shrēyas*,' '*good*,' stands for the acquiring of seen and unseen results; the '*teaching*' is for the purpose of that acquisition; and it consists either in instruction without the help of books, or in the teaching and expounding of the scriptures.

What the present verse means is that, as far as possible one should avoid too much beating and chiding; some slight chastisement has been already permitted under Gautama 2.42.43.

Question.—"How then are they to be kept in the right path?"

The answer is supplied by the next line:—'*Words sweet*'—gentle and loving;—'*soft*'—*i.e.*, even when gentle, they should not be very loud or haughty or harsh like that of the crow. *E.g.*, 'dear child, read on,—do not direct your attention elsewhere,—attentively finish this chapter quickly and then you can immediately proceed to play with boys of your own age.' He who does not pay attention, even after being thus spoken to—for him the proper method has already been laid down—'by means of a bamboo-piece.'

'*Should be employed*'—spoken.

'*By one desiring merit*';—*i.e.*, only by so doing does he acquire the full merit of teaching.—(159)

VERSE CLX

HE, WHOSE SPEECH AND MIND ARE PURE AND EVER PROPERLY GUARDED, OBTAINS THE WHOLE REWARD RECOGNISED BY THE CANONS OF THE VEDA.—(160)

Bhāṣya.

That teacher, or any person, whose '*speech and mind*,' even in the presence of disturbing causes,—'*are pure*'—do not become perturbed;—'*and properly guarded*,'—*i.e.*, even when perturbation has been caused, he does not make up his mind to injure other persons, nor does he have recourse to activity calculated to harm them; all this is what is meant by the 'guarding' of speech and mind.

'*Even*'—is added with a view to show that what is laid down applies to each and every man, and not to the teacher only, and that also only at the time of teaching.

'*He obtains the whole reward*.'

The term '*vedānta*' in the text stands for '*vēdasiddhānta*,' '*canons of the Veda*'; the term '*siddha*' being deleted in the same manner as the term '*atyanta*' has been held to be dropped in the term '*siddhē*' as occurring in the declaration '*siddhē shabdārthasambandhē*, etc.' (in the *Mahābhāṣya*).

The term '*vedānta*' therefore stands for the 'canons'—established doctrines—contained in the Vedic texts—wherein it has been '*recognised*' that 'such and such results proceed from such and such an act'—a fact that is accepted by all persons learned in the Veda;—the whole of such results '*he obtains*.'

By the present statement the author has made it clear that the proper control of speech and mind is helpful in the ordinary life of man, as also in sacrificial performances. For, if it were meant to be helpful only in ordinary life, then its transgression would involve the omission of only what is helpful to man in his ordinary life; and in that case the transgression not causing any deficiency in any sacrificial performance, why should not the man with unguarded speech and mind obtain the full reward of these latter? And yet what the text says is that 'it is the self-controlled man that obtains the whole reward.'

Others have explained the term '*vedānta*' to mean the *Esoteric Brāhmaṇas* (Upaniṣads). And by this explanation the passage means that the man obtains the whole of that reward which consists in the 'attaining of Brahman,' which has been postulated, in the said esoteric treatises, as proceeding from the performance of the compulsory duties, and also from that of those restraints and observances which have been laid down without reference to any rewards.

If it be asked—"how can the compulsory acts be held to bring about a result in the shape of attaining Brahman?"—our answer is simply that such an opinion has been held by some persons.

Or again, the term '*vedānta*' may be explained as the 'end' of the teaching 'of the Veda'; and the result obtained is that which proceeds from this teaching;—*i.e.*, the result in the form of having fulfilled the injunction of 'becoming a teacher.' By this explanation, what is laid down in the text would become entirely subservient to the 'injunction of teaching.'—(160)

VERSE CLXI

EVEN THOUGH PAINED, ONE SHOULD NOT (USE SUCH WORDS AS) CUT TO THE QUICK; HE SHOULD NOT DO, OR THINK OF, INJURY TO OTHERS; HE SHOULD NOT UTTER WORDS BY WHICH OTHERS ARE PAINED, AND WHICH (THEREFORE) WILL OBSTRUCT HIS PASSAGE TO (HIGHER) REGIONS.—(161)

Bhāṣya.

This is another duty laid down for man in relation to ordinary life.

'*Aruntudaḥ*' means *that which cuts*—'*tudati*'—*the vitals*—'*arūṅṣi*'; *i.e.*, affecting the vitals;—he who utters such words—*i.e.*, such words of chiding as are extremely painful,—is called '*aruntudaḥ*.'

'*Pained*';—even though pain may have been inflicted on him by the other person, he should not utter unpleasant words.

Similarly '*injury to others*' is *harming others*; and one should not do an act conducive to it; nor should he think of it.

Or, '*paradrohakarmadhīḥ*' may be taken to mean 'think of doing injury to others.'

Such words by which—even though uttered in joke—other persons are pained—one should not utter.

Even a part of the sentence uttered by one should not be so disagreeable; for even portions of sentences may become indicative of unpleasant notions, through the force of their meaning, the particular context (occasion) and so forth.

One should not utter such words as they are '*alokyā*,'—*i.e.*, obstructing his passage to the heavenly regions.

XXVII. Equanimity under Ill-Treatment

VERSE CLXII

THE BRĀHMAṆA SHOULD EVER SHRINK FROM REVERENCE, AS FROM POISON; AND HE SHOULD ALWAYS SEEK FOR DISRESPECT, AS FOR NECTAR.—(162)

Bhāṣya.

When the student goes to beg for food, or when the teacher is teaching at home for livelihood,—if he fails to win reverence, he should not allow his mind to be perturbed by it; on the other hand, '*he should shrink from reverence*'; *i.e*, if what is given to him is given with due respect, he should not regard it as sufficient (simply on that account).

'Like nectar,' '*he should always seek for disrespect*,'—ill-treatment. The genitive ending has been used (in '*avamānasya*') by imposing upon the root '*ākāṅkṣa*' the sense of the root '*iṅ*' with the preface '*adhi*,' *i.e.*, the sense of *thinking of*; and thus bringing it under Pāṇini's sūtra 2.3.52, by which the root '*iṅ*' with '*adhi*,' governs the genitive. It is on the basis of this similarity that 'anxiety' is present in both (*desire* and *thought*).

"But what is not offered with respect should not be eaten."

True; but what the present verse does is to prohibit the perturbation of mind; and it does not mean that food offered with disrespect should be eaten. The sense of all this is that one should look equally upon respect and disrespect; and not that he should actually hanker after disrespect.

Further, the Religious Student may accept even such food as is offered with disrespect; for it is not a regular gift, and hence, does not come under 4.235, where the receiving of gifts offered without respect is decried.—(163)

VERSE CLXIII

ONE WHO IS SCORNED SLEEPS IN COMFORT AND WAKES UP IN COMFORT AND GOES ABOUT IN THE WORLD IN COMFORT; IT IS THE SCORNER THAT PERISHES.—(163)

Bhāṣya.

The present verse is commendatory of the injunction contained in the preceding verse, and it serves the purpose of indicating the result proceeding from what has been enjoined.

He who is not perturbed by dishonour or scorn '*sleeps in comfort*': otherwise he would be burning with resentment and would not get any sleep; and on waking up, he would still be thinking of the dishonour, and would find no comfort. On rising from sleep, he moves about his business in comfort.

That person however who has done the scorning perishes by that very sin.—(163)

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XXVIII. Course and Method of Study

VERSE CLXIV

SANCTIFIED IN SELF, THE TWICE-BORN MAN, WHILE DWELLING WITH HIS TEACHER, SHOULD, BY THE ADOPTION OF THIS COURSE, GENERALLY ACCUMULATE SANCTITY FOR THE LEARNING OF THE VEDA.—(164)

Bhāṣya.

'*Sanctified in self*'—*i.e.*, duly initiated,—'*the twice-born man should, by the adoption of this course, accumulate sanctity.*' '*This*' refers to all those duties that have been laid down for the Religious Student, from verse 70 onwards. The meaning is that *anēna kramayogēna*—by the orderly carrying out of the host of injunctions, one should accumulate '*sanctity*'—self-purification, consisting in freedom from sin; just as freedom from sin is attained by means of the *Chāndrāyaṇa* and other austerities, so also is it attained by means of the course of restraints and observances prescribed in connection with the study of the Veda. For this reason one should accumulate it, '*gradually*,'—without haste, he should acquire it and go on enhancing it.

'*Course*' is 'process';—'this should be done after having done that, and so forth'; *e.g.*, 'Preceded by the uttering of the syllable *om*, etc.' (as laid down in verse 81); and the '*adoption*' of this is taking up of the performance.

'*For the learning of the Veda*,'—for the purpose of learning it; *learning* stands for the *getting up of the text* and *understanding of the meaning*.—(164)

VERSE CLXV

THE ENTIRE VEDA, ALONG WITH THE ESOTERIC TREATISES, SHOULD BE LEARNT BY THE TWICE-BORN PERSON,—BY MEANS OF VARIOUS KINDS OF AUSTERTIES AND OBSERVANCES PRESCRIBED BY RULE.—(165)

Bhāṣya.

'*By means of austerities*'—such as the Chāndrāyaṇa and the like ;—'*of various kinds*'—of such diverse forms as eating only once, eating during the fourth part of the day and so forth ; but without injuring the body.

'*Observances*'—such as the '*Upaniṣad*,' (?) the '*Mahā-nāmnikā*' and so forth.

'*Prescribed by rule*'—laid down in the *Smṛtis* dealing with domestic rites.

By means of the above, duly performed, *one should learn the entire Veda*.

Some people have held that—"in the preceding verse the term '*tapas*' stood for the duties of the Religious Student, and those same are meant by the term *tapovishēṣa* in the present verse."

But this is not right ; because all those are included under the term '*vrata*,' 'observances.' The term '*vrata*' stands for those restrictions that are based upon scriptures ; and thus '*vrata*' being a generic term, the Mahānāmnikā and the rest also become included under it. Hence by 'observances' here are meant fasting and the rest.

In connection with this verse some people have held that significance is meant to be attached to the singular number in '*vedaḥ*' ; and they argue thus :—

"It is true that the affix '*tavya*' (in the word '*adhigantavyaḥ*') already indicates that the injunction intends the Veda to be the predominant factor; but in view of the injunction and its subject-matter, it is clear that the Veda is really subservient to the 'learning of its meaning'; and the subserviency of the Veda being accepted as meant, the proper examination of the injunction leads to the conclusion that the function of the pupil in regard to the Veda extends up to the learning of the meaning. The sense of the injunction thus comes to be this—'By means of the Veda duly studied one should learn its meaning.' If the injunction did not mean this, the Veda could not be regarded as *something to be cultivated*; anything that is *cultivated* or refined, is so done only as subservient to, and aiding in, something else; and as regards the Veda, it has been already found that its use lies in bringing about the knowledge of what is contained in it. If this were not so, the predominance (of the Veda), even if directly expressed, would be abandoned; just as in the case of the injunction '*saktūn juhoti*,' the predominance of *saktu* is relinquished and the text is construed as '*saktubhiḥ*,' (thus making the *saktu* subordinate to the *Libation*). Further, the verbal root actually used in the text denotes *understanding*: '*adhigamana*,' 'learning' (which is what is expressed by the root in '*adhigantavyaḥ*'), means *knowledge*, in accordance with the dictum that 'all roots denoting *motion* denote *knowledge*'; and as for the getting up of the verbal text of the Veda, this has been already laid down before, under verse 71; so that what the present injunction does is to lay down that the said *getting up of the text* is to be carried on till the meaning becomes duly comprehended.

"Then again, it is just because the singular number in '*vedaḥ*' in this passage is regarded to be significant that the injunction herein contained is not recognised as laying down the study of several Vedas, and hence its scope is going to be extended with a view to include such study by what is going to be said later on, under 3·2.

"If then, there is to be a study of *several* Vedas, where would be the use of significance being attached to the singular number in the present verse?

"It is certainly of use; it serves to indicate that even by the study of a single rescensional text one is to be regarded as having fulfilled the injunction of 'Vedic study,' and that the study of several Vedas is purely optional.

"If the study of several Vedas is not actually prescribed by injunction, what lunatic would be there who would torture himself by the tattering of teeth (involved in the learning of several Vedas)?

"But there *is* the other injunction—'Having learnt the *Vedas*, etc.' (3.2); this learning is for one who desires a particular reward, and this reward is *Heaven*. Or, if we have some assertions made in continuation of the said injunction, referring to 'streams of butter' or some such thing,—then these may be regarded as the reward (of learning *several Vedas*).

"As for the injunction of the study (of one Veda) by the Religious Student, it pertains to the *learning of the meaning*, and serves a perceptibly useful purpose; *e.g.*, the knowledge of what the Veda says is found to be of use in the actual performance of religious acts; and in fact it is only the man so learned that is entitled to their performance. The learning of *several* Vedas, on the other hand, serves a purely imperceptible purpose. If this were not so, then, the injunction of 'Vedic Study' having been fulfilled by the study of a single Veda, the assertion of 'having studied the *Vedas*' (3.2) would be entirely superfluous,—if it were not an injunction of learning several Vedas for the purpose of acquiring *merit* (an imperceptible reward)."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—How can the view here put forward be acceptable?—since there is the single injunction—'the Veda should be learnt'; and if this be regarded as not pertaining to an imperceptible transcendental result,—on the ground (1) that it is an injunction of sanctification, and (2) that it is of use only in the performance of perceptible acts—then the same can be said in regard to the study of several Vedas also; for the same conditions are present there also. And further, according to the view in question, there would be a diversity (in regard to the Veda) : in one case (that of the single Veda) it would, like the injunction of fire-laying, be related to all compulsory and optional acts, through the comprehension of its meaning; while in the other (that of several Vedas), it would be directly conducive to a desirable result.

It might be argued that "the injunction of the learning of several Vedas is a distinct injunction, and it is not based upon the injunction of 'becoming a teacher' (as the injunction of learning *one* Veda is); so that it is only one who desires a particular reward that is entitled to the former."

But this is not right; as a matter of fact, it is not a distinct injunction at all; there is only one injunction bearing upon the question,—*viz.*, 'The entire Veda should be learnt'; and what the other passage—' Having learnt the Vedas, etc.' (3.2) — does is to restrict the number of Vedas learnt to *three* only, in view of the possibility of the idea being entertained that the singular number (in the injunction 'the *Veda* should be learnt') not being meant to be significant, one might study as many recensional texts as he could,—five, six, even seven. Then again, in the passage under question (3.2) we do not find the injunction in the form 'one should learn,' the actual words of the injunction being '*One should enter the state of the House-holder.*'

Then again, what has been said above in regard to significance being attached to the singular number in '*Vēdaḥ*' is absolutely incoherent. Such significance should be based upon direct injunction, and not merely upon argument and reasoning; and in the case in question what the Injunction lays down is 'learning for the acquiring of the Vedic text,' and the predominance of this 'learning of the text,' indicated by means of the two words ending with the Accusative ending, does not cease merely on the ground of its subserviency to the 'comprehension of the meaning.' If such reasoning were accepted, significance would have to be attached to the singular number in '*graham*' (in the passage '*graham sammārṣṭi*,' 'wash the cup,'); for the cup, even though the predominant factor, does become subservient to the 'washing'; but no such subserviency is directly expressed by word,—as there is in the case of the passage '*grahair-juhoti*,' where the words directly express the subserviency of the 'cups' to the '*Homa*.' Thus it is clear that the predominance of 'Vedic Study' is distinctly indicated by the direct denotation (of the Accusative ending), and also by Injunction; and the predominance being thus expressed, no significance can be attached to the singular number.

"Well, if the purposes of the injunction of 'Vedic Study' are accomplished by the getting up of a single Veda, it behoves you to point out the use of learning several Vedas."

This we shall explain under Chapter III.

"If the Injunction of Vedic Study extends up to the learning of the meaning also, then, even after the text of the Veda has been got up, so long as the meaning has not been learnt, there would be no cessation of the performance of such Restraints and Observances as the avoiding of honey, meat, etc.—'What harm is there in that?'—It would be contrary to the usage of cultured persons: cultured persons do not avoid the eating of honey, meat, etc., after they have got up the Vedic text, even though they continue to listen to the expounding of its meaning."

There is no force in this objection. For there is another law which says—'Having learnt the Veda, one should bathe'; and here 'having learnt' refers to the mere reading of the text, and 'should bathe' indicates the abandoning of all those Restraints and Observances that constitute the auxiliaries to 'Vedic Study'; for Bathing is as much prohibited (for the Vedic Student) as Honey and Meat; so that when Bathing is permitted by the said law, it permits the use of Honey and the rest also, by reason of their association, and also on account of the prohibition of all these occurring in the same context. As for intercourse with women (which also is prohibited along with Bathing, etc., for the Vedic Student), this forms the subject of a separate prohibition—'With his life of continence unperturbed, etc.', (*Manu*, 3-2); and the transgression of this during the time that one is learning the meaning of Vedic texts would do no violation to the Injunction of Vedic Study; for during the said time, 'continence' does not form a necessary factor of 'study'; as all Restraints and Observances cease after the getting up of the text. Then again, this prohibition (of intercourse with women) is meant to fulfil some purpose for the man (and hence not compulsory); it is for this reason that in the event of transgression occurring in some way or the other, there is the expiation laid down (in 11.118) for the Vedic Student commiting adultery; and what the prescribing of this special expiation indicates is that the emission of semen being a delinquency on the part of the person who is still keeping the Restraints and Observances (as is clear from 11.120),—this case would not be met by the ordinary expiatory rites of the '*Chāndrāyaṇa*' and the rest, laid down in connection with 'minor sins.'

"What are the grounds for taking the expression 'should bathe' as figurative (and indicative of the discontinuance of Restraints and Observances)?"

Our answer is as follows:—The 'bathing' herein laid down could not consist of the mere washing of the body with water; for if it were so, then what is enjoined would have to be regarded as serving some transcendental purpose; on the other hand, the Restraints imposed upon the Vedic Student stand in need of the mention of some time at which they could be discontinued; so that if the Injunction is taken as indicating this limit of time, it comes to supply a much-needed information.

"But these Restraints do not stand in need of any other limit; they are meant to subserve the injunction of Vedic Study; so that the fulfilment of that injunction would be their natural limit; the fulfilment of the injunction consists in the accomplishment of its object; its object is *study*; and the accomplishment of study is something that is easily perceived. [Hence there can be no point in taking the expression 'should bathe' as indicative of the limit of the Restraints and Observances.]"

This would be quite true, if the injunction of Vedic Study rested merely on what is directly expressed by it. As a matter of fact, however, its object embraces things not so expressed; for instance, the comprehension of the meaning of Vedic texts resulting from the said study is also included in the object of the said Injunction; because if it were not so, then the Injunction would fail to be sanctificatory in character. In fact, if the Injunction rested entirely in what is directly expressed by it, it would lose its injunctive character itself; for the *injunctiveness* of the Injunction consists in its urging the agent to accomplish what it denotes; and 'what it denotes' consists of (*a*) the result to be accomplished, (*b*) the means of accomplishing it and (*c*) the procedure adopted; and in as much as all these three are expressed by a single word, none of them can be regarded as beyond what is denoted by the Injunction. Thus then, in the injunctive verb '*adhīyīta*' 'should study,' the thing to be accomplished is what is determined by the verbal root 'to study,'—and the 'procedure' consists of the keeping of Restraints and Observances. As a matter of fact, this injunction, by itself, is not capable of bringing about the fulfilment of what it denotes; because in the case of every Injunction the full accomplishment of what it denotes is obtained through the execution of an object; and the execution of the object of the injunction in question is already accomplished by the force of another Injunction. For instance, for the Teacher, there is the Injunction—'Having initiated the pupil, he should teach him the Veda'; and as the work of 'teaching' cannot be accomplished without the work of 'learning,' the Teacher, with a view to the accomplishing of the injunction of his own duty, urges the boy to the work of 'learning'; and it is not possible for the boy, without being urged by the Teacher, to accomplish the act, merely on the strength of his own knowledge of the injunction. From all this it follows that the act of 'learning the Veda' should be regarded as prompted by the injunction addressed to the Teacher. And when the act is accomplished by being prompted by that injunction, there is no need for any other injunction prescribing the pupil's act of 'learning.' Thus then, being devoid of prompting force, what sort of injunctive character could belong to the Injunction in question ('the entire Veda should be learnt')? In face of this possibility of the Injunction losing its character, we have to look out for some such method whereby it would acquire the requisite prompting force. And the only sure way of doing this is to regard it as an injunction of embellishment. Nor would the embellishment in question be entirely useless; for it is only when the learning (of the Vedic text) has been accomplished, that the pupil derives knowledge of some sort of meaning, which latter knowledge becomes useful in the performance of all those acts (that are laid down in the Veda). From this it is clearly perceived that the Injunction in question lays down the necessity of acquiring the knowledge of the meaning of the texts that have been learnt in the course of 'Vedic Study.' Though from the very nature of things, the meaning of the texts becomes comprehended as soon as the texts have been heard,—yet such a comprehension is never definite and sure. Hence the prompting done by the Injunction is towards that method by which the said knowledge may become definitively certain. This *certainty* comes about when one has pondered over the subject and succeeded in setting aside all doubts; and the doing of this *pondering* is not found to be indicated by any other means of knowledge; it is certainly not prescribed by the injunction of 'becoming a Teacher,'—as this latter is accomplished by the learning (by the pupil) of the mere verbal text. Nor is it indicated by any visible purpose to be served by it; for what purpose of man is there which could not be fulfilled without the said *pondering*,—and for the fulfilling of which one would undertake it?

"Just as for one who desires to acquire landed property, the performance of the act conducive to it is likely to be taken up by chance (or whim),—the same might be the case with the pondering in question also."

But in that case, there being no certainty regarding the whims and desires of men; it is just possible that some one might not do the pondering at all; or even if he did do it, he might not do it immediately after the learning of the Vedic text.

Thus then, this part (of study) not being indicated by any other means, it comes to be regarded as falling within the province of the Injunction in question, in accordance with the principle that that alone forms the subject-matter of an Injunction which is not got at by any other means. Since then, (*a*) the 'learning of the text' is already got at by other means,—(*b*) since the comprehension of the meaning which follows, by the very nature of things, upon the mere reading is uncertain and indefinite,—(*c*) since such comprehension serves no useful purpose,—(*d*) since even after the sanctificatory learning of the text has been accomplished, it is only the definite knowledge of its meaning that serves the useful purpose of helping the performance of acts,—and (*e*) since the said definite knowledge is obtained only by means of pondering,—it follows that it is necessary to do this *pondering* during a well-defined time; and for the due accomplishment of this pondering, the Injunction in question comes to be one pointing to it as its ultimate purpose.

It is for this reason that in regard to the Restraints there arises the doubt as to whether they are to end with the learning of the words heard from the mouth of the Teacher, or they are to go on with the enquiry into the meaning of these texts, till this is definitely ascertained,—the necessity of learning this meaning being indirectly implied. Such being the doubt, the direction that, 'One should bathe after having learnt the Veda,' serves to indicate the limit of the observance f the said Restraints; and since the indirect indication of this direction is equally helpful to the subject-matter in question, and to the settling of the doubtful point, it is only right to accept the said indication.

"Why is it said that the comprehending of the meaning is not directly laid down? As a matter of fact, the words used are that 'the Veda *should be learnt*,' which directly speaks of the said comprehension. In the Veda as well as in other *Smṛtis*, we find such directions as 'Learns the Veda,' and 'The Veda should be studied.' And since the rule laid down by Manu also is based upon those directions, its meaning must be the same as that of these directions."

The 'learning' spoken of in the directions ('*vēdodhigantavyaḥ*') refers to that comprehension of meaning which is only indirectly implied. Or, 'learning' may stand for the getting up of the verbal text only; and the necessity of learning the meaning would be deduced from the reasoning expounded above. Nor is there any incongruity in the conclusion that, though the Injunction in question is one only, yet one part of it—that pertaining to its subject-matter—is prompted by the Injunction of 'becoming a teacher,' and another portion of it is prompted by itself. Though this involves a diversity, there is nothing wrong in this,—representing as it does, what is a mere fact.

It has been urged that "it is only right that several Vedas should be learnt for the purpose of accomplishing a transcendental result."

We shall answer this under 3.1.

The term '*vēda*' denotes that textual rescension which consists of the collection of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa passages. But in actual usage the term '*vēda*' is applied to *portions* of that collection also. Hence, in order to remove all doubts on the point, the text has added the qualification 'entire.' As a matter of fact, the learning of a single sentence cannot be regarded as fulfilling the 'learning of the Veda,' for the simple reason that the other sentences also are 'Veda,' and the said 'learning of the Veda' is a sanctificatory act; just as in the case of the 'sacrificial cups' [the 'washing' of a *single* cup is not regarded as fulfilling the 'cup-washing,' which has been prescribed as a sanctificatory act]. Still, with a view to make this quite clear, the text has added the word 'entire.'

Others explain the term 'entire' as meant to include the Subsidiary Sciences. The term '*vēda*' itself stands for the entire collection of sentences above referred to; so that if one were to learn a single verse less than that, he would not be regarded as having 'learnt the Veda.' Thus (the learning of the *whole* Veda being implied in the term 'Veda' itself), the addition of the epithet 'entire' could only be for the purpose of including the Subsidiary Sciences. This is what has been declared in another *Smṛti* also—'That the Veda along with its six subsidiaries shall be learnt is the duty of the Brāhmaṇa.'

"All that the present verse says is that what is called 'Veda' should be learnt *entire*; and certainly the Subsidiary Sciences are not called by the name 'Veda'; what then is there which signifies that the Veda should be learnt *along with the Sciences*? As for the law—'the Veda with its six subsidiaries should be learnt,'—here we find the Subsidiary Sciences mentioned by their own name; while in the present verse the adjective 'entire' qualifying the 'Veda,'—how could the Subsidiaries be included?"

Our answer is as follows:—As a matter of fact, the present verse is based upon the *Shruti*—'the Veda shall be learnt'; and it has been established that this 'learning' is meant to extend up to the full comprehension of the meaning; this comprehension is not possible without the help of the Subsidiary Sciences. It is thus that these sciences become included by implication; and thus the learning of Elucidations, Etymologies, Grammar and Exigetics also becomes implied by the same Injunction. For these reasons, the inclusion of the Subsidiary Sciences being admitted, it is only right that the term 'entire' be taken as indicating the same fact.

The Nirukta (Etymological Explanations) and the rest are '*aṅgas*,' 'parts,' of the Veda, but not in the sense in which the hands and feet are 'limbs' of man's body, being its component parts; the Subsidiary Sciences are not components of the Veda; in fact they are called 'limbs,' '*aṅgas*,' of the Veda only figuratively; the sense being that without these the Veda is not able to accomplish its purposes; and hence they are as if they were 'limbs' of it. It is in view of this figurative signification of the term 'Veda,' that the adjective 'entire' should be explained.

'*Along with the Esoteric treatises*.'—The Upanisads are the 'esoteric treatises.' Though these also are 'Veda' they have been mentioned separately, on account of their great importance.—(165)

VERSE CLXVI

THE BEST OF BRĀHMAṆAS, DESIRING TO ACQUIRE PIETY, SHOULD CONSTANTLY REPEAT THE VEDA; BECAUSE FOR THE BRĀHMAṆA, VEDA-REPEATING IS DECLARED TO BE THE HIGHEST PENANCE ON EARTH.—(166)

Bhāṣya.

The *repeating* of the Text for the purpose of getting it up, which comes up as supplementary to the subject-matter of the context, is here re-iterated for the purpose of eulogising it, and not for enjoining it again.

The term '*constantly*' refers to the time of study only.

The term '*tapas*,' '*piety*,' stands for fasting and such other bodily mortifications; but in the present context it denotes figuratively that spiritual faculty produced by the mortifications which consists in the capacity to grant boons and pronounce curses.—'*Tapasyan*' stands for 'desiring to acquire' the said *piety* by means of bodily mortifications; the root (in '*tapasyan*') denoting the bodily sufferings undergone in the process of *acquiring*. The *Parasmaipada* ending (in '*tapasyan*') is justified on the ground that the participle is not intended to have the force of the reflexive-passive (in which case alone the Ātmanepada ending would be necessary, by Pāṇini's Sūtra 3.1.88).

The second half of the verse is a recommendatory reiteration, supplying the reason for what has been asserted in the first half.

Whatever 'penance' there is on the Earth, the 'repeating of Veda' is superior to all. This is meant to eulogise the act as leading to results similar to those brought about by all the austerities.—(166)

VERSE CLXVII.

IT IS SAID THAT THAT TWICE-BORN MAN, WHO, EVEN THOUGH GARLANDED, RECITES THE VEDA DAILY TO THE BEST OF HIS CAPACITY, UNDERGOES THE HIGHEST PENANCE TO HIS VERY NAIL-TIPS.—(167)

Bhāṣya.

This is another commendatory statement pertaining to the injunction of Vedic Study contained in the Vājasanēya-Brāhmaṇa.

The construction is—'*ā nakhāgrēbhya ēva.*'

'*Ha*' denotes *hearsay*.

The term '*highest*' having already signified the high character of the penance, the phrase '*to his very nail-tips*' has been added with a view to expressing the fact that the penance intended is higher even than the highest; the sense being that even though the nail-tips are insensible, yet they also are affected by the penance; the *Kṛchchhra* and other penances, not pervading over the nail-tips, are not productive of all that is desirable; but the penance in question reaches even those tips. This is the special praise bestowed upon the penance.

'*Tapyatē tapaḥ*';—the augment '*yak*' and the *Ātmanēpada* ending are in accordance with Pāṇini 3.1.88, by which the root '*tap*' takes the said augment and ending, when governing the noun '*tapas.*'

'*Even though garlanded.*'—One who wears a garland is called 'garlanded,' *i.e.*, the man who wears a string of flowers.

This epithet indicates the renouncing of the restraints imposed upon the Religious Student. The meaning is that, even if one were to renounce the duties of the Religious Student, and yet recite the Veda '*to the best of his capacity*,'—as much as he can do, even though that be little,—'*daily*'—every day,—he becomes endowed with excellent success.

This is mere praise; it does not mean that one should read the Veda after renouncing the restraints.—(167)

VERSE CLXVIII

THE TWICE-BORN MAN, WHO, NOT HAVING LEARNT THE VEDA, LABOURS OVER OTHER THINGS, SOON FALLS, ALONG WITH HIS DESCENDANTS, EVEN WHILE LIVING, TO THE STATE OF THE SHUDRA.—(168)

Bhāṣya.

Some persons (as noted above) have explained the term '*entire*' (of the preceding verse) to include the Subsidiary Sciences; and according to this view, it might be thought that the study of these might be taken up in any order one might choose, without any restriction; hence the present verse proceeds to lay down a definite order,—*viz.*, the Veda should be learnt first, then the Subsidiary Sciences. Others have however taken the term 'entire' to preclude the possibility of men being content with the learning of parts only of the Veda; and according to these, the 'learning of the Veda' naturally comes up first, after the completion of the '*Traividya*' observances (of the *Upanayana*); so that (what the present verse means is that) until the Veda has been learnt, the learning of the Sciences cannot be permitted.

'*The twice-born man*'—Brāhmaṇa—'*who, not having learnt the Veda, labours*';—*devotes attention*—'*over other subjects*,' *i.e.*,—the Subsidiary Sciences, or treatises on Reasonings—'*falls, even while living, to the state of the Shūdra*'—'*soon*'—quickly,—'*along with his descendants*';—*i.e.*, accompanied by his son, grandson and other descendants.

'*Labour*'—is great effort. Since the absolute prohibition of labour over the study of the Sciences cannot be intended, all that is meant is that these latter are to be studied during the time available, after the Veda has been learnt.

The mention of '*falling to the state of the Shūdra*' is meant to express excessive deprecation.

The use of the term '*twice-born*' implies that the restriction herein laid down regarding the rules of study applies to only one who has gone through the Initiatory Rites; and before Initiation, the study of such Subsidiary Sciences as of Phonetics, Grammar, and the rest as are not interspersed with quotations from the Veda, is not prohibited.

"The study of the Subsidiary Sciences is implied by the Injunction of Vedic Study; and this injunction is acted up to by the boy prompted by his Teacher; so that before Initiation, there being no Teacher, how can there be a study of the Subsidiary Sciences?"

There is no force in this objection. According to the assertion—'the child who is taught by his father they call efficient'—the Initiatory sanctification might be performed by the father; who, before the Initiation, will teach him the Science of Grammar and the rest.—(168)

XXIX. Meaning of Term 'Twice-born'

In several places, the duties of the 'twice-born person' have been described; and the Author now proceeds to provide the exact meaning of the term 'twice-born,' in the same friendly spirit in which he has supplied the explanation of the terms '*Āchārya*' and the rest.

VERSE CLXIX

ACCORDING TO THE DIRECTIONS OF THE REVEALED WORD, THE FIRST BIRTH OF THE TWICE-BORN MAN IS FROM THE MOTHER, THE SECOND, AFTER THE GIRDLE-TYING CEREMONY, AND THE THIRD, AFTER SACRIFICIAL INITIATION.—(169)

Bhāṣya.

'*Mâtuḥ*—from the mother;—'*agrē*'—first—'*adhijananam*,'—birth, of man.

'*The second, after the girdle-tying ceremony*';—*i.e.*, after the *Upanayana*. The short vowel '*i*' in the term '*mauñjibandhanē*' is according to Pāṇini 6-3-63, by which there is much latitude given in regard to vowels contained in proper names.

'*The third, after sacrificial initiation*,'—such as the Jyotiṣṭoma and the rest. This initiation also has been described as 'birth' in such passages as—'when the priests initiate the sacrificer, they bring about a repetition of birth.'

These are the three births of twice-born men, described in the Veda.

"In that case the man becomes *thrice-born*."

Let that be so; as a matter of fact, the Upanayana is the basis of the name 'twice-born';—and it is on this name that the man's title to the performance of *Shrauta*, *Smārta* and conventional rites is based. The mention of the first and third 'births' is simply for the purpose of eulogising the second one, which is the best of all births. [As regards the third birth] it is only the performance of sacrifices to which the uninitiated man is not entitled; while the one who has not undergone the *Upanayana* ceremony is not entitled to any religious act at all.

Others hold that it is 'Fire-kindling' that is here spoken of as 'sacrificial initiation,' on the ground of its being the forerunner of all sacrifices. That Fire-kindling also is regarded as a 'birth' is shown by such passages as—'he who does not kindle the fire is as good as unborn.'—(169)

VERSE CLXX

AMONG THESE, AT THAT BRAHMIC BIRTH WHICH IS MARKED BY THE TYING OF THE GIRDLE, THE SĀVITRĪ HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE HIS "MOTHER," AND THE TEACHER HIS "FATHER."—(170)

Bhāṣya.

'*Among these*'—above-mentioned births;—that which is '*Brahmic birth*,'—*i.e.*, Upanayana—'*which is marked by the tying of the girdle*,'—which is symbolised by the tying of the girdle made of *Muñja-grass*; at this '*Sāvitrī is his mother*,' —*i.e.*, it becomes accomplished by the expounding of the Sāvitrī-mantra. This shows that in the whole Upanayana ceremony, the expounding of the *Sāvitrī* is the most important factor; it is for this purpose that the child is 'brought near' (*upa-nīyatē*). '*The Teacher is his father*.'

Birth is always brought about by the Father and Mother; hence metaphorically the Teacher and the Sāvitrī have been described as 'father' and 'mother.'—(170)

The Upanayana has been described as '*marked by the tying of the Girdle*'; and this might be understood to mean that it is on account of tying the girdle that the Teacher is to be honoured like the father; hence the next verse is added :—

VERSE CLXXI

THEY CALL THE TEACHER "FATHER," ON ACCOUNT OF HIS IMPARTING THE VEDA. BEFORE THE TYING OF THE GIRDLE, THE PERFORMANCE OF NO RELIGIOUS ACT IS PROPER FOR HIM.—(171)

Bhāṣya.

'*They call the teacher "Father," on account of his imparting the Veda,*'—*i.e.*, on account of his teaching the entire Veda, not merely of expounding the Sāvitrī. '*Imparting*' stands for making the boy agree to pronounce the words of the Veda.

"If it be as described here, then, until the teacher has acquired the position of the father, the boy cannot obtain his second birth; and until he has become 'twice-born,' he would be as unrestrained in his conduct as he is prior to the Upanayana."

In view of this difficulty the text adds—'*before the tying of the girdle for him*'—*no religious act*—any act, *Shrauta*, or *Smārta* or *conventional*, for the acquiring of transcendental results,—is performed; *i.e.*, he is not entitled to perform any such act. In fact it is only after his *Upanayana* that the boy becomes entitled to the performance of the duties of his caste and of humanity.

"How could there be any question of the boy being entitled to the performance of any such acts, when he is lacking in the requisite knowledge (prior to Initiation and Vedic Study)?"

It is in view of this that it has been declared that "the pupil is to his teacher both pupil to be taught and person to be helped in the performance of sacrifices"; [and while he is himself lacking in the requisite knowledge] he should be taught by his teacher (how to perform the acts); as it has been said above (2.69)—'The teacher should teach him the rules of cleanliness and right conduct.' Says Gautama also (2.6)—'The restraints begin with the Upanayana.' The business of the teacher extends up to the completion of Vedic Study.—(171)

VERSE CLXXII

He should not pronounce Vedic texts, apart from the Svadhā-offering ; because so long as he is not born in the Veda, he is equal to a shudra.—(172)

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*till the tying of the girdle*' has to be construed with this verse ; or the intended limit may be taken as supplied by the commendatory statement contained in the second half—'*so long as he is not born in the Veda.*'

'*Brahma*'—Vedic text—'*he should not pronounce.*' This is an instruction to the father of the boy ; the sense being that he should guard the child from pronouncing Vedic texts in the same manner as he guards him from the drinking of wine and such other acts.

Some people interpret this prohibition of pronouncing Vedic texts to indicate the propriety of learning the Subsidiary Sciences before *Upanayana.* They further explain the causal affix (in '*abhivyāhārayēt*') to mean that 'the child should not be made by his father to pronouce Vedic texts, there is no harm done if the child himself pronounces a few indistinct words of the Veda.'

But this is not right ; as we read in another *Smṛti*—'He should not *pronounce* Vedic texts' (Gautama, 2.5). And in the following commendatory statement also it is stated that '*he is equal to a Shūdra,*' which means that the child pronouncing Vedic texts is just as reprehensible as the Shūdra.

The term '*svadhā*' stands for the food offered to Pitṛs ; or, the term may stand for the 'rites performed in honour of Pitṛs' ; and the term '*svadhāninayana*' means 'that mantra by means of which the said food is offered or given' ; *e.g.*, such mantras as '*shundhantām pitaraḥ*' and so forth. With the exception of such mantras, the boy should not pronounce any Vedic texts.

It is from this that we deduce the fact that the uninitiated boy should offer to his father libations of water, the '*navashrāddha*'; etc. That he is not entitled to the *Pārvaṇa* and other *shrāddhas* follows from the fact of his still being without the 'Fire.' These latter shall be described under the section on '*Piṇḍānvāhāryaka*.' We shall explain all this in full detail in *Adhyāya III*.—(172)

VERSE CLXXIII

FOR THE BOY WHOSE INITIATORY RITE HAS BEEN PERFORMED, INSTRUCTION REGARDING OBSERVANCES IS CONSIDERED DESIRABLE; AS ALSO THE GETTING UP OF THE VEDA, IN DUE COURSE, ACCORDING TO THE PRESCRIBED RULE.—(173)

Bhāṣya.

Verse 2.69 has laid down the order of sequence among Cleanliness, Right Conduct and Vedic Study; and hence the Veda should be read in that same order. The learning of the Veda having become possible after the Initiatory Rite, the present verse serves to lay down the order in which it is to be done. The boy, on being initiated, should keep the '*Traividya*' and other observances; and then proceed to study the Veda.

'*For the boy whose Initiatory rite has been performed*,'—*i.e.*, for the Religious Student—'*instruction regarding observances is considered desirable*,'—and is actually done by teachers. As a matter of fact, it is on the strength of the scriptures that the said instruction is 'considered desirable'; hence the 'desirability' spoken of stands for the 'necessity of doing' it.

After this instruction follows the '*getting up of the Veda*,'—'*in due order*'—as here described,—'*according to the prescribed rule*.'—This is a reiteration, for the purpose of filling up the metre.—(173)

VERSE CLXXIV

THAT SKIN, THAT SACRED THREAD, THAT GIRDLE, THAT STAFF AND THAT GARMENT, WHICH HAS BEEN PRESCRIBED FOR ONE, STAND DURING THE OBSERVANCES ALSO.—(174)

Bhāṣya.

The authors of Gṛhyasūtras have laid down certain acts called 'observances'; such for instance as, 'for one year one desires to get up the Veda or a part of it,'—in which connection there are observances and vows and restraints prescribed; when one of these observances has been completed, and another is taken up, then all the rules and regulations that have been prescribed in connection with the Upanayana have to be followed.

"In that case how are the skin, etc., previously taken up to be disposed of?"

They are to be thrown into the water.

"That has been declared to be the method of disposing of things previously taken up; but of what form would be the disposal of such of those things as might have been destroyed (or lost)?"

As regards cases of loss, in as much as each of the things has its use definitely prescribed in the descriptions, it naturally follows that when one is lost, it is replaced by another; and this taking up of the latter would constitute the 'disposal' of the former.

'*That skin*' which has been prescribed for a particular Religious Student, *e. g.*, 'the skin of the *Kṛṣṇa* deer for the Brāhmaṇa, that of the *Ruru* deer for the *Ksattriya* and so forth, Similarly with the *staff* and other things.

All this stands '*during the observances also.*' In view of the context, 'observances' here must be taken as standing for 'instruction regarding observances.'—(174)

XXX. Rules to be observed by the Religious Student

VERSE CLXXV

WITH A VIEW TO ENHANCING HIS OWN PIETY, THE RELIGIOUS STUDENT SHOULD, WHILE LIVING WITH HIS TEACHER, OBSERVE ALL THESE RULES,—HAVING FULLY SUBJUGATED ALL HIS ORGANS.—(175)

Bhāṣya.

The Author is going to set forth a set of restraints and observances, in a section by themselves; and the present verse is intended to emphasise the importance of these; the sense being that what has been said before must be done, but what is coming next is even more important and conducive to superior results.

The term 'Religious Student' has been added in order to preclude the suspicion that a fresh section having begun here, the duties that are going to be described are not meant for the student.

"If the text is continuing to describe the duties of the Religious Student, why should this be regarded as a different section?"

Even though what are going to be described are similar in character to those that have gone before, yet there is a certain superiority attaching to them; and it is purely on the ground of this slight distinction that their treatment has been regarded as forming a different section.

The remaining words of the Text are explained as added for the purpose of making up the verse.

'*Should observe,*'—Should follow.

'*These*'—Those going to be described. The pronoun 'this' always refers to what happens to be uppermost in the mind.

'*Living with his Teacher*'—for the purpose of acquiring learning. The participle '*living*' indicates permanent proximity.

'*Having fully controlled his organs*'—in the manner described above. (Verses 88—100.)

'*With a view to enhancing piety*';—*i.e.*, for the purpose of that embellishment of himself which is brought about by the proper observance of the Injunction of Vedic Study.—(175)

The Author proceeds to describe the rules spoken of in the preceding verse.

VERSE CLXXVI

EVERY DAY, HAVING BATHED AND BECOME CLEAN, HE SHOULD MAKE OFFERINGS TO DEITIES, SAGES AND FATHERS, AND DO THE WORSHIPPING OF THE DEITIES AND THE PLACING OF FUEL.—(176)

Bhāṣya.

Every day, '*having bathed and become pure,*'—*i.e.*, having his uncleanliness removed by bath,—'*he should make offerings to Deities, Sages and Fathers.*' If he is already clean, he need not bathe; as the adding of the term 'clean' clearly shows that the 'bathing' here laid down is only for the purpose of cleanliness, and hence its performance is absolutely compulsory, like the 'bathing' to be done by the *Snātaka*, Accomplished Student. It is for this reason that in another *Smṛti* bathing has been prohibited (for the Religious Student); though this prohibition refers to bathing with clay, for purposes of personal adornment. Gautama however has prescribed actual bathing. Hence what is meant is that one should plunge into water like a stick, and he should remove dirt, etc., by rubbing the body with his hands. Unless there is touching of an unclean thing, such dirt as arises from perspiration, or from contact with the dust contained in the clothing, etc., does not make one 'unclean'; for the presence of such dirt is inevitable. Says the Brāhmaṇa—'What is *dirt*? Is it the skin, or hairs of the beard or penance?'—which shows that the presence of such 'dirt' is conducive to spiritual merit.

"How is it known that the *bathing* (here laid down) is for the purposes of cleanliness?"

The present injunction cannot be taken as prompting, to the performance of divine service, a person who fulfills the two distinct qualifications of 'having bathed' and 'become clean'; (1) because as a matter of fact, one who has bathed can never remain unclean; (2) because even for a person who has adopted cleanliness by having sipped water, etc., bathing is found to be enjoined; (3) because we meet with such passages as 'having bathed, sipped water, one should sip water again,' where even for the person who has bathed a method of further cleanliness is enjoined. From all this it is clear that what the present verse enjoins is that whenever occasion (in the shape of the contact of unclean things, etc.) arises, one should bathe, even though there be already present the 'cleanliness' that is generally understood as such.

Or, the present verse may be regarded as a totally independent rule, intended to prohibit bathing without special occasion arising in the shape of uncleanliness; and it is in view of this prohibition that we have the counter-exception—'one should bathe after having learnt the Veda,'—which enjoins bathing at the end of Vedic Study (even in the absence of any uncleanliness).

"*He should make offerings to Deities, Sages and Fathers.*"—By reason of the mention of '*tarpaṇa*,' the 'offering' here meant appears to be that offering of water to the Deities and others which has been prescribed among the duties of the house-holder, under 3.283. The authors of *Gṛhyasūtras* also have declared this act as to be done with water only; *e.g.*, says Āshvalāyana (3.4.3)—'He satisfies the Deities.' In ordinary life also this act is known as the 'offering of water.'

The Deities to whom this offering is to be made have been enumerated by the writers on Gṛhya—*viz.*, Agni, Prajāpaṭi, Brahmā and so forth. The '*tarpaṇa*,' 'offering,' to these does not consist of producing in them the feeling of satisfaction (which is the etymological meaning of the term '*tarpaṇa*'); it consists only in the pouring, on their behalf, of water with joined hands. Hence what is here laid down comes to be only a sacrificial offering, in which water is the substance offered. Specially as the character of 'deity' could not otherwise have belonged to those to whom the offering is made; for that alone has been called 'deity' to whom a sacrifice is offered; it is not one who *becomes satisfied.* The only definition of 'deity' that we have is—'Deities are recipients of hymns and recipients of offerings'; they become 'recipients of hymns' by becoming the objects of eulogy, and they become 'recipients of offerings' by becoming those to whom offerings are made. When therefore our author speaks of them as '*tarpya*,' 'to be satisfied,' he uses the term in its figurative sense of 'being recipients of the offering of water.' The teacher and such other persons are recognised as 'recipients' when the cow and such things are transferred to their ownership; and the Deities also are 'recipients.' Thus both having the common character of 'being recipients,' they are described as 'being satisfied.' If what is laid down here meant actual 'satisfying' of the Deities, then this 'water-offering' would become a purely sanctificatory act; and yet no 'sanctification' is possible in the case of Deities; for the simple reason that they have not been, nor are they ever likely to be, employed; and what has never been employed, or is not likely to be employed, cannot rightly be regarded as an object of sanctification.

'*Sages*,'—*i.e.*, those sages that happen to be one's '*Gotra-ṛṣis*'; *e.g.*, for those belonging to the 'Parāshara-gotra,' Vashiṣṭha, Shakti and Pārāsharya would be the 'sages' (to whom the offering is to be made). The author of *Gṛhyasūtras* have however spoken of the 'seers of Vedic Mantras' (and not the *Gotra-ṛṣis*) as the 'sages' to whom the offering is to be made; *i.e.*, the sages Madhuchchhandas, Gṛtsamada and Vishvāmtira. Since the text speaks of 'sages' without any qualification, it is open to us to take it as standing for both kinds of sages; but in view of the fact that the Gṛhyasūtras have specified them (as being the 'seers of mantras'), it is only right to take these latter as meant.

'*Fathers.*'—One's dead ancestors,—father, grandfather, etc., all *Sapiṇḍas* and *Samānodakas.* In the case of the 'Fathers,' the 'offering' is to be the actual '*Tarpaṇa*' itself. This is going to be distinctly laid down under the rules bearing upon *Shrāddha.*

Worshiping of the Deities.—In connection with this some ancient writers have made the following observations:—"Who are these deities, whose 'worship' is here laid down? If they are meant to be those painted in picture-books—figures with four arms, with a thunderbolt in the hand and so forth,—then, since ordinary men regard these as 'images' (which connotes *unreality*), they can be called 'Deity,' only figuratively. If, on the other hand, they are meant to be those related to hymns and offerings,—which are indicated by Vedic injunctions, and also by the words of mantras, and which are called so by persons versed in the use of words and their denotations,—such as 'Agni,' 'Agni-Soma,' 'Mitra-Varuṇa,' 'Indra,' 'Viṣṇu,' and so forth—then, in that case, their character of 'Deity,' would be dependent upon the said acts (of offering, etc.), and not upon the fact of their having any connection with the denotation (of the term 'Deity'); and further, a particular (Deity) would be the 'Deity' for only that offering which is enjoined as to be offered to him; *e.g.*, when the 'Cake baked upon eight pans,' is called '*āgnēya*' (dedicated to Agni), Agni becomes the 'deity' only of that cake, and not of that which is called '*saurya*' (dedicated to Sūrya)."

From the above considerations the conclusion that the ancient writers have deduced is as follows:—In cases where the term cannot be taken in its direct denotation, it is only right to take it in the figurative sense; specially as such is the actual usage. Hence the 'worship' enjoined in the present verse is that of *images.*

What the truth on this point is we shall explain below, under verse 189.

'*Placing of fuel*'—throwing into the fire pieces of wood, every morning and evening.—(176)

VERSE CLXXVII.

HE SHOULD ABSTAIN FROM HONEY, MEAT, SCENT, GARLAND, FLAVOURS, WOMEN, ALL FERMENTED ACIDS AND ALSO THE KILLING OF LIVING CREATURES.—(177)

Bhāṣya.

'*Madhu*'—stands for the *honey* produced by bees. As for *wine* (which also is called 'madhu'), it is an intoxicant; and hence its use is prohibited even before the Upanayana: 'The Brāhmaṇa should ever abstain from intoxicants'—says Gautama (2.20).

'*Meat*,'—even such as has been offered (to deities and fathers).

The term '*scent*' stands for camphor and such other things as are of extremely sweet scent,—the name of the quality (scent) being used figuratively for things possessed of it. All highly perfumed substances are prohibited, and what is prohibited is the applying of these perfumes to the body; as for the scent itself, when it proceeds from the fragrant substance, it cannot be checked. Nor does the prohibition apply to the case where the perfume reaches the student by chance. What is reprehensible therefore is the intentional using of fragrant incense and such things as luxury. It is for this reason that there is nothing reprehensible in the case where the pupil is told by his Teacher to cut a Sandal-tree and the sweet smell of the wood reaches him it its natural way. It is by reason of its being mentioned along with 'garland' that we take it to mean *strong scent*.—That which is not strong enough to exhilarate the mind,—*e.g.*, the smell of such things as *Kuṣṭha*, *Ghṛta*, *Pūtidāru*, etc.—is not prohibited.

'*Garland*'—flowers strung together.

'*Flavours*'—Sweet, acid and the rest.

"Since things absolutely devoid of flavour could not be eaten, living itself would be impossible (if one were to avoid all flavours)."

True; but what are prohibited are highly tasty things, like sugar. This prohibition applies also to such substances as are mixed with other things, by way of condiments. Or, the prohibition may apply to too much indulgence in too richly cooked and tasty food. To the same end we have the following saying—'He alone acquires learning who shuns wealth like serpent, sweets like poison and women like demonesses.'

Others explain '*rasa*,' '*flavour*,' to stand for the poetic emotions, Erotic and the rest; the sense being that one should not arouse his emotions by witnessing dramatic performances or listening to poetical recitations.

Others again have held the view that the prohibition applies to the pieces of sugar-cane, *Dhātri* and such other substances, when extracted and separated from them,—and not as contained within them.

This however is not right; the term '*rasa*' is not known as symonymous with 'fluid.'

As a matter of fact, what is prohibited with regard to each of the things named is its enjoyment, in whatever form this may be possible. For instance, of honey and meat, what is prohibited is the *eating*, and not the seeing or touching; of scent and garland, what is prohibited is using them with the idea of adorning the body, and not merely holding them by the hand; similarly in the case of women, it is sexual intercourse that is prohibited; and it is by reason of there being a fear of such intercourse following that the author is going to prohibit later on, the looking at, and touching of, women. As says Gautama (2.16)—'The looking at, and touching of women (are reprehensible), for fear of its leading to actual intercourse.'

'*Fermented acids*,'—such things as turn acid; that is those that turn acid either by being kept overnight, or by being mixed with other substances. Such substances are prohibited by reason of the avoiding of these being among the duties of all twice-born persons; and yet it has been re-iterated here for the purpose of including all those things that are named 'acid' only figuratively; it is thus that 'harsh words' become prohibited. Says Gautama—'Acid words (should be avoided).' It is for the purpose of including all this that the author has added the epithet 'all.' This epithet 'all' is meant to refer to 'flavours' and 'acids.' It is thus that the figurative use becomes established.

Some people offer the following explanation:—"The term 'acid' prohibits the acid flavours, and the term 'all' prohibits unpleasant words."

These people should be asked the following question:—Why cannot the epithet 'all' be taken as prohibiting those things that are prohibited only by implication? In this way we could obtain the prohibition of curds and like things which have turned acid. If however the prohibition (by 'all') be explained as referring to things whose use is possible,—then there can be no objection to it.

'*Of living creatures,*'—such as insects and fleas; the killing of these is done through childishness; hence we have the present prohibition with a view to emphasise the necessity of making special efforts to avoid it. Or, the re-iteration of the prohibition may be meant to be indicative of the fact that the avoidance of killing is auxiliary to 'Vedic Study.' So that the *killing* would involve the transgression, not only of the prohibition calculated for the benefit of the agent, but also that of the due observance of the injunction of Vedic Study.

"Why is not the same assumption made regarding the *fermented acids* and other things also?"

The prohibition of the *acids*, etc., is such as has room for it in other cases also [*e.g.* Harsh words are prohibited for other people and under other circumstances also; the prohibition of killing has no such room for application, since it is necessary during sacrificial performances]. And when between two things it is found that one becomes absolutely null and void, while there is still room for the other, then preference is given to the former.—(177)

VERSE CLXXVIII

FROM ANOINTING, APPLYING COLLYRIUM TO THE EYES, SHOES, HOLDING THE UMBRELLA, ATTACHMENT, ANGER, AVARICE, DANCING, SINGING AND PLAYING ON MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS.—(178)

Bhāṣya.

'*Anointing*'—rubbing of the head and body with butter, oil or such other oily substances.

'*Applying collyrium to the eyes*';—the addition of the word 'eyes' is only for the purpose of filling up the metre.

What is prohibited in regard to these two is the having recourse to them by way of ornamentation; and not their use as medicine. That this is so is clear from their being mentioned along with 'scents and garlands.'

'*Shoes*—foot-covers *made of leather*; not all kinds of foot-cover.

'*Holding of the umbrella*'—either by one's own hand or by the hand of another person; both are prohibited.

'*Kāma*' here stands for *attachment*; the preclusion of *sexual desire* being already included under the prohibition of association with women (in 177).

'*Anger*'—rage.

'*Avarice*'—selfishness. Notions of 'I' and 'mine' are the characteristics of the mind.

'*Dancing*.'—The throwing about of one's limbs for the delectation of ordinary people, as also the acting of dramas according to the rules laid down by Bharata and others.

'*Singing*'—the exhibition of the 'Ṣaḍja' and other musical notes.

'*Playing upon musical instruments*,'—the producing of musical sounds by means of the lute, the flute and so forth, as also the striking, to time, of such instruments as the drum, *mṛdagña* and the like.—(178)

VERSE CLXXIX

FROM GAMBLING, QUARELLING WITH PEOPLE, CALUMNIATING, AND ALSO LYING; FROM GAZING AT AND TOUCHING OF WOMEN, AND FROM THE INJURING OF OTHERS.—(179)

Bhāṣya.

'*Gambling*;'—playing with dice. Cock-fighting, etc., are also prohibited by this,—the term 'gambling' being used in its most general sense.

'*Quarelling with people*';—wordy dispute, without any reason, on common matters; or asking people at random for news.

'*Calumniating.*'—Recounting the defects of other people through sheer ill-will.

'*Ly'ng*'—describing things otherwise than what is actually seen or heard.

Every one of these words has the Accusative ending, on account of its being governed by the verb 'should abstain from' (in the preceding verse).

'*The gazing at and touching of women*';—'*gazing at*' means looking intently with a view to observe the shape of limbs; 'this part of her body is beautiful—that is not so,' and so forth. '*Touching*' stands for *embracing*. These two are prohibited for fear of their leading up to sexual intercourse; and this is to be applied to the case of the young boy in some way or other.

'*Injuring of others*,'—*i. e.*, doing harm; obstructing the fulfilment of some purpose. For instance, if he is questioned on matters relating to the marriage of girls, he should not say that a certain bridegroom is unfit, even if he be really so; he should remain quiet (say nothing), as lying has been prohibited.—(179)

VERSE CLXXX

HE SHOULD ALWAYS SLEEP ALONE; NOWHERE SHOULD HE ALLOW HIS MANHOOD TO RUN OUT; BY INTENTIONALLY ALLOWING HIS MANHOOD TO RUN OUT, HE BREAKS HIS VOW.—(180)

Bhāṣya.

'*He should always sleep alone; nowhere should he allow his manhood to run out,*' —*i.e.*, not even outside; intercourse with women having been already prohibited.

Next follows a commendatory statement—'*Intentionally, etc.*' '*Intention*' means *wish*......By allowing his manhood to run—by any means—he '*breaks*'—destroys—'*his vow*' of studentship (continence).—(180)

VERSE CLXXXI

THE TWICE-BORN RELIGIOUS STUDENT, HAVING UNINTENTIONALLY DROPPED HIS MANHOOD DURING A DREAM, SHOULD THRICE RECITE THE THREE VEDIC VERSES BEGINNING WITH "PUNARMĀM," AFTER HAVING BATHED AND WORSHIPPED THE SUN.—(181)

Bhāṣya.

When one renounces his vow of continence intentionally, then he has to perform the expiatory rite prescribed for the '*Avakīrṇī*' (11.120 *et. seq.*); the present verse lays down what one should do when he does it unintentionally.

No significance attaches to the mention of 'dream'; the *absence of intention* is the only necessary condition; and no intention can be present during dreams. Hence this same expiatory rite is to be performed in a case where, even though he may be not asleep, the flow occurs involuntarily, in the same manner as certain other fluids flow out of the body.

The sense of the verse thus is that—'if one drops his manhood unintentionally, he should perform this expiatory rite that he should recite the three verses, etc., etc.—(181)

VERSE CLXXXII

HE SHOULD FETCH THE JAR OF WATER, FLOWERS, COWDUNG, EARTH AND KUSHA-GRASS,—AS MUCH AS MAY BE REQUIRED; AND DAY BY DAY HE SHOULD BEG FOR ALMS.—(182)

Bhāṣya.

He should fetch as much of water in jars and other things as might serve the purposes of the Teacher.

This is only by way of illustration; the meaning being that he should do other household-work also,—all that is not absolutely demeaning. What this verse is meant to indicate is that the pupil should not be made to do any demeaning work,—such as touching the utensils in which food has been eaten by persons other than the Teacher himself. For as regards the Teacher himself, his service has been already prescribed in a general way.

The compound '*yāvadarthāni*' is to be expounded as '*yāvān arthaḥ ēṣām.*'

'*Day by day he should beg for alms*';—'alms' here stands for a very small quantity of *cooked food*, just enough for sustenance. It would not be right to argue that it stands for *food in general* (not necessarily *cooked*); since the generic term '*anna*' (food) is found to be used in the prohibition coming later on (in 188) regarding 'the *food* of one person'; because in view of the injunction 'having collected the alms, he should present it to the Teacher and then eat it,' where the *bringing* and *eating* are mentioned together, it is clear that *cooked* food is meant; if dry grains had been brought in, how could they be eaten forthwith? If the grain were collected and then cooked in the Teacher's house, the food thus cooked would be one that has the *alms* for its source, it would not be the *alms* itself. In common usage also it is *cooked food* that is called 'alms.'

'*Day by day.*'—"The daily *begging for alms* is already implied in what follows later on (in 188)—'He should live every day on alms.'

In 188, the term 'every day' has been added for the purpose of laying down the means of subsistence; while the term 'day by day' in the present verse is meant to preclude the possibility of some one keeping the food mixed with butter, etc., overnight and then eating it next day; the sense being that he should beg for alms and eat it *day by day*; and he should never beg on one day and then, having kept it over-night, eat it next day after mixing it with butter, etc.—(182)

The Author next mentions the persons from whom the alms are to be begged.

VERSE CLXXXIII

THE RELIGIOUS STUDENT, BEING PURE, SHOULD FETCH ALMS DAILY FROM THE HOUSES OF PERSONS WHO ARE NOT DEVOID OF VEDA AND SACRIFICES, AND WHO ARE FAMED FOR THEIR DEEDS.—(183)

Bhāṣya.

'*Who are not devoid of Veda and sacrifices*';—who are equipped with Vedic learning, and perform the sacrifices to which they are entitled;—'*not devoid*' means *not without*, *i.e.*, *fully equipped.*

'*Famed for their deeds*;'—those who may not be entitled to the performance of sacrifices, but who are accustomed to meritorious acts. Or, those persons may be called '*famed for their deeds*' who are content with their own means of livelihood, and do not go in for such means of living as usury and the like.

'*From the houses of*' these people '*he should fetch alms*'—*i.e.*, beg and bring it away.

'*Pure*'—Clean.

'*Daily*'—This is a descriptive reiteration.—(183)

VERSE CLXXXIV

HE SHOULD NOT BEG FOR FOOD FROM HIS TEACHER'S FAMILY; NOR FROM THE FAMILY OF HIS PATERNAL OR MATERNAL RELATIONS. BUT WHEN OTHER HOUSES ARE NOT AVAILABLE, HE SHOULD AVOID THE PRECEDING IN PREFERENCE TO THE SUCCEEDING.—(184)

Bhāṣya.

Even though the Teacher's family may fulfil the aforesaid conditions, yet 'he should not beg for food' from that family. '*Kula*,' '*family*,' stands for 'relations'; hence one should not receive alms from the uncle and other relations of the Teacher.

'*Paternal relations*'—from the family of those related to the student on his father's side.—'*From his maternal relations*'—*i.e.*, from his maternal uncle and others.

This verse should not be construed in such a way as to connect the words 'paternal relations, etc.,' with the *Teacher*; since the Teacher's relations have all been included under the term '*Teacher's family*.'

"From whom then is he to beg for food?"

From houses other than those here mentioned.

'*When other houses are not available*'—*i.e.*, not possible;—when, for instance, the entire village is inhabited either by the Teacher's family, or by his own paternal and maternal relations; and there are no other families;—or even though they are there, they do not give him alms;—then the student may beg from those just mentioned; when others are not available, he should first beg from his maternal relations; if these latter be not available, then from his paternal relations; and when even these are not available, then from the Teacher's family.—(184)

VERSE CLXXXV

IN THE EVENT OF ALL THE AFORESAID BEING NOT AVAILABLE, HE MAY WANDER OVER THE WHOLE VILLAGE, REMAINING PURE AND HAVING HIS SPEECH WELL-CONTROLLED; BUT HE SHOULD AVOID PERSONS OF ILL-REPUTE.—(185)

Bhāṣya.

'*All the aforesaid*'—*i.e., those not devoid of the Veda and sacrifices* and so forth—'*being unavailable*';—'*he may wander over the whole village*';—he may go over the whole village, irrespectively of caste and other distinctions, for the purpose of obtaining his means of subsistence. Only '*he should avoid persons of ill-repute*'—*i.e.*, those who are known to have committed serious sins, even though they may never have been seen to commit them. Says Gautama (2-35)—'The begging of alms may be done from all castes, save the disreputable and the fallen.'

'*Having his speech well-controlled*';—*i.e.*, till he obtains the alms, he should not utter any words save those used in the actual begging.—(185)

VERSE CLXXXVI

HAVING FETCHED FUEL-STICKS FROM A DISTANCE, HE SHOULD PLACE THEM IN THE AIR; AND WITH THESE HE SHOULD, WITHOUT FAIL, MAKE OFFERINGS TO THE FIRE, MORNING AND EVENING.—(186)

Bhāṣya.

The term '*distance*' is meant to stand for such plots of land as are not owned by any one; for instance, the forest is 'distant' from the village, and it is not owned by any one. If such were not the meaning, and 'distance' simply meant 'remote places,'—then since the exact degree of remoteness is not specified, the meaning of the injunction would remain indefinite.

'*Having fetched*'—having brought.

'*Should place*'—should keep.

'*In the air*'—*i.e.*, on the roof of the house; no placing is possible in the open air, without some support.

'*With these he should make offerings morning and evening.*'

The fetching of the fuel may be at that or at any other time, according as the student pleases.

Some people regard the 'placing in the air' as serving some transcendental purpose. Others have however held that the fuel brought fresh from the tree is wet; and hence it is necessary to place it either on the top of the house or on that of a wall, etc. (for the purpose of drying).—(186)

VERSE CLXXXVII

HE WHO, WITHOUT BEING ILL, OMITS FOR SEVEN DAYS, TO BEG ALMS AND TO OFFER FUEL TO THE FIRE, SHALL PERFORM THE RITES PRESCRIBED FOR THE AVAKĪRṆIN.—(187)

Bhāṣya.

'*He who, for seven days*'—consecutively, '*has omitted to beg alms and to offer fuel to the Fir*',—*without being ill*'—while not suffering from any disease,—'*shall perform the rites prescribed for the Avakīrṇin*';—*i.e.*, the expiatory rite the exact form of which is going to be described in Chap. 11. (verse 118).

This is said here only for the purpose of showing the gravity of the offence; and it does not mean that the rite mentioned is to be actually performed in expiation of the omission. That this is so is shown by the fact that another *Smṛti* has laid down a much simpler expiation for this omission, *viz.*: 'offering of clarified butter, etc.' The following fact also is another indicative of the same conclusion:—If what is mentioned here were a real expiatory rite, then on the occasion of mentioning the conditions under which the '*Avakīrṇin-rites*' are to be performed as an expiatory rite, the author would have mentioned these omissions also, in the same way in which he has mentioned 'sexual intercourse with women.'

Some people interpret this verse to means as follows:—"It is necessary to do the two acts (of begging alms and offering fuel) for seven days only; having done them for seven days, if one drops them, there is no harm in this; and these seven days are to be the first ones after Upanayana."

This however is not right; as it would be in direct contravention to the direction that 'this should be done till the Final Return from the teacher's house,'—as also to what follows in the next verse.—(187)

VERSE CLXXXVIII

THE AVOWED STUDENT SHOULD SUBSIST ON ALMS; HE SHOULD NOT (HABITUALLY) EAT THE FOOD GIVEN BY ONE PERSON. FOR THE STUDENT, SUBSISTING ON ALMS HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE EQUAL TO FASTING.—(188)

Bhāṣya.

Objection.—"It has already been laid down that he should go about begging alms every day (183)."

What is there said would show that the begging of alms is meant to serve the visible purpose (of sustaining the body); specially as it has been subsequently laid down that 'having offered it to the Teacher, he should eat it'; and this '*eating*' cannot be sanctificatory of the alms; which alone could prevent us from taking it as serving the purely visible purpose of sustaining the body.

Some people have explained that the re-iteration of the 'daily begging of alms' is made for the purpose of adding the further direction that 'he should not eat the food given by one person.'

But this is not right. Since the eating of the food given by one person is precluded by the term 'alms' itself. 'Alms' stands for *an aggregate of what is obtained by begging;* whence then could there be any possibility of eating the food given by one person?

The conclusion on this point is that the whole rule has been re-iterated here with a view to adding (in the next verse) that such eating of the food given by one person is permissible at *Shrāddhas*.

'*He should subsist on alms*';—he should nourish his body —sustain his life—by means of food obtained by begging; and he should not eat food received from a single person.

The verse should not be taken to mean that "he should not eat what belongs to a single person,—he should eat what belongs to several owners; *e.g.*, what belongs to several undivided brothers." For the word in the text means simply 'one who eats one food—or one person's food.'

The term '*Vrati*' here stands for the Religious Student; and as the fact of the rule pertaining to him is clear from the context, the addition of the word can be taken only as filling up the metre.

Next follows the commendatory statement:—'The subsisting—sustaining of the body—of the student on alms only has been declared to be equal to fasting.'—(188)

VERSE CLXXXIX

DURING A PERFORMANCE IN HONOUR OF GODS AND IN HONOUR OF ANCESTORS, HE MAY, WHEN INVITED, EAT FREELY, LIKE AN ASCETIC, IN DUE ACCORDANCE WITH HIS OBSERVANCES. BY THIS HIS OBSERVANCES DO NOT SUFFER.—(189)

Bhāṣya.

This verse provides an exception, under certain conditions, to the rules regarding subsisting on alms.

'*In honour of Gods*';—*i.e.*, when Brāhmaṇas are fed in honour of the gods; and also when they are fed in honour of the fathers;—if he is '*invited*,' requested—'*he may eat freely*'—the food given by one person. But he himself should not ask for it.

This again should be '*in due accordance with his observances*'; *i.e.*, he should avoid honey and meat, which are inconsistent with his observances. The two phrases—'*in due accordance with his observances*' and '*like an ascetic*'—express the same meaning; and it does not mean that in a village he is to eat 'in accordance with his observances,' while in the forest he is to eat 'like an ascetic.' It is with a view to filling up the metre that the two phrases have been used. [There is another reason why the phrase '*like an ascetic*' should not be taken separately]—'Ascetic' here stands for the *hermit*, so if the student were permitted to eat 'like the hermit,' the eating of meat also would become allowed for him; as the hermit is permitted to eat meat, by such rules as 'he may eat the flesh of dead animals' (Gautama, 3.31).

'*In honour of Gods*';—*i.e.*, those rites of which gods are the deities; *i.e.*, the feeding of Brāhmaṇas laid down as to be done at the performance of the *Agnihōtra*, the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* and the other sacrifices offered to the gods; as we find in such injunctions as 'at the Āgrahāyaṇa and other sacrifices one should feed Brāhmaṇas and make them pronounce "*svasti*."' It is in connection with these that we have the present permission for the religious student.

Others explain the term '*performance in honour of the gods*' to mean that feeding of Brāhmaṇas which is done in honour of the Sun-god on the seventh day of the month, and so forth.

This however is not right. For the act of *eating* has no connection with the gods,—being, as it is, not instrumental in the accomplishment of any sacrifice. Further, the mere fact of an act being done with reference to a god, does not make the latter the 'deity' of that act; if it did, then the Teacher would have to be regarded as the 'deity' when one gives a cow to him, and the room will have to be regarded as the 'deity' when one sweeps it. Then again, it is with the *eater* that the act of *eating* is directly connected; and the Sun-god has no active function in the fulfilment of that act (as the Teacher is in the former case); nor is he the thing aimed-at (as the room is in the latter case); as the eating is not for his sake. Further, the accusative ending (in the term denoting *food*) denotes that it is meant for the eater, not that it is meant for the Sun-god. Nor has it been enjoined anywhere that 'one should feed Brāhmaṇas for the sake of (with reference to) the Sun-god.'

It might be argued that on the basis of usage we assume the existence of such an injunction.

But this cannot be; because there is always some scriptural basis found for such assumption of injunctions.

"In the present case also we have such basis in the shape of the 'external' *Smṛtis*."

If there were such a Smṛti-rule, its meaning would be that 'one should please the gods by feeding Brāhmaṇas.' And it would not be right to assume such a meaning; as scriptural injunctions are aimed, not at *pleasing the Gods,* but at accomplishing what is prescribed by the injunctions. Then again, if such were the meaning of the Injunction, its connection with the Sun-god and others intended to be deities could not be based either upon an object, or upon a desired result; nor again could they be the purpose, as in the case of the act of piercing; nor are they desired for their own sake, like cattle and other desirable things, for the simple reason that they are not something to be enjoyed. If it were the *satisfaction* of the Sun-god that were desired,—that also, will need a proof for its own existence; and there is no such proof available. Such a thing as the 'satisfaction of the Sun-god' is not known by Perception or other means of knowledge,—in the way that cattle, etc., are,—whereby it could be desired and connected with the performance of sacrifices.

If the motive of the man be held to be the idea that "the Sun-god is my lord and he will endow me with a fruit desired by me";—this also cannot be accepted, as there is no proof for this either. There is no Injunction in support of this idea. It is only an Injunction that prompts to activity the person who is related to a certain well-known result, which also serves to single out the man so prompted; but it does not point to the presence of the result. What the Injunction points to is the fact that a certain act known by other means of knowledge as leading to a particular desirable result is related to the performance as his qualifying factor.

If it be held that the offering is a kind of 'sacrifice,' and the *feeding* is a kind of *disposal* of it,—our answer is that that may be so regarded, if such is the usage of cultured people. But the feeding cannot be shown to have any direct connection with the deity; and as for connection through the intervening agency of the *sacrifice*, that we do not object to. Then again, as a matter of fact, when people undertake the performance of such acts, they have no idea that they are performing a *sacrifice*; the only idea that they have is that when the Brāhmaṇas have been fed, the particular deity would be satisfied. From all this it is clear that the Deity has no sort of action conducive to the act of feeding, nor is it the qualifying factor of any other thing that has such action. Thus then, the Deity is neither the object of the act, nor has it any connection with it. Nor again is it possible for the Sun-god and the rest to be regarded as *aimed at* by the act; for in the act of *feeding*, it is the person *fed* that is aimed at; and it is the Brāhmaṇas that are fed. Further, the mere fact of being *aimed at* does not make one the 'deity'; for in that case, when one gives a cow to the Teacher, or sweeps the room, the Teacher and the room would have to be regarded as 'deities.'

"How then is there to be Brāhmaṇa-feeding at a performance in honour of ancestors? There also the fathers could not be the 'deities' of the act. The offerings made into the Fire could not be regarded as made in honour of the ancestor; as other deities are found to be mentioned in connection with them. And just as the 'satisfaction of the Sun-god,' so the 'satisfaction of ancestors also, cannot be regarded as the result to be accomplished, by the act; for the very same reason that the connection of such satisfaction with the Injunction is not cognisable by any other means of knowledge."

To this some people make the following answer:—The 'satisfaction of Ancestors' is clearly recognised (as the result to be accomplished). That such beings as the 'Fathers' do exist is proved by the fact of souls being imperishable; and it is only through their deeds that they become connected with physical bodies. The feeding of these 'Ancestors' is the principal business, of which the reward has been described in the passage—'feeding them, one obtains ample reward.' This reward could only consist in the satisfaction of the Ancestors: this 'satisfaction' again could only be in the form of happiness, mental contentment; it could not be in the form of physical gratification which follows, in the case of men, from the act of *eating.* This pleasure may sometimes accrue to the fathers during the different conditions of life in which they happen to be born under the influence of their own past deeds. The verbal root '*tṛp*' denotes only *satisfaction*; physical gratification is something different, and can be known only by other means of knowledge.

Against this the following objection might be raised:—"In as much as the Son is the nominative agent in the act of feeding, how could the result, which should accrue to the agent, accrue to the Ancestors,—as people versed in law do not regard actions as bringing rewards to persons other than the actual doers."

Such an objection cannot be rightly taken. Because in this case the Ancestors themselves are the accredited agents; by the mere act of begetting the child, the father has done all this (that the son does on his behalf); in fact the son is begot for the sole purpose that he will confer on the Father benefits, seen as well as unseen. Thus then, just as in the *Sarvasvāra* sacrifice—where the performer offers his own life and is thus absent when the subsequent details are performed,—some other persons continue to be regarded as the 'performer,' by virtue of his having died after having requested the Brāhmaṇas to finish the sacrifice for him, by means of the words

'O Brāhmaṇas, please finish the sacrifice for me';—so would it also be in the case in question. The only difference between the two cases is that in the case of the *Sarvasvāra*, the actual doers are the hired priests doing the act with the totally different motive of earning a living, while in the case in question the doer is the son, who has been prompted by that same Injunction. Just as the Father performs the sacraments *for his son*, being prompted to it by the Injunction of *begetting sons*, which Injunction extends up to the final admonition addressed to the son (after Upanayana),—similarly the *Shrāddha* and other rites are performed *for the father* by the son. Just as the maintaining of the living father is a necessary duty of the son, as laid down in (11.10A), so is it with the dead father also.

The performance of the act in question is not purely voluntary, like the *Vaishvānara* sacrifice, in connection with which we read—'On the birth of a son, one should offer the Vaishvānara cake baked on twelve pans; –he upon whose birth this offering is made becomes glorious, an enjoyer of food and endowed with efficient organs.' Here we find that the Father comes to perform the Vaishvānara sacrifice when he desires certain results for his son; and it is not compulsory, like the Tonsure and other sacramental rites. As regards the act under consideration, on the other hand, we have the direction that 'the rite in honour of the Fathers should be performed till one's death,' which shows that the rite is to be performed throughout one's life.

As regards the objection that the result of the act, according to this view, does not accrue to the doer of the act, —this is explained in a different manner : just as in the case of the Vaishvānara sacrifice, the result, in the shape of having a highly qualified son, accrues to the father, who is the doer of the act,—so in the case in question also, the result, in the shape of the 'Father's satisfaction,' accrues to the son, the doer of the act. So that in both ways—whether the result accrue to the father or to the performer of the rite,—there is no incongruity at all. For as regards the father also, a result like the one in question is one that is desired by him in the very act of begetting the child; so that the father also does not obtain a reward not desired by him.

"If the ancestors are not the 'deities' of the Shrāddha-rite, how can it be called '*paitra*' (in honour of ancestors), which term has been formed by the adding of the affix denoting the *deity*?'"

What we say in answer to this is that the Fathers are regarded as deities on the ground of their being, like deities, the entities with reference to whom the offerings are made. The ancestors are referred to in some such form as 'this feeding of Brāhmaṇas is done for the purpose of benefiting you.' In the offering called the '*Piṇḍapitṛ-Yajña*,' the ancestors are actually 'deities'; but of *shrāddhas*, the ancestors have not been regarded as 'deities.' As for this feeding of Brāhmaṇas, it is on the same footing as the offerings that are made into the fire of portions of clarified butter, cake and such other things. And in this way the Brāhmaṇas themselves occupy the position of ancestors. Hence at the time that the food is served to them, one should think of it being offered to his ancestors, with some such expression in his mind—'this is offered to you, it is no longer mine.' The Brāhmaṇas thus fed attain the position of the '*Āhavanīya* fire' (into which libations are poured); the only difference being that into the Āhavanīya the offering is actually thrown, while it is only placed near the Brāhmaṇas, and they take it up themselves.

Nor will it be right to argue that "*Shrāddhas* cannot be regarded as *sacrifice*, as in them the syllable '*svāhā*' is not pronounced with reference to the gods." Because we find the same in the case of the '*Sviṣṭakṛt*' offerings (which are regarded as sacrifice). Thus then, the *Shrāddha*, even though of the nature of a 'sacrifice,' can be offered to Ancestors. Nor is there any incongruity in the Ancestors being the 'deities' (of the offering) and also the recipients of the result. We are going to explain more about this matter, which is not directly mentioned in the text, under Chapter III.

From all this it becomes established that the Sun and the other gods are not 'deities' in the feeding of Brāhmaṇas.

"The definition of 'deity' as *one who is aimed at in a sacrifice* is too narrow; because as a matter of fact, we find the name 'deity' applied even in cases where there is no connection with any sacrifice; *e.g.*, in such statements as—(*a*) 'the worshipping of deities,' 'one should approach the deities.' But neither *worship*, nor *going forward* (which is what is expressed by *approaching*), is possible with regard to deities."

There is no force in this; as the *worship* may be taken as enjoined in connection with those cases where the deity is actually enjoined; or, it may refer to the *Vishvēdēva* deities as related to the Agnihotra and other sacrifices.

"Even so, the difficulty does not cease. The deity can never be the *object of worship*; as that would deprive it of the very character of 'Deity' (which has been defined as consisting in being *aimed at in a sacrifice*); for if it were the *object of worship*, it could not be the *recipient of the sacrifice*. It has been declared that 'the active agent of one act cannot be an active agent of another.' The 'active agent' is a particular kind of force, and this force varies with each particular act; and as the presence of such force can be indicated only by its effects, we can reasonably assume only that much of diversity in it as there may be effects. From this it follows that what is the 'recipient of a gift' must remain the *recipient*, it cannot become the *object*.—'How then do we have such expressions as *give this to the cooker*, where the *nominative* of the action of *cooking* becomes the *recipient*,—or *having his body wounded by arrows, he went away helplessly, being looked upon by the glances of his beloved*, [where the *object* of the act of *looking* becomes the *nominative* of the act of *going*].'—The answer to this has already been explained:—such expressions become justified by the difference between the *efficiency* and the *efficient* being regarded as secondary and figurative; as is found to be the case in such expressions as 'having eaten, he goes.' Thus then, if the act in question is meant to be a *worship*, then its object cannot have the character of the 'Deity'; while if the Sun and the rest are 'deities,' then the act enjoined cannot be regarded as 'worship.' Nor can it be held that the Sun being well known as a 'deity,' the present injunction lays down its *worship.* Because the term 'deity' is not a common name of the Sun and other gods, in the way in which the term '*go*' (cow) is of the '*shabalēya*' and other bovine varieties."

To the above we make the following reply:—It is quite true that the Sun and others are not, in their own form, 'deities'; the term 'deity' is a relative term; and it is only from an injunction that we can learn that a certain being is the 'deity' of an act; the fact being that when a certain offering is enjoined with reference to a being, this latter is the 'deity' of that offering. It is for this reason that Agni is not the 'deity' of any other offering save that 'dedicated to Agni.' [All this is quite true] but no injunction of 'worship' is possible without the object to be worshipped; and deities are found to be mentioned as objects of worship. Now if the act of 'worship' is not possible when the term 'deity' is taken in its primary sense, then the 'worship' may be taken as being of the nature of 'sacrifice.' But, in the absence of any mention (in the injunction of feeding Brāhmaṇas) of the substance to be offered and the deity to whom it is to be offered, the act in question cannot acquire the character of true 'sacrifice'; so that the text in question may be regarded as a descriptive reference for the purpose of prescribing the 'forenoon' as the proper time for it; the sense being that 'all acts in honour of the gods should be done during the forenoon.'

"Why is it said that the deity is not directly mentioned?"

For the simple reason that there is no word directly signifying any deity. The term 'deity' that is actually found is the common name of all deities; so that the injunction refers to the worshipping of Agni, Āditya, Rudra, Indra, Viṣṇu, Sarasvatī and so forth; and during the *worship* there is offering of incense, light, garland, presents and such other things. In the case of Agni, the connection with the act of worship offered is always direct; as regards Āditya (the Sun-god) since he is far off, his worship consists in the placing of sandal-paste, flowers, etc., on a clean spot; and as regards Indra and the other gods, since they are not visible, their worshipping is done by the placing of flower, etc., accompanied by a reference to their names. Though in the act of worship, the beings worshipped form the predominant factor, yet inasmuch as they are subservient to the act to be done, it is the act of worship that comes to be recognised as what should be done. If the substance offered were the predominant factor, then the Deity could never form the subject of the injunction. All this is made clear in Jaimini's Mîmānsā-Sūtra, 2.1.6 and 7. The view put forward on the other hand is perfectly reasonable, the case being analogous to that of the Hymns and Eulogies. The Hymn is not made for the sake of the hymn itself; so the *worship* also is not for the sake of the *worshipped.* If might be argued that Hymns and Eulogies are not mentioned here by name. But the answer to this has already been given. The accusative has the sense of the instrumental, as in the expression '*saktūn juhoti,*' where '*saktūn*' has been taken as '*saktubhiḥ.*'

Similarly the sentence '*mṛdam gām daivatam pradakṣiṇāni kurvīta,*'—'one should have the clay, the cow, the deity to his right,'—lays down the use of the right hand; the sense being that all acts done in honour of the gods should be done with the right hand; the passage cannot mean that the deities ensouling the clay, etc., should be actually placed on the right; for the simple reason that the deities have no physical form.

The same holds good regarding the injunction 'one should move up to the gods.' Since it is not possible for one to go near the gods by walking on foot, and since the root '*gam*' (as in '*abhigāchchēt*') signifies *knowledge*, why should '*abhigamana*' differ from *Remembrance?* The sense thus is that during the act one should think of the gods; *i.e.*, he should avoid all anxiety or distraction of the mind. In this way this *Smṛti* is found to be one whose basis is actually found in the Vedic Injunction, which says—'One should think in his mind of that deity to whom he may be offering the libation.' ... ...

"But this *thinking* of the deity is already implied in the *aiming* (which has been put forward in the definition of the Deity),—which cannot be done without *thinking*."

This objection has no force; as mere *aiming* can be done also by a man who is anxious and whose mind is distracted.

Thus then all such expressions as 'the property of the gods,' 'the cattle of the gods,' 'the substance of the gods' and the like are to be taken as referring to such cattle and things as have been assigned to (dedicated to) the gods. Some people have held that in the section dealing with penalties to be inflicted upon persons stealing the 'property of gods,' it is the image of the god that is meant; as otherwise the regulations bearing upon the subject would become liable to be infringed. As regards the images upon whom the character of 'gods' has been imposed, things are called their 'property' on the basis of an assumed sense of ownership; and it is such property that is referred to as 'property of the gods,' in such passages as—'the highest penalty is to be inflicted on the stealing of the property of Gods, Brāhmaṇas and Kings.' In reality, gods can have no rights of ownership; and hence the literal sense of the expression being inadmissible, it is only right that we should accept the figurative one.

"In the present case what is the figurative sense? In every instance of figurative use, the presence of a common function (or quality) forms the basis; *e.g.*, the expression 'the Boy is Fire' is used when the boy is found to possess the white resplendence of fire. Similarly in every case the figurative or secondary sense is recognised only where there is some common property present;—the presence of such property being cognised by means of perception and other means of cognition. In the case in question however, since the sense of the *deity* is recognisable only by the purpose served by it, —and the form of the deity cannot be ascertained through that purpose,—how could there be any recognition of common properties?"

Our answer is as follows:—We find particular forms of deities described in the Mantras and Arthavādas; and all these descriptions are interpreted as figurative. People who do not perceive any basis for such interpretation take the passages in their literal sense and regard Indra and the deities as actually possessing those forms ; and the similarity of such forms they actually perceive in the images ; and in this sense also it is only natural that the description should be regarded as figurative.

Some people have explained that the feeding of Brāhmaṇas at *Shrāddha* in honour of the Vishvēdēvas is what is described here as being 'in honour of the gods.' But such feeding, being part of what is done 'in honour of ancestors,' becomes included under the latter phrase, and the re-iteration of it would be entirely meaningless. Then again, since we have the generic term 'gods,' on what grounds could we restrict it to the *Vishvēdēvas* only? If such restriction be based upon the association of the term '*pitrya*' 'in honour of ancestors,'—then, since the acts thus spoken of would not be included in 'those done in honour of ancestors,'—the two words could be justified on the analogy of the expression '*go-balībarda*,' 'bovine bull,' which is used even when there is not much difference between what is denoted by the two terms.—(189)

VERSE CLXL

THIS DUTY HAS BEEN PRESCRIBED BY THE SAGES FOR THE BRĀHMAṆA ONLY ; THIS DUTY HAS NOT BEEN SO ORDAINED FOR THE KṢATTRIYA AND THE VAISHYA.—(190)

Bhāṣya.

The duty—that one should eat the food given by one person only under certain circumstances—that has just been prescribed, is meant for the Brāhmaṇa only ;—it has been so ordained '*by the sages*'—by the learned, after having learnt it from the Veda. They do not intend this to apply to the Kṣattriya and the Vaishya; which means that students belonging to these two castes should not eat any food except what they get as alms.

Objection.—"As a matter of fact, it is only the Brāhmaṇa that is entitled to eat at *Shrāddhas* ; as is clear from such declarations as—'Which *Brahmaṇas* are to be fed at *Shrāddhas*, and which to be avoided ?'—'To the most deserving *Brāhamaṇa* etc.' and so forth ; from which it is clear that the Brāhmaṇa alone is entitled to receive gifts. Further, what we have here is a counter-exception, not an original Injunction ; and all denials are dependent upon possibility [and in the present case there is, as just pointed out, no possibility of the feeding pertaining to any non-Brāhmaṇa]."

To the above we make the following reply :—It has been ordained that after the Brāhmaṇas have eaten, the remnant should be disposed of by being made over to 'relations' ; and in this there is no restriction as to caste ; the man thus would feed any one who may happen to be his 'relation' ; and in this the recipients are indicated, not by the caste-names 'Kṣattriya' etc., but simply by the general name 'relation.' It is in view of this possibility of non-Brāhmaṇas partaking of the food at *Shrāddhas* that we have the prohibition in the Text.—(190)

VERSE CLXLI

PROMPTED BY THE TEACHER, OR EVEN WHEN NOT PROMPTED, HE SHOULD PUT FORTH HIS EXERTION TO STUDY, AND ALSO TO DOING WHAT IS HELPFUL TO THE TEACHER.—(191)

Bhāṣya.

'*Prompted*'—ordered—'*by the teacher, he should put forth his exertion*'—make an effort—'*to study.*'

"It has been already laid down that 'one should read when wanted by the Teacher.' How then can there be any exertion put forth by one who is *not prompted* ?"

What is here said refers to the student who has learnt a part of the Veda, and is going to learn the remainder; for this latter the 'instruction of the teacher' is not necessary.

Similarly he should do, without being told to do so, such helpful acts for the teacher as fetching jars of water, massaging his body whenever he happens to be fatigued, and so forth.—(191)

VERSE CLXLII

HAVING UNDER CONTROL HIS BODY AND HIS SPEECH, AS ALSO HIS ORGANS OF SENSATION AND HIS MIND, HE SHOULD STAND WITH JOINED PALMS, LOOKING AT THE FACE OF HIS TEACHER.—(192)

Bhāṣya.

On coming from some other place, '*he should stand looking at the face of his Teacher*,'—he should not sit;—'*having under control, his body*';—*i.e.*, he should not do such acts as the throwing about of hands and feet, laughing and so forth; nor should he speak anything needlessly.

He should control his '*organs of sensation*,'—*i.e*, if he finds anything wonderful near the Teacher, he should not think of it again and again. He should control the Auditory and other organs also; the control of the visual organ is secured by looking at the Teacher's face.

He should control the mind also; *i.e.*, he should avoid the thought of difficulties pertaining to scriptural matters, or of the building of houses, granaries and the like.

The prohibition contained under 288 with regard to 'making an effort to control, etc.,'—is meant to prohibit attachment.

The meaning of all this is that when he is near his Teacher, he should not permit the slightest movement of his organs, even towards such things as are not prohibited.

'*With joined palms*'—*i.e.*, with the hands joined together in the shape of a pigeon, turned upwards.—(192)

VERSE CLXLIII

HE SHOULD ALWAYS HAVE HIS ARM RAISED, REMAIN WELL-BEHAVED, AND WELL-GUARDED; WHEN ADDRESSED WITH THE WORDS "BE SEATED," HE SHOULD SIT FACING HIS TEACHER.—(193)

Bhāṣya.

The arm should be raised, not only above the sacred thread, but also out of the upper garment.

The adverb '*always*' is meant to imply that the arm is to be raised not only while he is standing, nor only while he is reading, but on other occasions also.

'*Well-behaved*';—he should have his behaviour—speech and other acts—good, above reproach. The word '*always*' implies that even when not near the Teacher, he should not utter indecorous words, or do any such wrongful act.

'*Well-guarded*';—*i.e.*, fully self-controlled, regarding speech, mind and eyes,—he should avoid even the slightest defects. The man who follows the bent of his desires (and does not restrain them) is called among people 'unguarded'; and the opposite of this is '*well-guarded*.'

Others explain this to mean that 'near his Teacher one should keep his body covered, and he should not take off his upper garment.'

In the manner thus described, '*he should stand*' (as laid down in the preceding verse); but when the Teacher says to him '*be seated*'—either in so many words, or by the gesture of his brows, etc.; the function of the injunction being to convey the direction, and this conveying need not be done only by means of words,—'*he should sit*.'

'*Facing his Teacher*'—with his face towards the Teacher.—(193)

VERSE CLXLIV.

IN THE PRESENCE OF HIS TEACHER, HE SHOULD ALWAYS HAVE INFERIOR FOOD, DRESS AND APPAREL; HE SHOULD RISE BEFORE HIM, AND GO TO SLEEP LATER.—(194)

Bhāṣya.

'*In the presence of his Teacher*'—he should eat—'*inferior*'—*i.e.*, less—'*food.*' This 'inferiority' of the food may be sometimes in *quantity*, and sometimes in *quality*; that is to say, if he happen to obtain as alms such food as is richly cooked and mixed with butter, milk and vegetables, then he should not eat it,—if his Teacher has already eaten food of not the same quality, or when he is eating with his Teacher, or if equally rich food has not been prepared in the Teacher's house. If similar food has been got ready for the Teacher, then he should reduce the food he himself eats.

As regards dress, if the Teacher's happens to be woolen, the pupil should wear cotton.

'*Apparel*'—ornaments, toilette, etc. This also should be inferior.

'*Always*'—*i.e.*, even after the period of studentship. It is in view of this that 'apparel' has been added; for the Religious Student there could be no adornment, etc.

'*He should rise before him*'—*i.e.*, from the bed, at the end of night; or from the seat, after he has understood that it is time for the Teacher to rise; he should rise before his Teacher.

'*He should go to sleep*'—retire to bed, or take his seat—'*later*'—*i.e.*, after the Teacher has gone to sleep.—(194)

VERSE CLXLV

HE SHOULD NOT LISTEN TO AND CONVERSE WITH (HIS TEACHER), WHILE LYING DOWN; NOR WHILE SEATED, NOR WHILE EATING, NOR WHILE STANDING, NOR WITH HIS FACE TURNED AWAY.—(195)

Bhāṣya.

'*Listen to*'—*i.e.*, listening to the words of the Teacher, when the latter calls him and directs him to do some work.

'*Converse with*'—*i.e.*, holding conversation with the teacher.

'Listening' and 'conversing' form the copulative compound '*pratishravaṇasambhāṣē.*'

'*While lying down*';—*i.e.*, with his body reclining upon his own bed.

'*Na samācharēt*'—should not do.

'*Nor while seated*'—upon a seat.

'*Nor while eating, nor while standing,*'—*i.e.*, standing upright in one place, without moving.

'*Nor with face turned away*'—*i.e.*, with face averted from the direction in which the Teacher may be looking.—(195)

VERSE CLXLVI

HE SHOULD DO (THESE) STANDING, WHEN THE TEACHER IS SEATED; ADVANCING TOWARDS HIM, WHEN HE IS STANDING; GOING FORWARD TO HIM, WHEN HE ADVANCES; AND RUNNING AFTER HIM, WHEN HE RUNS;—(196)

Bhāṣya.

[The question arising]—"How then is he to listen to and converse with the Teacher?"—the Text answers:—When the Teacher gives his directions seated, then the pupil should rise from his seat, and do the 'listening and conversing' while standing.

'*Advancing towards him, when he is standing*';—when the Teacher gives his orders standing, the pupil should advance towards him a few steps.

'*Going forward to him, when he advances*';—*i.e.*, going up to the teacher. The prefix '*prati*' has the sense of being face to face.

'*When he runs*'—moves with force; he should run behind him.

VERSE CLXLVII

FACING HIM, WHEN THE TEACHER HAS HIS FACE AVERTED; GOING NEAR HIM, WHEN THE TEACHER IS AT A DISTANCE; BOWING LOW, WHEN THE TEACHER IS LYING DOWN, AS ALSO IF HE IS STANDING CLOSE BY.—(197)

Bhāṣya.

'*When the teacher has his face averted,*'—the pupil should sit facing him; that is, if the Teacher happen to have his face turned the other way when he gives his directions, the pupil should go over to the side facing the teacher and then do the aforesaid (listening and conversing).

'*When the teacher is at a distance,*'—the pupil should go near him, approach him.

When the teacher is seated, as also when he is lying down, the pupil should *bow down*—humbly bend his body low.

'*Nidēshē*' means 'close by'; when he is sitting close by, then the aforesaid acts should be done after bowing low.—(197)

VERSE CLXLVIII

WHEN NEAR HIS TEACHER, HIS BED OR SEAT SHOULD ALWAYS BE LOW; AND WITHIN SIGHT OF HIS TEACHER, HE SHOULD NOT SIT AT EASE.—(198)

Bhāṣya.

'*Low*'—not high; *i.e.*, low in comparison with the Teacher's.

'*Always*'—*i.e.*, also after the period of studentship.

'*Within sight of his Teacher*'—*i.e.*, where the Teacher sees—'*he should not sit at ease*'; *i.e.*, he should not spread his legs or throw about his limbs, and so forth. '*Sit*' stands for action in general; the sense being that he should not do whatever he likes.—(198)

VERSE CLXLIX

EVEN BEHIND THE TEACHER'S BACK, HE SHOULD NOT PRONOUNCE HIS MERE NAME; NOR SHOULD HE MIMIC HIS GAIT, SPEECH OR DEPORTMENT.—(199)

Bhāṣya.

'*He should not pronounce*'—should not utter—'*the teacher's name.*'

'*Mere*'—*i.e.*, bereft of such honorific titles as '*Upādhyāya*,' '*Āchārya*,' '*Bhaṭṭa*' and the like;—'*even behind his back.*'

'*Nor should he mimic*'—should not imitate him, like an actor;—'*gait*'—(saying) 'thus does my teacher walk';—'*speech*'—*i.e.*, swiftly, slowly, at a medium pace and so forth;—'*deportment*'—'thus he eats,' 'thus he binds his turban,' 'thus he roams about,' and so forth.

What is prohibited here is imitating the teacher in a joking spirit.—(199)

VERSE CC

WHERE THE CENSURING OR DEFAMING OF HIS TEACHER IS GOING ON, THERE HE SHOULD EITHER CLOSE HIS EARS, OR GO AWAY THENCE TO ANOTHER PLACE.—(200)

Bhāṣya.

'*Where*'—in whatever place, in the assembly of wicked people,—his teacher's *censuring*—setting forth of wrongs really committed by him,—or *defaming*—attributing to him of evils not present in him—'*is going on,*'—'*there*' '*he should close his ears*'—cover them up with his finger, etc.

'*Thence*'—from that place,—'*he should go away to another place.*'—(200)

VERSE CCI

THROUGH CENSURE ONE BECOMES AN ASS, AND THE DEFAMER BECOMES A DOG ; HE WHO LIVES ON HIM BECOMES A WORM, AND HE WHO IS JEALOUS BECOMES AN INSECT.—(201)

Bhāsya.

This is a statement commendatory of what has been enjoined in the foregoing verses. Hence it has to be explained as follows :—

'*Through censure*';—*i.e.*, by listening to the censuring of his Teacher—'*one becomes an ass*'; the ablative being taken either as denoting *cause*, or as having the force of the participle; *parīvādāt* being construed as '*parīvādam shrutvā*,' 'having listened to censuring.'

'*Defamer*,'—the person listening to defamation is figuratively called 'defamer'; just as one preparing meat has been called the 'Killer' of the animal. As for the act of defaming itself, the prohibition of this becomes naturally implied by the prohibition of hearing it.

'*One who lives upon*';—he who supports himself on what he receives from his Teacher ; or one who behaves ill-mannerly towards him.

'*One who is jealous*';—who does not brook the rise and advancement of his Teacher and burns within (at its sight).

The two latter have not been spoken of before this ; hence what is said in regard to these is to be regarded as direct injunction.

'*Parīvāda*' and '*parivāda*,' both forms—with long as well as with the short *ī*—are correct, according to Pāṇini, 6. 3. 122.—(201)

VERSE CCII

HE SHOULD NOT OFFER HIS WORSHIP TO THE TEACHER WHILE AT A DISTANCE FROM HIM ; NOR WHEN ANGRY, NOR NEAR A WOMAN. IF SEATED UPON A CONVEYANCE OR A SEAT, HE SHOULD COME DOWN AND THEN SALUTE HIM.—(202)

Bhāṣya.

What is prohibited here is the act of sending sandal-paint, garlands and other articles of worship through a messenger. It being found possible that one might be prompted to offer such worship by the consideration that 'whether one does an act himself or gets it done by another, he is equally the *doer* in both cases, since the prompter also has been regarded as the agent,'—the present verse prohibits such offering of worship through other persons. There is no harm in doing this, either when one is himself incapacitated, or when he happens to be in a different village; for we find people adopting such usage as—when the Teacher has gone to another village, the pupil tells some one who happens to be going to the same village 'please offer my salutations to my Teacher,' and this other person goes and salutes him.

'*Nor when angry*';—it being impossible for any one to be angry with his Teacher, the meaning is that if one happens to be angry with some one, he should, at the time of offering his obeisance, give up the anger and keep his mind calm. Some people read '*kruddham*,' (making 'angry' qualify the Teacher).

'*Nor near*'—in proximity to—'*a woman*'—his loving wife; *i.e.*, not while the Teacher is seated near her. The entire process of service of the Teacher being meant for winning his favour, anything likely to displease him has been prohibited. It is in view of this that the term 'woman' has been explained as above.

'*Conveyance*'—such as the cart and the rest.

'*Seat*'—small or large wooden platforms.

From these one should come down and then salute the Teacher.

Under verse 119 what was laid down was simply *rising* from the seat; while here it is *coming down* from it that is enjoined. When one is seated upon a wooden platform, it is possible for him to *rise* without *coming down* from it.

"But *coming down* from the seat is not possible without *rising*; so that the *rising* being already implied in the present injunction, what is laid down in 119 becomes superfluous."

It is not superfluous; what is meant by it is that when it so happens that the pupil is seated with his face towards one side, and the Teacher approaches from behind him,—as soon as the pupil becomes cognisant of his approach, he should turn his face towards the Teacher and then rise; and he should not rise and then turn round; as in so doing the act of *turning towards* the Teacher becomes intervened by that of *rising*; and this might displease the Teacher, who would think that 'he was rising for some other reason, not for honouring me.'

Thus the mention of the 'seat' has its use in both places (here and in 119).—(202)

VERSE CCIII

WHEN SITTING IN THE COMPANY OF HIS TEACHER, HE SHOULD NOT SIT EITHER TO THE LEE-WARD OR TO THE WIND-WARD OF HIM; NOR SHOULD HE SAY ANYTHING BEYOND THE HEARING OF HIS TEACHER.—(203)

Bhāṣya.

When the wind comes from the side on which the Teacher is sitting to where the pupil sits,—and when it comes from where the pupil sits to when the Teacher is,—these are called '*lee-ward*' and '*wind-ward*'; one being 'lee-ward' and the other 'wind-ward.' In either of these fashions one should not sit in the Teacher's company; he should sit in such a fashion that he gets the wind sideways.

'*Beyond his hearing*';—*i.e.*, what he cannot hear.

'*Nothing*,'—with reference either to the Teacher or to other persons.

'*He should say*'—nothing, what the Teacher cannot hear, but can see from the moving of the lips that the pupil is saying something.—(203)

VERSE CCIV

HE MAY SIT WITH THE TEACHER ON CARTS DRAWN BY OXEN, HORSES AND CAMELS, ON TERRACES AND ON GRASS-MATS; AS ALSO ON REEDMATS, ROCKS, BENCHES AND BOATS.—(204)

Bhāṣya.

The term 'cart' is connected with each of the foregoing terms; and the cart yoked with, drawn by, oxen (*go*), 'horses' ('*ashva* ') and 'camels' (*uṣṭra*) is called '*goshvoṣṭrayānam*'; the term '*yukta*' ('yoked,' 'drawn by') being dropped, as in the word '*dadhighaṭa*' ('curd-jar'). That this is so is clear from the fact that it is not possible for two men to ride together on the bare back of the ox, etc. If we had the word '*yāna*' standing by itself, then we might have taken the verse itself as permitting the riding along with the teacher on the bare back of the ox, etc. In some places we do find this to be permitted by usage.

'*Terrace*,'—the surface on the top of houses; and in such places sitting with the Teacher is as possible as on the floor of houses.

'*Grass-mats*'—beds made of grass and leaves, etc.

'*Reed-mats*'—beds made of reeds and sticks.

'*Rocks*'—stone-slabs either on the top of hills or elsewhere.

'*Benches*'—seats made of wood, called '*pota*,' '*varta*,' etc.

'*Boats*';—*i.e.*, contrivances for floating on water, which would include rafts and other similar things.—(204)

VERSE CCV

WHEN THE TEACHER'S TEACHER HAPPENS TO BE CLOSE BY, HE SHOULD ADOPT TOWARDS HIM THE SAME BEHAVIOUR AS TOWARDS HIS OWN TEACHER; BUT UNTIL PERMITTED BY HIS TEACHER, HE SHOULD NOT PAY RESPECTS TO HIS OWN ELDERS.—(205)

Bhāṣya.

The present verse permits the afore-mentioned behaviour towards one's Teacher to be adopted in certain other cases.

Since the whole of the present deals with study, the term '*guru*' should throughout be taken in the sense of 'teacher.' If the teacher of one's Teacher happens to be near, he should behave towards him as towards his own teacher.

'*When he happens to be close by.*'—This implies that it is not incumbent upon the pupil to go over to the house of his teacher's teacher for the purpose of paying respects to him.

While living in the Teacher's house,—'*until he is permitted by his Teacher*'—allowed by him to do so,—he should not go to pay respects to his own 'elders';—to his father, mother, etc. This does not mean that when these elders come to his Teacher's house, he shall wait for the Teacher's permission before he offers obeisance to them.

"Whence do you get this meaning?"

It follows from the fact that one's parents are the highest objects of veneration; and as regards the paternal uncle, maternal uncle and other relations, if one salutes them, this does not stand in the way of his proper behaviour towards the Teacher. For after all, all his efforts are meant to win the Teacher's favour.

As regards the order to be observed in saluting the mother, the father and the Teacher, when all these happen to be together,—it has already been declared that the Mother is superior to all; and as between the Father and the Teacher, there is option: In as much as the respect due to the Teacher is by reason of the position of the 'Father' having been imposed upon him, the Father should be regarded as superior; but since it has been declared (in 146) that 'the father imparting the Veda is superior,' it would follow that the Teacher is superior. It is for this reason that there is option.—(205)

VERSE CCVI

THIS SAME SHALL BE HIS CONSTANT BEHAVIOUR TOWARDS HIS INTELLECTUAL TEACHERS, TOWARDS HIS BLOOD-RELATIONS, TOWARDS PERSONS RESTRAINING HIM FROM SIN AND TOWARDS THOSE WHO GIVE HIM SALUTARY ADVICE.—(206)

Bhāṣya.

This also is an instance of 'Transference.'

Teachers other than the Preceptor are called here 'intellectual teacher'—such as the Sub-Teacher and the rest. One should behave towards these just as it has been detailed above (under 192 *et seq.*).

'*Towards blood-relations*'—*i.e.*, towards the elder brother, the paternal uncle, etc

'*Constant behaviour*'—*i.e.*, behaviour as towards the Preceptor.

As distinguished from the 'Preceptor,' the other 'Intellectual Teachers' are to be so honoured only during the period of one's learning under them.

'*Towards persons*'—friends and others—'*restraining him from sin*'—*i.e.*, from evils, such as connection with other women and so forth. It has been said that when one is found to be thinking within himself of doing some evil deed, then his friends and others 'should restrain him from sin, even to the extent of dragging him by his hairs'; and towards one who restrains him in this way, he should behave as towards his Teacher,—even if he happens to be of equal or inferior age.

Also towards those who give salutary advice, independently of books. Or, 'giver of salutary advice' may be taken as standing for noble-minded persons in general.—(206)

VERSE CCVII

TOWARDS SUPERIORS HE SHOULD ALWAYS BEHAVE AS TOWARDS THE TEACHER, AS ALSO TOWARDS THE TEACHER'S SON WHO HAS ACQUIRED THE POSITION OF THE TEACHER, AND TOWARDS THE TEACHER'S OWN BLOOD-RELATIONS.—(207)

Bhāṣya.

'*Superiors*';—those possessed of greater amount of wealth and learning. Towards these '*he should behave always as towards the Teacher*';—*i.e.*, he should offer him obeisance, welcome and so forth.

In this verse many such words have been used as are superfluous; but in as much as this is a metrical work, such usage is not objectionable. 'Towards superiors' was all that should have been said here; 'as towards the Teacher' would be already implied; '*behaviour*' has already been mentioned in the preceding verse. Many such instances can be found in this work.

'*Towards the Teacher's son who has acquired the position of the Teacher*';—the addition of the word '*āchārya*' is meant to show that the son should have obtained the position of the Teacher. The sense is that, if during the Teacher's absence, his son teaches his pupils for a few days, he should be treated as a Teacher

Another reading is '*guruputrēsvathāryēṣu.*' The term '*ārya*' in this case would mean 'one belonging to the highly qualified Brāhmaṇa-caste,' as we find in such instances as—'shūdrāchchāryo jyāyān.'

This verse does not enjoin that such treatment should be accorded to all the sons of the Teacher.

'*Towards the Teacher's own blood-relations.*'—The epithet 'own' has been added for the purpose of restricting the statement to members of the Teacher's family; the mere fact of being a member of the Teacher's family is the sole ground for the treatment being accorded to him,—irrespectively of age, learning, etc.—(207)

VERSE CCVIII

WHETHER HE BE YOUNGER, OR OF EQUAL AGE, OR A STUDENT OF SACRIFICIAL RITUAL,—THE TEACHER'S SON, IMPARTING INSTRUCTION, DESERVES THE SAME HONOUR AS THE TEACHER.—(208)

Bhāṣya.

For those persons who do not adopt the reading whereby the term '*āchārya*' (teacher) is made the qualification of the 'Teacher's son' in the preceding verse,—it would follow that the entire treatment of the Teacher is to be accorded to the Teacher's son who is qualified and belongs to the same caste, even though he may not have done any teaching. And it is this wide rule that is restricted by the present verse.—It is only the Teacher's son imparting instruction that deserves the same honour as the Teacher,—and not he who does not impart instruction.

"That the Teacher's son who imparts instruction should be honoured like the teacher follows from the mere fact of instruction having been received from him; and from what we read in connection with the story relating to the infant (*vide* 151 above) the propriety of similar treatment of the junior is already known; so that even for the mention of the 'younger or of equal age' the present verse would not be required."

True; what has been said before is the treatment to be accorded to one who teaches the Veda, or even a portion of the Veda,—even though he be not the regular preceptor; while the person referred to here is not one who has made one get up the Veda; it is only one who teaches for a few days or even for a part of the day. And since such a person would not be either a 'Preceptor' or a 'sub-teacher,' his honouring would not be included under what has gone before; so it becomes necessary to enjoin it in the present connection.

It is from this verse that we understand that the entire treatment of the Teacher is not to be accorded to one who teaches only broken parts of a *mantra*.

For those however who read '*āchārya*,' 'who does the work of teaching' in the preceding verse,—the present verse would be a mere reference to what has been enjoined before, for the purpose of adding the injunction occurring in the next verse.

'*Or a student of sacrificial ritual*';—the mention of 'sacrificial ritual' is only by way of illustration; the meaning is that even though he be a mere student of a subsidiary science, or of a portion of the Veda—*Mantra* portion or the Brāhamaṇa portion,—yet he deserves to be honoured like the teacher; only if he happens to be the teacher's son and imparts instruction in some science, he should be honoured like the teacher. Though this has been already said (in the preceding verse) yet that does not matter, as the present verse is meant to be merely re-iterative.

Some people offer the following explanation :—"The phrase '*imparting instruction*' stands for the *capacity of teaching*; the sense being that if the teacher's son has learnt the Vedas and is capable of teaching it, he should be honoured like the teacher;—whether he actually does the work of teaching or not."

This explanation is verbally quite correct. The Present Participal affix (in '*adhyāpayan*,' 'imparting instruction') has the sense of *characterisation*; and this characterisation is that of an act; so that the use is in accordance with Pāṇini 3.2.126; and the *act* is directly mentioned as that '*deserving the same honour as the teacher*.'—(208)

VERSE CCIX

HE SHALL NOT SHAMPOO THE LIMBS OF HIS TEACHER'S SON, NOR ASSIST HIM IN BATHING, NOR EAT OF THE FOOD LEFT BY HIM; NOR SHOULD HE WASH HIS FEET.—(209)

Bhāṣya.

'*Shampooing*'—rubbing after oiling—he shall not do.

'*Washing of his feet*' also he shall not do;—for the teacher's son.

It is from this prohibition that it follows that, even though not directly enjoined, these acts should be done for the teacher. When however the teacher's son himself becomes the teacher, by becoming fully equipped to teach the entire Veda,—then the eating of the food left by him, etc., come to be done for his own sake; and the present prohibition does not apply to the acts under such circumstances. For their prohibition refers to what is due to the son, through the injunction transferring to him the treatment accorded to the teacher,—and not to what would be due to him by direct injunction.—(209)

VERSE CCX

THE TEACHER'S LADIES BELONGING TO THE SAME CASTE SHOULD BE HONOURED LIKE THE TEACHER HIMSELF; THOSE NOT BELONGING TO THE SAME CASTE SHOULD BE HONOURED WITH RISING AND SALUTATIONS.—(210)

Bhāṣya.

'*The teacher's ladies*'—wives—'*belonging to the same caste*'—of the same caste as the teacher,—'*should be honoured like the teacher*'—by carrying out their orders and so forth.

'*Those not belonging to the same caste*' are to be honoured only '*with rising and salutations.*' The plural number in 'salutations' has the sense of '*et cetera*': hence the doing of what is agreeable and beneficial, the non-mimicking of gait, etc., also become included.—(210)

VERSE CCXI

ANNOINTING, ASSISTING AT BATH, SHAMPOOING OF LIMBS AND DRESSING OF THE HAIR SHOULD NOT BE DONE FOR THE TEACHER'S WIFE.—(211)

Bhāṣya.

'*Annointing*'—rubbing of the head and body with oil, butter, and such things.

'*Shampooing*'—rubbing—'*of limbs*'; this includes the washing of feet also.

What is prohibited here is every service that involves the touching of the body; and the reason for this the author is going to explain below (in 213).

'*Dressing of the hair*';—arranging the hair into various shapes, and adorning the frontal hair with *Kuṅkuma*, *Sindūra* and other things. This has been mentioned only by way of illustration; hence the adorning of the body also with sandal-paint, etc., becomes interdicted.—(211)

VERSE CCXII

THE TEACHER'S WIFE, WHEN YOUNG, SHALL NOT BE SALUTED AT HER FEET BY A PUPIL WHO IS FULL TWENTY YEARS OLD, AND WHO IS CONSCIOUS OF WHAT IS GOOD AND WHAT IS BAD.—(212)

Bhāṣya.

'*One who is full twenty years old*';—*i.e.*, fully grown up. There is no harm in the case of the pupil who is still a 'child,' not having passed his sixteenth year. What is meant is one who has completed his twenty years. To the same effect we have the next qualification—'*who is conscious of what is good and what is bad*.' The 'good' and 'bad' meant here are the pleasures and pains arising from sexual love, also the beauty and ugliness of women, as also their fidelity and infidelity.

In any case stress is not meant to be laid upon the number '*twenty*.'—(212)

VERSE CCXIII

IT IS THE VERY NATURE OF WOMEN TO CORRUPT MEN. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE WISE ARE NEVER UNGUARDED REGARDING WOMEN.—(213)

Bhaṣya.

It is the nature of women that they make men fall off from their fidelity: by associating with men, women would make them deviate from their vow.

For this reason the wise are never '*unguarded*'; *i.e.*, they shun women from a distance;—'unguardedness' would consist in touching her and so forth.

It is in the very nature of things that a young woman, when touched, produces a disturbance in the mind; and this mental disturbance itself has been interdicted, to say nothing of other vulgarities.

'*Pramadā*' means *woman*.—(213)

VERSE CCXIV

IN THIS WORLD WOMEN ARE CAPABLE OF LEADING ASTRAY THE IGNORANT, AS WELL AS THE LEARNED, WHO BECOMES A SERVILE FOLLOWER OF DESIRE AND PASSION.—(214)

Bhāṣya.

It should not be thought that the person who has full control over his organs and who is fully aware that even looking at the Teacher's wife with impure motives is a heinous offence, incurs no danger by touching her feet. Because so far as women are concerned, the person cognisant of the grievousness of the sin, as well as the person not so cognisant, both are equal; for no amount of learning is any use in this matter; women are capable of leading astray—on the wrong path, contrary to usage and scriptures—all men.

'*Who becomes a servile follower of desire and passion*,'—who becomes contaminated with desire and passion. This epithet only serves to indicate a particular condition of man. Barring the too young and too old, and one who has reached the highest stage of Yoga, there is no one, with the exception of one who has entirely destroyed his human susceptibilities, who is not attracted by women, just as iron is attracted by the magnet. This is not due to any powerful influence intentionally exercised; it is in the very nature of things that at the sight of a young woman, the mind of man becomes upset, specially that of young students.—(214)

VERSE CCXV

ONE SHOULD NOT SIT ALONE WITH HIS MOTHER, SISTER OR DAUGHTER. THE POWERFUL HOST OF SENSE-ORGANS OVERPOWERS EVEN THE LEARNED.—(215)

Bhāṣya.

For reasons above described '*one should not sit alone*'—in a solitary room, etc., one should not sit; nor should he touch the body, etc. Because the host of sense-organs is extremely fickle; and it '*overpowers*'—draws, makes helpless—'*even the learned*'— *i.e.*, the person who has his mind fully controlled by wisdom acquired from the scriptures.—(215)

VERSE CCXVI

THE YOUNG MAN MAY PERFORM THE PROPER SALUTATION ON THE GROUND TO THE YOUNG WIVES OF HIS TEACHER,—SAYING "HERE I AM."—(216)

Bhāṣya.

'*May*' signifies dis-satisfaction on the part of the author; or, it may be construed with the next verse.

'*On the ground*'—the clasping of the feet is not necessarily meant to be done.

'*The young man .....to the young wives*' ;—*i.e.*, what is here laid down pertains to cases where both parties are young. If the student is a child, or the Teacher's wife is old, then the clasping of the feet is unobjectionable.

'*Here I am*' ;—this refers to the rule prescribed before (in 123).

'*Proper*'—*i.e.*, with upturned hands, etc. (see 72).—(216)

VERSE CCXVII

HAVING RETURNED FROM A JOURNEY, HE SHOULD CLASP THE FEET OF HIS TEACHER'S WIFE, AND DAILY HE SHOULD SALUTE HER, BEARING IN MIND THE DUTY OF THE RIGHTEOUS.—(217)

Bhāṣya.

Having returned from a journey, he should clasp her feet—'the left foot by the left hand, etc.' (Verse 72).

'*Daily*'—every day.

'*Salute her*'—on the ground.

'*Righteous*'—Cultured. Bearing in mind that such is this duty of cultured men.—(217)

VERSE CCXVIII

JUST AS A MAN DIGGING WITH THE SPADE OBTAINS WATER,—EVEN SO ONE WHO IS EAGER TO SERVE ACQUIRES THE LEARNING THAT IS IN THE TEACHER.—(218)

Bhāṣya.

This describes the reward in connection with the entire body of injunctions bearing upon service; and it is commendatory of learning the Veda by means of serving the Teacher.

Just as a certain man digging the earth by a spade, or some such implement, obtains water,—and he does not obtain it without trouble; similarly the pupil who is eager to serve—and attends upon him—acquires the learning that is in the Teacher.—(218)

VERSE CCXIX

HE MAY HAVE HIS HEAD SHAVED, OR WEAR HIS HAIR IN BRAIDS, OR HAVE ONLY THE TOP-HAIR BRAIDED. THE SUN SHOULD NEVER SET, NOR SHOULD IT RISE, WHILE HE IS STILL IN THE VILLAGE.—(219)

Bhāṣya.

'*Muṇḍaḥ*'—means that he should shave the whole of his head.

'*Jaṭilaḥ*'—one who has hairs *braided, i.e.*, inextricably sticking to one another.

Or one whose '*shikhā*,' 'top-hair,' only is braided; and the rest of the head is shaven.

And he should so behave himself that the sun does not set while he is still in the village; '*village*' here includes the *town* also. The meaning is that at the time of sun-set he should betake himself to the forest. Similarly the sun should not rise while he is in the village; that is, for the Religious Student, sun-rise also should take place while he is in the forest.

'*Enam*'—refers to the Religious Student.

Others have explained this to mean that 'the Sun should not set while he is still addicted to the vulgar acts of sleeping and the like.' To this same effect we have the term 'sleeping' in the next verse. Under this explanation what the verse prohibits is sleeping during the two twilights; and it does not mean that he should be actually in the forest at those times; for the Student would be still too young and would be frightened (by being in the forest at twilight). In fact Gautama (9.10) has declared that the twilights should be spent outside the village after the '*Godāna*' ceremony; and this ceremony is laid down as to be performed in the sixteenth year; and arrived at that age, the student can, if he reaches the forest, offer his twilight prayers there.—(219)

VERSE CCXX

IF THE SUN SHOULD RISE OR SET WHILE HE IS STILL SLEEPING, EITHER INTENTIONALLY OR UNINTENTIONALLY, HE SHOULD FAST DURING THE DAY, RECITING (THE SĀVITRĪ).—(220)

Bhāṣya.

In connection with what has gone before one should perform the following expiatory rite.

If while the student is still sleeping, the sun should rise and thereby make him incur sin.—'*Abhi*' is a preposition according to Pāṇini's Sūtra '*abhirabhāgē*'; and hence we have the accusative ending in '*shayanam*.'—The meaning is that if while the student is sleeping, the sun should rise, then *he should fast during the day.*

Some people offer the following explanation:—"If the offence is committed in the morning, the reciting and fasting are to be done during the day, food being taken at night; while if the offence is committed in the evening, the reciting and fasting are to be done during the night, food being taken next morning. So that the term 'day' is purely illustrative." And in support of their view they quote the words of Gautama (23.21)—'He should go without food during the day, and if the sun sets before him he should fast during the night, reciting the *Sāvitrī*.'

This however is not right. In both cases the expiatory rite should be performed during the day; specially as there is no authority for regarding the term 'day' of the text as illustrative; as the term 'day' does not have its denotation dependent upon that of the term 'night'; it is entirely independent. Hence the right meaning appears to be that there should be option; that is, if the person is one who will not fall ill by keeping up the whole night, he might do it during the night; while others would do it during the day.

That the '*reciting*' is of the *Sāvitrī*, we gather from the words of Gautama (quoted above).

"How can Gautama be quoted as authority on this point?"

As a matter of fact, the verb '*should recite*' is incomplete, since it is not mentioned what is to be recited. And when there is such incompleteness, it is only right that the missing detail should be filled in from other scriptural sources.

But what the term '*day*' mentions is the *time*; and this does not stand in need of any other time, so that there is no need for calling in the help of Gautama.

Or, the right explanation may be that, since the present verse prescribes the expiatory rite to be performed on the omission of the twilight prayers, the reciting of the *Sāvitrī* comes in naturally; it has been declared above (2.83) that 'there is nothing higher than the *Sāvitrī*.'

'*Intentionally*;'—*i.e.*, who knowingly sleeps in the evening.

'*Unintentionally*;'—when he has been sleeping for a long time and fails to perceive the advent of evening; this is what is meant by 'absence of intention.' The sense of all this is as follows:—When the omission is intentional and due to carelessness, it is necessary to perform the expiatory rite here prescribed; he who omits the prayers at sun-set and sun-rise, for him the expiatory rite has been prescribed as 'fasting,' which has to be done at the neglect of all compulsory duties.

Or, he who intentionally transgresses the scriptural ordinance, this also is 'ignorance' on his part.—(220)

VERSE CCXXI

IF DURING ONE'S SLEEP THE SUN HAS SET, AND IF DURING ONE'S SLEEP THE SUN HAS RISEN,—IF HE DOES NOT PERFORM THE EXPIATORY RITE, HE BECOMES TAINTED BY GRIEVOUS SIN.—(221)

Bhāṣya.

This is a commendatory statement pertaining to the aforesaid injunction of the expiatory rite.

He who becomes tainted by the setting of the sun,— similarly who becomes tainted by the rising of the sun;—and he does not perform the expiatory rite prescribed above,—then he becomes tainted by '*grievous*'—not minor—'*sin*.' 'Sin' is the name of that unseen force which leads one to suffer pain in the form of living in hell and so forth.—(221)

VERSE CCXXII

HAVING SIPPED WATER, WITH CALM AND COLLECTED MIND, HE SHALL DAILY ATTEND UPON THE TWO TWILIGHTS, IN A CLEAN PLACE, RECITING THE MANTRAS TO BE RECITED, ACCORDING TO RULE.—(222)

Bhāṣya.

In as much as there is great sin accruing from sleeping at sun-set and sun-rise,—therefore '*having sipped water*'—'*with mind calm*'—intent upon the purpose—'*and collected*'—having set aside all distractions;—'*in a clean place, reciting the mantras to be recited,*'—*i. e.*, the *Praṇava*, the *Vyāhṛtis* and the *Sāvitrī*;—'*one should attend upon the two twilights.*' The two twilights are the objects to be attended upon; and 'attendance' in this case can only be in the form of a particular disposition of the mind.

Or, the construction may be—'*During the two twilights he shall attend upon*—the Sun.' Since the mantra (Sāvitrī) is one sacred to the Sun, it is the Sun that should be the object of attendance; *i. e.*, having given up all distraction, he should fix his mind upon the Sun.

The rest of the verse is a descriptive commendation of the foregoing injunction; the *attending* alone being the object of the injunction.

Others explain that the verse is meant to be the injunction of the '*clean place.*'

But in this case there would be a needless repetition. In connection with all acts it has been laid down that 'it should be done by one who is clean'; and if one were to sit in an unclean place, how could he be regarded as 'clean'?—(222)

VERSE CCXXIII

IF EITHER A WOMAN, OR A JUNIOR PERSON, DO SOMETHING GOOD, HE SHOULD FAITHFULLY PERFORM ALL THAT; AS ALSO THAT IN WHICH HIS MIND FINDS SATISFACTION.—(223)

Bhāṣya.

'*If either a woman,*'—*i.e.*, the teacher's wife,—'*or a junior person*'—a younger boy,—having learnt from the teacher—'*do something good,*'—*i.e.*, perform acts conducive to the triad beginning with '*dharma*' [*i. e.*, acts conducive to religious merit, worldly prosperity and pleasure]—'*all that one should perform.*' It is possible that by reason of their association with the teacher they may have obtained the requisite knowledge.

Or '*junior person*' may stand for the Shūdra employed in the Teacher's service; and if he should offer such advice as—'the two excretory organs are to be washed in this manner,—wash your hands thoroughly, you have forgotten the right order of applying mud and water;—when giving him water I have often seen your Teacher washing his posterior parts in this way that he cleans it first with mud, then with water,'—*i.e.*, if being fully cognisant of the right usage he should offer such advice;—similarly if the Teacher's wife should teach him the right way to sip water; '*all that he should perform faithfully*'—with full faith; and he should not disregard the advice as coming from a *Shūdra* or a woman.

'*Do.*'—What is meant, is practice following the precept. It is going to be declared later on that 'one should derive knowledge of his duty and cleanliness from all sources.'

It is quite possible that the Teacher himself might have told his wife to help the boy, who is like a son to him, to sip water in the right manner; or he might tell (the servant)—'you should give him mud and water for cleaning his excretory organs';—and under all these circumstances, the pupil should follow the advice as to the using of the mud and the pouring of water.

Or, the meaning may be that, in the matter of the purity of metal, stone, and water, etc., he should accept as authoritative the method adopted in the Teacher's house by his wife and servants. In this way the present verse would be laying down the extent to which the usage of women and Shūdras should be relied upon.

"In this way then, the practice of all persons ignorant of the Veda becomes authoritative; and this is not right; because as a matter of fact, not even the slightest practice of persons ignorant of the Veda should be authoritative. The very root (of the authority of practices) consists of connection with persons learned in the Veda. If this root in the shape of connection with persons learned in the Veda, is present, then that would supply the requisite authority ; where would be the use of mentioning the *woman* ? Specially as in matters like this, no authority can be intended, to rest in the practices of women and *Shūdras.* If such had been the intention of the Author, he would have said this under the section dealing with the 'sources of knowledge of Dharma.' "

From all this it is clear that the truth of the matter is that the present verse is meant to introduce the explanation of what is 'good' (coming in the next verse).

Or, it may be regarded as re-iterating the trustworthiness of the words of the Teacher; the sense being—'Even when the woman or the *Shūdra* state the words of the Teacher, it is right to act up to them,—what to say of what is told directly by the Teacher himself !'

'*As also that in which his mind finds satisfaction.*'—The purport of this has been explained under the term 'Self-satisfaction' (2.6).

In every way it is clear that there is not much useful purpose served by this verse.—(223)

VERSE CCXXIV

SPIRITUAL MERIT AND WEALTH ARE CALLED "GOOD"; OR PLEASURE AND WEALTH ; OR SPIRITUAL MERIT ALONE, OR WEALTH ALONE IS "GOOD"; BUT THE TRUTH IS THAT IT IS THE AGGREGATE OF THE THREE.—(224)

Bhāṣya.

In a friendly spirit, the Author now proceeds to explain what it is that is praiseworthy, which, when carried into practice, does no harm either visible or invisible, and which is called 'good' in ordinary parlance.

What is stated here is not founded on the Veda, nor is it an explanation of the denotation of words, as we have had before in the case of such words as 'preception' and the rest. The fact of the matter is that when a man acts he seeks to obtain something 'good'; and the Author is going to explain that such and such a thing is the 'good' for the sake of which man acts.

On this point he puts forward the different opinions that have been held.

(1) Some people have held that *spiritual merit and wealth are "good."* 'Spiritual merit' consists in the due observance of the Injunctions and Interdictions contained in the scriptures. 'Wealth' consists in cattle, lands, gold and so forth. These alone constitute "good"; since man's happiness depends upon them.

(2) Another opinion is that '*pleasure and wealth*' constitute the "good." Pleasure is the one thing desired by men; hence pleasure is the "good"; and wealth also, since it is conducive to pleasure. The *Chārvākas* (Atheists) have declared that "Pleasure is the one end of man, and wealth is the means to it, as also is 'Spiritual Merit,' if there is such a thing."

(3) [The third opinion is that] Spiritual Merit is the highest 'good' of all,—all this being based upon that. To this end it has been declared that 'from Spiritual Merit proceed Wealth and Pleasure.'

(4) That Wealth is the sole 'good' is held by tradesmen and professionals.

(5) The real truth is that it consists in '*the aggregate of the three*.' Hence it follows that one should attend to Wealth and Pleasure also, but only such as are compatible with Spiritual Merit, and not such as are contrary to it. So says Gautama (9.46)—'One should, as far as lies in his power, make his mornings, middays and evenings fruitful with Spiritual Merit, Wealth and Pleasure.'

'*Aggregate of three*';—*i.e.*, a group consisting of three factors. That is, the name 'good' is applied by convention to the three taken together.—(224)

VERSE CCXXV

THE PRECEPTOR, THE FATHER, THE MOTHER AND THE ELDER BROTHER SHOULD NOT BE TREATED WITH DISRESPECT, ESPECIALLY BY A BRĀHMAṆA,—EVEN THOUGH HE BE DISTRESSED—(225)

Bhāṣya.

In fact no one should be treated with disrespect; specially these. That is to say, the disrespect of these entails a heavier expiation.

'*Distressed*'—injured by them.

'Treating with disrespect' consists in disregard; the omitting of honour due; as also insulting, which is called 'want of respect.'

The term '*Brāhmaṇa*' has been added only for filling up the metre.—(225)

VERSE CCXXVI

THE PRECEPTOR IS THE EMBODIMENT OF BRAHMAN; THE FATHER IS THE EMBODIMENT OF PRAJĀPATI; THE MOTHER IS THE EMBODIMENT OF THE EARTH, AND ONE'S OWN BROTHER IS THE EMBODIMENT OF THE SELF.—(226)

Bhāṣya.

This verse is commendatory of what has gone above.

That supreme Brahmaṇ which is described in the Vedantic Upaniṣads—of that the Preceptor is the '*embodiment*';—*i.e.*, he is as it were the very image of Brahman. '*The father is the embodiment of Prajāpati*'—*i.e.*, Hiraṇyagarbhạ. The mother is the same as this earth,—both being equally capable of bearing burdens. '*One's own*'—*i.e.*, uterine—'*brother is the embodiment of the self*'—the conscious entity within the body.

All the gods here named are possessed of majestic greatness, and destroy one, if they are treated with disrespect, while if propitiated, they endow one with all desirable things; and similar to these are the preceptor and the rest; who thus become eulogised by this verse.—(226)

VERSE CCXXVII

THE TROUBLE THAT THE PARENTS UNDERGO IN THE BIRTH OF CHILDREN,—FOR THAT THERE CAN BE NO COMPENSATION EVEN IN A HUNDRED YEARS.—(227)

Bhāṣya.

This is another commendatory statement describing a past event.

'*Trouble*'—pain;—'*Parents*'-'father and mother';—'*of children*'—of their offsprings. '*At the birth*'—from conception up to the tenth year of their age. The 'trouble' of the mother consists in the bearing of the child in the womb; then again, parturition endangers the very life of women. After the birth of the child, there follows the trouble of rearing him; all this is known by all persons in their own experience. For the father also there is 'trouble' beginning with *Upanayana* and ending in the explanation of the meaning of Vedic texts.

The term '*birth*' here cannot mean *conception*; as this act entails no trouble at all; what are meant are all the acts that follow the act of *conceiving*, all which are troublesome.

'*For that*'—trouble—'*there can be no compensation*'—payment of the debt; the repayment of the benefits conferred; this cannot be done '*even in a hundred years*'—*i.e.*, even during several lives; what to say of a single life! There may be some compensation for parents if one presents them with innumerable wealth or saves them from a very great calamity.—(227)

VERSE CCXXVIII

HE SHOULD ALWAYS DO WHAT IS PLEASING TO THOSE TWO AND TO THE PRECEPTOR ; ON THESE THREE BEING SATISFIED, ALL AUSTERITY BECOMES COMPLETED.—(228)

Bhāṣya.

For reasons stated above,—'*of these two*'—of the father and the mother,—'*and of the preceptor*,'—'*always*'—as long as one lives,—'*he should do what is pleasing to them*' ; and one should not be satisfied with acting agreeably to them once, twice or thrice only.

'*On these three*'—preceptor and the rest—'*being satisfied*'—*i.e.*, when they have been propitiated by devoted service,—'*all austerity*' ; *i.e.*, the rewards that are obtained by the performance of the '*Chāndrāyaṇa*' and other penances for several years are obtained from the satisfaction of these three.—(228)

VERSE CCXXIX

THE SERVICE OF THESE THREE IS DECLARED TO BE THE HIGHEST AUSTERITY ; UNTIL PERMITTED BY THEM, ONE SHOULD NOT PERFORM ANY OTHER MERITORIOUS ACT.—(229)

Bhāṣya.

Question.—"How can the reward of austerities be obtained by means of serving the mother, etc., which is not austerity at all ?"

Answer.—Because attending upon the feet of those persons is the best form of austerity.

'*Until he is permitted by them*,'—the pupil—'*should not perform any other meritorious act*, that may stand in the way of his serving of the three persons ; *e.g.*, bathing at sacred places, keeping of vows and fasts, which, by reason of their leading to the boy's body being emaciated, causes anxiety in their minds. Even for the performing of the Jyotiṣṭoma and other sacrifices, it is necessary to obtain their permission ;

because the disregarding of these persons has been interdicted; and if the boy were not to consult them regarding the performance of acts involving much effort and expenditure of wealth, they would feel bewildered and would feel as if they were disregarded. There is no use in taking permission for the performing of such acts as are compulsory.—(229)

VERSE CCXXX

THESE HAVE BEEN DECLARED TO BE THE THREE REGIONS, THESE THE THREE LIFE-STAGES, THESE THE THREE VEDAS AND THESE THE THREE FIRES.—(230)

Bhāṣya.

What is stated here is on the understanding that there is no difference between the cause and its effects.

'*These have been declared to be the three regions,*'—because they are the means by which one is enabled to reach the three regions.

'*These the three life-stages*'— *i.e.*, with the exception of the *first*, that of the Religious Student. The meaning is that the reward obtained by means of the three life-stages beginning with that of the Householder is obtained if these three persons are satisfied.

'*These the three Vedas*';—because service of them brings the same reward that is obtained by reciting the three Vedas.

'*These the three Fires*';—because the serving these brings the rewards that are obtained by the performance of acts done with the help of the three sacrificial fires.

This also is purely eulogistic.—(230)

VERSE CCXXXI

THE FATHER HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE THE GĀRHAPATYA FIRE, THE MOTHER THE DAKṢIṆA FIRE, AND THE PRECEPTOR THE ĀHAVANĪYA FIRE; AND THIS TRIAD OF FIRES IS HIGHLY IMPORTANT.—(231)

Bhāṣya.

The father, etc., have been called 'gārhapatya' and the rest by reason of some sort of resemblance.

'*This Triad of Fires*'—*i.e.*, the three sacrificial Fires—'*is highly important*,'—*i.e.*, conducive to great results.

The word '*trēta*' (*Triad*) is etymologically analysed as '*trāṇam itā*' which means 'got up for the purposes of protection.'—(231)

VERSE CCXXXII

THE HOUSEHOLDER WHO FAILS NOT TOWARDS THESE THREE WOULD WIN THE THREE REGIONS, AND REJOICE IN HEAVEN, RADIANT IN BODY, LIKE A GOD.—(232)

Bhāṣya.

'*Who fails not*'—who does not omit the service; *i.e.*, by serving these '*he wins*,'—makes his own, obtains mastery over —'*the three regions*.'

'*The householder*.'—It is when the son has reached the householder's stage that his service becomes of great value to his parents and others; as by that time they become old.

'*Radiant*.'— Shining, resplendent with his own effulgence.

'*Like a God*,'—*i.e.*, like the Sun.

'*Rejoices in heaven*'—in the heavenly regions.—(232)

VERSE CCXXXIII

HE ACQUIRES THIS REGION BY DEVOTION TO HIS MOTHER, THE MIDDLE REGION BY DEVOTION TO HIS FATHER, AND THE REGION OF BRAHMAN BY SERVING HIS PRECEPTOR.—(233)

Bhāṣya.

'*This region*;'—*i.e.*, the Earth; the Mother being equal to the Earth, on account of both of them being capable of bearing burdens.

'*By devotion to his Father, the middle region*;'—*i.e.*, the sky. The Father has been described as Prajāpati; and accoding to the followers of the Nirukta, Prajāpati has his abode in the middle Region; and he is the sustainer or protector of men.

'*The Region of Brahman*'—*i.e.*, the solar region; according to the declaration (in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*) that 'the Sun is Brahman, such is the teaching.'

'*Region*'—means a particular place.

'*Acquires*'—gains.

All this is a purely commendatory statement; and much attention need not be paid to it. Nor is it that only persons desirous of sovereignty over the said regions are to do honour to the Father, etc.; for the injunction is not an optional one. In fact, the mere fact of the person being one's father is the sole condition of his being honoured; and the omission of it involves a transgression of the scriptures.—(233)

VERSE CCXXXIV

ALL THE DUTIES HAVE BEEN HONOURED BY HIM WHO HAS HONOURED THESE THREE; AND ALL ACTS REMAIN FRUITLESS FOR HIM WHO DOES NOT HONOUR THEM.—(234).

Bhāṣya.

'*Honoured*'—respected. The mention of 'honouring' indicates that the person honoured is intent upon repaying the benefits he has received. As a matter of fact, the person who is honoured becomes pleased and tries to repay it. Or, '*honoured*' may be taken as standing for 'pleased.' And as Duties are endless, the entire satisfaction of these would not be possible; so that what is indicated is 'anxiety to bring about the desired result'; hence what is meant is that 'all acts done by him bear fruit quickly.'

'*By him who has honoured these three*'—who has satisfied them by his service.

If these persons are not honoured, then whatever meritorious act the man does with a view to reward remains fruitless.

'*All acts*',—*i.e.*, rites performed according to *Shrauta and Smārta* rules.

This verse is purely commendatory. The fact of the matter is that the injunction of honouring the three persons aims at the accomplishment of something desirable for man; so that by transgressing it the man would incur a great sin, which would obstruct the fulfilment of any reward that he might have won by his acts. It is with a view to this that it is said that '*all his acts remain fruitless.*'—(234)

VERSE CCXXXV

SO LONG AS THESE THREE LIVE, HE SHOULD NOT DO ANYTHING ELSE; HE SHOULD ALWAYS RENDER SERVICE UNTO THEM, REJOICING IN WHAT IS PLEASING AND BENEFICIAL TO THEM. —(235)

Bhāṣya.

What is meant by this verse has already been explained.

'*He should not do anything else.*'—Any other act leading to visible or invisible results,—without their permission, as has already been stated above (under 229).

'*He should always render service unto them, rejoicing in what is pleasing and beneficial to them.*—What causes them pleasure is 'pleasing,' and what sustains them is 'beneficial.' —(235)

VERSE CCXXXVI

HE SHOULD COMMUNICATE TO THEM BY THOUGHT, WORD OR DEED WHATEVER HE MAY DO WITHOUT INJURY TO THEM, FOR THE SAKE OF THE NEXT LIFE.—(236)

Bhāṣya.

'*Pāratryam*'—'*that which is done for the sake of another life*'—is that act whose reward is obtained during the next birth. The form of this word is Vedic.

Whatever religious act he should do, apart from the serving of them, without causing them trouble,—of all that he should inform them; he should make it known to them.

The qualification '*without injury to them*' has been added with a view to convey the following idea:—One should not press them to permit the performance of an act that may be injurious to them. It sometimes happens that a simple-minded person, when pressed, permits the doing of an act, not minding the harm that it may do him, and the present verse is meant to prohibit this.

'*By thought, word or deed.*'—This communication is not for the purpose of accomplishing some unseen result. The meaning is that he should show by his actual deed that he has acted in strict accordance with the permission accorded to him.

Or, the verse may be construed as—'whatever act for the sake of the next life he does, by thought word or deed, that he should make known to them.'—(236)

VERSE CCXXXVII

ALL THAT OUGHT TO BE DONE BY MAN IS FINISHED ON THESE THREE ; THIS IS THE HIGHEST DIRECT DUTY ; EVERY OTHER IS A SUBORDINATE DUTY.—(237)

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*iti*' ('*all*') denotes the end, and signifies entirety.

Whatever there is that ought to be done by man, whatever there is that is conducive to the fulfilment of man's purpose, —all that is '*finished*'—becomes entirely accomplished—'*on these three*' being duly propitiated.

'*This is the highest duty*,'—because '*direct.*'

'*Every other*,' duty in the form of *Agnihotra* and the rest—is '*subordinate.*' That is, they are like the door-keeper (leading up to the king), and not directly like the king himself. This is a praise (of the act of serving the father, etc.).

The prohibition of disregarding them,—the injunction of doing what is pleasing and beneficial to them,—of not doing what may be injurious to them,—and the non-doing of acts not injurious to them, without their permission ;—apart from these, all the other verses are merely commendatory.—(237)

XXXI. Acquiring of Learning from the Lowest

VERSE CCXXXVIII

ONE IMBUED WITH FAITH MAY ACQUIRE EXCELLENT LEARNING EVEN FROM A LOWLY PERSON, SPECIAL LAW EVEN FROM THE LOWEST, AND THE GEM OF A WIFE EVEN FROM A BASE FAMILY.—(238)

Bhāṣya.

'*Imbued with faith*'—the pupil who is devoted, having his innermost soul imbued with trust in the scriptures.

'*Excellent learning,*'—*i.e.*, the science of reasoning as propounded in the Nyāya-shāstra, etc. ; or, it may mean 'that which duly shines,' *i.e.*, good poetry and poetics as propounded by Bharata and other writers ; or, it may mean the 'science of incantations,' which is of no use regarding *Dharma.*

Such learning one might '*acquire*'—learn—'*even from the lowly person,*'—*i.e.*, from a person born of a lower caste. '*excellent learning*' here should not be taken as the 'Vedic Science'; for even though in abnormal times of distress the learning of the Veda from lower castes may be permitted—as we shall find later on (Verse 241), yet it cannot be permitted in normal times. That learning which is '*not excellent,*'—such as the science of magic, etc.—one should not learn at all.

'*Lowest*' is the Chāṇḍāla ; from him even, one may learn the '*special law,*'—*i.e.*, law other than that expounded in *Shrutis* and *Smṛtis* ; *i.e.*, law relating to ordinary worldly matters. The term '*dharma,*' '*law,*' is also used in the sense of *rule.* The sense thus is that—if even a Chāṇḍāla should say—'such is the rule here,'—'do not stay here for long,'—'do not bathe in this water,'—'such is the custom among the people of the village,'—'such is the restriction imposed by the king,'—then one should not think that he should obey only the words of his Preceptor and he need not pay any heed to those of a *Chāṇḍāla* who has dared to advise him.

We should not take the term 'special law' to mean 'the knowledge of truth regarding Brahman'; because it is not possible to acquire this knowledge from the Chāṇḍāla and such people, for the simple reason that they are ignorant of the Veda; and from no other source such knowledge can be derived; specially as the teaching of Brahman is not like the teaching of incantations for the cure of scorpion-bite, etc.

'*Gem of a wife*,'—the wife who is like a gem; the compound being based upon similitude, according to Pāṇini 2.1.56; or, it may be explained according to Pāṇini 2.1.57 (the meaning being the 'gem-like wife'). If the term 'gem' be taken in the sense *of any good thing*, then the compound is according to 2.1.57; if, on the other hand, the term '*gem*' be taken as standing only for the emerald, the ruby and other precious stones,—and it is applied to other things only on account of their *excellence*, in which they resemble precious stones,—then the compound would fall under 2. 1. 56. The meaning is that if a girl happens to be possessed of a well-formed figure and a charming complexion, and she happens to bear auspicious signs indicative of the possession of much wealth in cash and kind, and the possibility of bearing many children and so forth, —then she should be married, even though she belong to a '*base family*,'—a family wanting in the due performance of religious acts, etc.

This forms an introduction to what is going to be enjoined under 241 *et seq.* (in connection with abnormal times); and what is here permitted is only when other sources are not available.—(238)

VERSE CCXXXIX

NECTAR MAY BE TAKEN EVEN FROM POISON, GOOD ADVICE EVEN FROM A CHILD; GOOD CONDUCT (MAY BE LEARNT) EVEN FROM A FOE; AND GOLD (MAY BE TAKEN) EVEN FROM AN IMPURE SOURCE.—(239)

Bhaṣya.

The preceding verse as well as these two verses (239 and 240) are supplementary to the injunction contained in verse 241.

The present verse cites an ordinary saying in support of the injunction. Ordinary people say that 'good may be taken even out of evil.' If there is nectar in poison, that should be taken in the same manner as the swan takes the milk out of water. This is said in reference to certain medicinal preparations which contain poisonous ingredients.

Even if a child should happen to say something good,—if he pronounces, for instance, some auspicious words at the time of one's starting for a journey,—it should be accepted.

'*Even from a foe*'—one should learn—'*good conduct*,'—*i.e.*, of cultured behaviour; and it would not be right to shun such behaviour simply because it happens to be followed by one's enemy.

The next instance is still more well known—'*gold may be taken even from an impure source.*'

The sense of all this is that just as the good things herein enumerated are accepted even from evil sources, so may learning be acquired even from a non-Brāhmaṇa.—(239)

VERSE CCXL

WIVES, GEMS, LEARNING, VIRTUE, PURITY, WISE SAYING AND THE VARIOUS ARTS MAY BE OBTAINED FROM ALL SOURCES. —(240)

Bhaṣya.

'*Gems*'—precious stones, even though obtained from such low-born people as the Shabara, the Pulinda and so forth, are regarded as clean; similarly should learning be regarded.

'*Arts*'—*e.g.*, Painting, etc., and those that have been regarded as mean, such as clothes-washing, the colouring and tying of cloth and so forth.

'*From all sources*'—*i.e.*, irrespective of considerations of caste.

'*May be obtained*,'—accepted ; by persons whose patience is truly assured. Begininng with Verse 239, all that is said is syntactically connected, and forming part of the same context, the whole is to be regarded as a commendatory statement.—(240)

VERSE CCXLI

IN ABNORMAL TIMES OF DIFFICULTY LEARNING FROM A NON-BRĀHMAṆA HAS BEEN ENJOINED, AS ALSO THE SERVING OF SUCH A TEACHER, IN THE SHAPE OF FOLLOWING HIM, DURING THE COURSE OF STUDY.—(241)

Bhaṣya.

This verse contains the injunction.

The '*difficulty*' here meant is *the absence of a Brāhmaṇa-teacher*. The compound '*āpatkālaḥ*' is to be expounded as '*āpadaḥ kalaḥ*,' '*time of difficulty*.' What is meant to be expressed being obtained from the term '*difficulty*' alone, the additional term '*time*' only serves to fill up the metre.

'*Āpatkalpē*' is another reading. The meaning in this case would be that the '*kalpa*,' '*kalpana*,' *assumption*, of these is permitted during difficulties.

If the preceptor after having begun the course of teaching, should happen, either on account of an expiatory rite or of some other reason, to abandon the pupil and go to another place,—and no other Brāhmaṇa-teacher is available,—and the pupil himself being too young, is unable to go to another place,—then he may receive teaching even from a non-Brāhmaṇa ; *i.e.*, from the *Kṣattriya*, and in his absence, from the Vaishya. In view of the context, which began with the mention of the 'learning of the entire Veda' (165), the '*learning*' here enjoined is the *getting up of the Veda*.

Though the term '*non-Brāhmaṇa*' denoting all the three castes, except the Brāhmaṇa, stands for *all men*, yet the *Shūdra* could not be meant here ; for the *Shūdra* is not entitled to learn the Veda ; and it is only when one has *learnt* something that he can *teach* it.

"But by transgressing the scriptural ordinance, the Shūdra also might learn the Veda, just as the Kṣattriya and the Vaishya do the work of teaching (which is not permitted)."

This also cannot be ; because it has been laid down that if the *Shūdra* happens to learn the Veda, his body should be cut up. And since the penalty is so severe, it follows that the act is a grievous sin ; and one who commits a grevious sin is regarded as 'fallen'; so that if the Religious Student associated with a 'fallen' person, he would render himself extremely defiled.

"But the act of teaching has been prohibited for the Kṣattriya and the Vaishya also ; so that the same guilt would be incurred in their case."

There is a difference between the two cases. That act is to be regarded as extremely heinous in connection with which the scriptures prescribe heavy penalties and expiation ; while that in connection with which the penalty and expiation prescribed are slight, should be regarded as slight. In connection with the work of teaching done by the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya*, the penalty and expiation laid down are not heavy, as they are in the case of the *Shūdra*. Further, in the case of the *Shūdra*, there would be two prohibited acts—that of *learning* the Veda, and that of *teaching* it ; while in the case of the *Kṣattriya*, there is only one,—that of *teaching*. Then, as regards the pupil associating with one who does the work of teaching in contravention of the law,—such associating has been permitted by the present verse itself ; hence it cannot be regarded as leading to defilement ; for associating with the Shūdra, who learns the Veda in contravention to law, on the other hand, there is no authority at all.

'*Anuvrajyā cha shushrūṣā*,' '*service in the shape of following*';—this is meant to prohibit such service as *saluting*, *washing the feet*, and so forth.

'*During the course of study*';—*i.e.*, during the time required for the getting up of the text.—(241)

VERSE CCXLII

A PUPIL, DESIRING AN UNSURPASSABLE STATE, SHALL NOT BE IN LIFE-LONG RESIDENCE WITH A NON-BRAHMAṆA TEACHER; OR WITH A BRĀHMAṆA-TEACHER WHO IS NOT AN EXPOUNDER.—(242)

Bhāṣya.

The foregoing verse might create the impression that the Life-long Student may live in residence with his non-Brāhmaṇa teacher, for the purposes of study; and it is this that is particularly interdicted here.

'*Ātyantikam vāsam*'—means *life-long residence.*

'*Should not live*'—should not do. The phrase '*vāsam vasēt,*' '*live in residence,*' may be construed by regarding one ('*vāsa,*' 'residence') as the particular and the other ('*vasēt,*' '*live*') as the general (form of the same act of *living*). The meaning being 'he should not *live* that particular kind of *living* which is done in the teacher's house,'—'he should go elsewhere after having finished his studies.'

"All that the preceding verse has permitted is *learning* from a non-Brāhmaṇa; how could there be any possibility of *life-long residence?*"

There is no force in this objection. It has been said above that one should *reside* with his preceptor; and the teacher has been called the 'preceptor,' hence the said possibility arises.

'*Or, with the Brahmaṇa who is not an expounder.*'—'*Or*' here stands for 'also.'

The Brāhmaṇa also, if he happen to be a *non-expounder,*—*i.e.*, if he is not equipped with good character and nobility, nor capable of studying and teaching,—all these qualifications should be taken as indicated by 'expounding'; for if 'expounding' itself were meant, then the *non-residence with a teacher who does no expounding* would be only natural, [and would not need to be strictly emphasised, as it is here].

'*State*' here stands for the attainment of bliss ;—'*Unsurpassable*'—to which nothing else is superior ;—'*desiring*'—such state,—*i.e.*, Deliverance in the form of Highest Bliss —(242)

VERSE CCXLIII

IF ONE LIKES TO LIVE IN LIFE-LONG RESIDENCE IN THE TEACHER'S HOUSE, HE SHOULD, INTENTLY SERVE HIM TILL HE BECOMES FREED FROM HIS BODY.—(243)

Bhāṣya.

If he likes to live in absolute—*i.e.*, life-long, permanent,—residence in the Teacher's house,—then, in that case,—'*he should intently*'—diligently—'*serve him*'—the Teacher; '*till he becomes freed from his body*,—*i.e.*, as long as his body lasts. —(243)

VERSE CCXLIV

THE BRĀHMAṆA WHO, TILL THE DISSOLUTION OF HIS BODY, SERVES HIS TEACHER, GOES FORTHWITH TO THE ETERNAL ABODE OF BRAHMAN.—(244)

Bhāṣya.

This verse lays down the reward of Life-long Studentship.

'*Dissolution of the body*'—renouncing of life ;—'*till*'—up to that time ;—'*who serves*'—attends upon—'*his Teacher*' ; —such a Brāhmaṇa—'*goes*' to the '*abode*'—place, mansion—'*of Brahman*'—'*eternal*';—*i.e.*, he does not return again to the cycle of births.

'*Forthwith*,'—*i.e.*, by an easy path ; not by the roundabout way of passing through the lives of animals and men.

The word '*Brahman*' here stands, according to the view of the Purāṇas, for the particular God with four faces ; and his '*abode*' is a particular place in Heaven ; while according to the Vedānta standpoint, '*Brahman*' is the supreme Self, and his '*abode*' is that Self itself, *i.e.*, becoming absorbed hereinto.—(244)

VERSE CCXLV

AT FIRST THE PUPIL, KNOWING HIS DUTIES, SHOULD NOT GIVE ANYTHING TO HIS TEACHER; BUT WHEN GOING TO TAKE THE FINAL BATH, HE SHOULD, ON BEING ORDERED BY THE TEACHER, PRESENT SOMETHING FOR HIM, TO THE BEST OF HIS CAPACITY;—(245)

Bhāṣya.

This verse should be taken as prohibiting the making of presents to the Teacher by the Life-long Student; since it lays down the gift to the Teacher as to be presented only by the pupil who is going to take the Final Bath, which the Life-long Student never takes; and it is the Life-long Student that forms the subject of the context. As for the *Upakurvāṇa* (the other kind of student, who is only in temporary residence), he does go on making presents to the Teacher, on every possible occasion, since the very day of the Initiatory Rite.

'*At first*';—*i.e.*, before the final Bath.

'*Should not give anything to his Teacher*';—the verb '*upakurvīta*' stands here for *giving*, such being the force of the prefix; so that the Dative in *guravē* is due to this verb itself. Or, the Teacher may be regarded as the person aimed at by the *act* (denoted by *upakurvīta*); and in this case the Dative would be in accordance with the *Vārtika* on Pāṇini 2.3.13.

'*But when going to take the Final Bath*';—*i.e.*, when the time for the Final Bath has arrived;—'*being ordered by the teacher*,'—in such words as 'bring me such and such a thing,' —he should '*to the best of his capacity*'—as much as he may be able to bring,—'*present something*,' useful, '*to the teacher*.'

"But this verse contains (as you have asserted at the outset) the prohibition of the Life-long Student presenting anything to the Teacher [and how do you reconcile this with the latter half, which prescribes such *giving*?]."

True; but the verse does not contain two independent sentences,—one (the first half of the verse) prohibiting the gift, and the other (the second half) permitting it. The fact is that there is a clear injunction that at the Final Bath a gift should be made to the Teacher; and it is to this injunction that the preceding prohibition is subservient; for, if the present prohibition related to all kinds of benefit to the Teacher, the entire body of injunctions laying down the service of the Teacher would become nullified; further, '*gift*' is not the only *benefit* that can be conferred; so that there is no justification for restricting the prohibition of 'benefit' to the *gift of money* only, and not to the 'doing of what is agreeable and beneficial to him.' There is nothing incongruous in taking the passage in a sense which is not the literal meaning,—when the passage is a purely commendatory one; and it is quite clear that the two halves of the verse form one syntactical whole [hence the former is taken as subservient and supplementary to the latter].—(245)

VERSE CCXLVI

JOYFULLY BRINGING TO THE TEACHER, A FIELD, OR GOLD, OR A COW, OR A HORSE, OR AT LEAST AN UMBRELLA AND A PAIR OF SHOES, GRAIN, VEGETABLES OR CLOTHES.—(246)

Bhāṣya.

It has been said that he should present something to the Teacher; and the present verse shows that any and everything should not be presented; the sense being that if the Teacher orders—'bring me the wife of such and such a person,' or 'let me have all that you possess,'—then the pupil shall not do what he says; what he should give are as follows,—'*Field*'—agricultural land;—'*Gold.*'

'*Or*'—signifies option; the sense being that all the things mentioned shall not be given.

'*Or at least,*'—*i.e.*, in the absence of the other things.

'*An umbrella and a pair of shoes*';—these two being mentioned in a copulative compound, it follows that both together have to be given.

'*Clothes*;'—no significance is meant to be attached to the nouns in this passage.

'*Bringing joyfully*';—this has to be construed with '*should present*,' (of the preceding verse). If, however, we read this as '*prītimāharēt*,' 'should bring pleasure to his Teacher,'—then this sentence becomes self-contained. '*Prītimāvahēt*' is another reading; the sense being that 'he should present the grain, etc., for bringing pleasure to the Teacher': or the *pleasure* may by itself be regarded as the object to be brought to the Teacher: and in that case the mention of the things becomes purely suggestive; the sense being that other things likely to give him pleasure,—such as gems, pearls, corals, elephants, mules, chariots, etc.,—may also be given. To this effect we have the saying of Gautama (2.48)—'On the completion of study the Teacher should be presented with something useful.'

Only such things have to be presented as the pupil happens to possess, he should not go about obtaining things by begging and other means, for presenting.—(246)

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VERSE CCXLVII

The Preceptor having died, he should serve, in the same manner as the Preceptor, the qualified son of the Preceptor, or the Preceptor's wife, or his Sapiṇḍa.—(247)

Bhāṣya.

This injunction is meant for the Life-long Student.

In the absence of the Preceptor, he should continue to live in residence, either with the Preceptor's son, who is endowed with Vedic learning and other qualities, or with the Preceptor's widow, or with the Preceptor's '*Sapiṇḍa*'; and towards each of these he should behave as towards his Preceptor; *i.e.*, he should present to him the food he obtains as alms, and so forth.

The term '*dārā*,' denoting *wife*, has been regarded by grammarians as always used with the plural ending; but writers on Smṛti use the singular form also; *e.g.*, '*Dharmaprajāsampannē dārē nānyām kurvīta*' (Āpastamba, 2.11.13).—(247)

VERSE CCXLVIII

WHEN ALL THESE ARE NON-EXISTENT, HE SHOULD PERFECT HIS BODY, WHILE HE CARRIES ON THE TENDING OF THE FIRE, WITH ONLY SUCH DIVERSIONS AS STANDING AND SITTING.—(248)

Bhāṣya.

'*Non-existence*' may mean either *death*, or absence of proper qualification.

'*When all these are non-existent,' he should carry on the tending of the fire,*—*i.e.*, he should continue to wash and besmear with clay the fire-house, he should kindle the fire, he should constantly keep near the Fire, just as his Preceptor used to do;—all this constitutes the 'tending of the fire.' While doing all this, '*he should perfect his body*'—*i.e.*, let it wear away; this is called '*perfecting*' in the same manner (of contrary signification) as the blind man is described as 'having excellent eyes.'

'*Sthānāsanavihāravān*'—'*with only such diversion as standing and sitting*'; *i.e.*, he should amuse himself only by standing for sometime and sitting for sometime.

Others have explained this to mean that he 'should sit in the proper posture for meditation'—such as the *Svastikā* and the rest—'and should go about begging alms.'—(248)

VERSE CCXLIX

THE BRĀHMAṆA WHO THUS KEEPS HIS STUDENTSHIP UNFLINCHINGLY, GOES TO THE HIGHEST PLACE AND IS NEVER BORN AGAIN INTO THIS WORLD.—(249)

Thus ends Discourse II of the Manusmṛti.

Bhāṣṣya.

'*Thus*' refers to the methods of the Lifelong Student.

'*He who thus keeps his Studentship unflinchingly*'—without failing,—'*goes to*'—obtains—'*the highest place*'—above; *i.e.*, he attains the Supreme Self.

'*Is not born again into this world*';—he does not fall into the cycle of births. That is, he becomes absorbed into Brahman.—(249)

['The Smṛti of Manu is highly honoured; and the right commentary upon it is that of Medhātithi's. In the course of destiny, this commentary became lost and manuscripts of it were not available anywhere. The King Madana, the son of Sahāraṇa, got together manuscripts of it, getting them copied here and there, from several places, and thus restored its long-lost text.']

Thus ends Discourse II of Medhātithi's Manubhāṣya.

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